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Abstract
In today’s globalized world, the power of influence of multinational corporations over the state
and society is significant. One particular area is related to how MNCs have influenced states and
public educational institutions in order to shape their educational agendas and training initiatives.
Many scholars have conceptualized such an influence as processes of corporate capture. In this
dissertation, I examine and compare the existing processes of corporate capture related to Boeing
and Embraer in the regional training systems of Charleston, South Carolina, U.S.A., and São
José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil. I also investigate how their distinctive state forms and their
forms of governance account for differences in the evolution of such processes. This research,
drawing from Neo-Marxist theories of the state and labor geography, critically engages with FDI
studies and the GPN literature. Methodologically, this dissertation is based on qualitative crossnational comparative methods. Fieldwork was undertaken between 2014 and 2017, when fiftynine semi-structured interviews were conducted with state managers, representatives from
educational institutions, not-for-profit organizations, and firms, among others. In this research I
develop two major arguments. First, I argue that the evolution of processes of corporate capture
in the regional training systems of São José dos Campos and Charleston is intrinsically
connected to their accumulation strategies and state forms. However, such an evolution happens
through different mechanisms and is related to different state scales. Second, I turn my attention
to the local forms of governance of Charleston and São José dos Campos, claiming that they
reinforce processes of corporate capture at the local scale. I argue that their tendency to reinforce
processes of corporate capture in training has to be comprehended alongside with their state form
and type of state selectivity.
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Glossary
Aftercare policies: The term is defined as “…comprising all potential services offered at the
company level by investment promotion organizations, designed to facilitate both the successful
start-up and continuing development of a foreign affiliate with a view toward maximizing its
contribution to local economic development and to ensuring the success and sustainability of the
company’s investment.” (Sachs 2009, 109).
Clientelism: Is a type of public management in Brazil that lacked a distinction between the
private and public sectors, having initiatives and actions based on favor exchanges, individualism
and personal ties. It was centralized in powerful economic actors such as landowners, who were
employed at the state based on cronyism (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006).
Corporate capture: Refers to the exercise of control or influence of MNCs over the interests of
business communities and governments (Phelps 2008).
Externalization/spillovers: There are two main categories of externalities. One category refers to
how industrial agglomeration of firms can facilitate assets sharing such as the provision of
specific services and goods, more skilled workforce, and the implementation of infrastructures
(such as roads, pipes and telecommunication networks). The other category refers to
technological externalities and are related to how agglomeration of firms facilitates the exchange
of information and expertise and thus, innovation (Paci and Usai 1999).
Global Production Networks: The term refers to “…the nexus of interconnected functions and
operations through which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed… Such
networks not only integrate firms (and parts of firms) into structures which blur traditional
organizational boundaries – through the development of diverse forms of equity and non-equity
relationships – but also integrate national economies…” (Henderson et al. 2002, 445).
Governance: The term is broader than government and refers to the informal and formal
networks of relations through which actors, such as firms and representatives of public, private
and not-for-profit institutions coordinate, organize, and foster initiatives (Rhodes 2007).
Governance mainly functions as a mechanism through which fractions of capital, multinational
corporations, and local firms present and foster their interests (Lovering 2011).
Industrial Clusters: Porter defines industrial clusters as “…geographic concentrations of
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries,
and associated institutions (e.g., universities, standards agencies, trade associations) in a
particular field that compete but also cooperate.” (Porter 2000, 1).
Managerialism: It is a form of public management that focus on reducing the “structural
distinctions between the public and private sectors so that the behavior of public managers
resembles that of managers in entrepreneurial, profit-driven, investor-owned firms.” (Lee 2008,
2).
Organic coupling: Organic coupling denotes a process that takes place through a co-evolution of
xi

regional assets and global firms in the same region. For example, the rise of national champions
and new lead firms due to a strategic government industrial policy (MacKinnon 2012).
Strategic coupling: Strategic coupling refers to the “dynamic processes through which actors in
cities and/or regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage strategic interests between local actors
and their counterparts in the global economy” (Yeung 2009, 213).
Structural coupling: Structural coupling concerns how states and their regions attract lead firms
in global production networks based on proactive policies and strategies in which countries
(often developing countries) provide competitive cost structures, fiscal and financial incentives,
stable policy environment, and abundant labor supply (MacKinnon 2012; Yeung 2015).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 2009, South Carolina state officials announced that Boeing had opted to establish a
major site of assembly and delivery for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner in the region of Charleston.
However, such a decision came at a price as South Carolina state officials committed to provide
to Boeing nearly one billion dollars in incentives. The provision of incentives is not only
common in the United States but also in less developed countries such as Brazil, where in some
places the cost of incentives per direct job has reached the value of $340,000 (Oman 1999). Such
a particularity has become more significant in the last four decades. The Fordist crisis in the
early 80s and a consequent advance of neoliberal policies increased the liberalization of
international trade, culminating in greater fluidity of multinational corporations (MNCs) across
nations, who have gained power over national states (Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017).
Nowadays, MNCs have greater ability to shift their operations, to leave their regions and to
move to more profitable places in terms of production, an aspect that raises many concerns
(Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). One major concern regards how such a mobility has affected
regional economies.
Regions are put in a delicate position. They must become enterprisers and find ways not
only to maintain the firms that are embedded in their communities, making such firms more
competitive, but also to attract new ones, given that their development now is dependent on their
capacity to do so (Hudson 2011). Not much different from an auction, firms announce their
interest in certain places, and regions compete with one another through tax credits, land
donations, incentives, loans at low rates, and provision of services such as training, amongst
others (Markusen & Nesse 2007). In such a context, regional economies have been pushed to
find more innovative ways to outbid their competitors, since giving these incentives has become
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the norm (Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). In this regard, some foreign direct investment (FDI)
studies and global production network (GPN) scholars have sought to analyze how states are able
to attract and retain MNCs in their regions, but often through negotiations and initiatives that are
not so beneficial for their regions, given that local states are subjected to the interests of such
corporations (Mackinnon 2012; Rutherford et al. 2018; Markusen & Nesse 2007; Phelps 2000,
2008; Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Almond et al. 2013).
The influence of MNCs over the state has been conceptualized by many scholars as
institutional or corporate capture (see Phelps 2000, 2008; Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps &
Fuller 2001). Corporate capture refers to the exercise of control or influence of MNCs over the
interests of the business community and government (Pavlinek 2016; Phelps 2008; Berrón and
González 2016). Regarding the labor market and training initiatives, scholars
have analyzed corporate capture by exploring how MNCs are able to get cost-free public
customized training packages, to distort local public skills agendas and strategies, to recruit the
most talented labor force from the business community, and to hire workers from outside their
communities (Phelps 2000, 2008). In such studies, the interests of governments are normally
associated with the interests of their local business communities, and are explored in terms of
their governments’ capacity to maximize spillovers in skills and technology transfers, foster
industry cluster formation, and processes of externalization (Rutherford et al. 2018; Markusen &
Nesse 2007; Grabher 1993; Christopherson & Clark 2007; Phelps 2008; Mackinnon 2012).
One particular topic that this research seeks to engage with regards how FDI and GPN
scholars have rationalized whether some states and their regional forms of governance are more
prone to have processes of corporate capture than others (Rutherford et al 2018; Phelps 2008;
Almond et al. 2017; Tregaskis & Almond 2017; Almond et al. 2014; Almond et al. 2013). For
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example, researchers have associated liberal states and their regional forms of governance with a
greater tendency of regions to have processes of corporate capture than regions within
developmental states (Rutherford et al. 2018; Almond et al. 2014; Almond et al. 2013; Phelps
2008, 2000).
It is in this context, and in connection with such a literature that the main goal of this
research was established. More specifically, the main goal of this research is twofold: First, this
dissertation seeks to examine the existing processes of corporate capture related to Boeing South
Carolina and Embraer in the regional training systems of Charleston, South Carolina, in the
United States, and São José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil respectively. Second, this research
seeks to investigate how Charleston’s and São José dos Campos’ (SJC) distinctive state and
governance forms account for differences in the evolution of such processes. In this respect,
three main research questions were established: (1) Do Boeing South Carolina and Embraer
foster processes of corporate capture in the regional training systems of Charleston and Sao Jose
dos Campos? (2) If so, how does the state in each region account for differences in how
corporate capture evolves? (3) Do the local forms of governance of each region reinforce or
minimize such processes of corporate capture?
During Summer 2014, when heading to my preliminary fieldwork in Charleston and SJC I
did not have a clear objective or goal regarding what my studies would consist of, but I did have
an interest in studying the role of their states and local forms of governance in developing skills
for their aerospace industrial clusters. This was specifically the case in relation to Boeing in
Charleston and Embraer in SJC, both large and influential airplane manufacturing corporations.
After collecting and analyzing my preliminary data, one major feature stood out: Embraer and
Boeing South Carolina were intentionally exerting their power of influence over the state and
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public educational institutions in order to get highly customized training services free-of-cost and
free of bureaucracy. Moreover, the public interests of both local states in regard to education and
training initiatives were often intermingled and blurred with the private interests of firms like
Boeing and Embraer. Such features sparked my interest in studies of corporate capture. As
discussed previously in this introduction, such features are not a rare or a new dynamic, but a
global trend; nonetheless, both cases had their particularities with potential to bring some
theoretical and empirical contribution to the field of economic geography.
My interest in doing a comparative study between Charleston/Boeing and SJC/Embraer
was not random. During my master’s degree study from 2011 to 2013 at UNESP in Brazil, I
was part of a research group whose goal was to analyze the local forms of governance of
different industrial clusters in the state of São Paulo. One major site of study was the aerospace
industrial cluster of SJC, where Embraer is located. Embraer is the third largest aerospace
manufacturing corporation in the world, behind only Boeing and Airbus. In SJC, the company
manufactures small- and medium-size commercial airplanes and employs more than 13 thousand
workers. Although I was not responsible for conducting interviews in SJC, this was enough for
me to reflect upon the idea of doing a comparative study with Boeing in the United States. This
idea was later expanded after many conversations with my advisor Dr. Tod Rutherford, who
suggested a comparative study with Boeing South Carolina. Boeing had just established in 2011
a plant in North Charleston, causing a great controversy due to the high incentives provided to
the company. The case called our attention as a potential site for a comparative study. Boeing,
although currently facing a critical moment in its sales due to the two 737 MAX fatal crashes in
the last two years, is still the largest aerospace manufacturing company in the world (Cameron &
Wall 2019). Boeing designs and manufactures not only commercial airplanes but also attack
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aircrafts, missiles, satellites, and telecommunications equipment, among others (Boeing.com). In
South Carolina, Boeing has one of its major sites of assembly and delivery for the Boeing 787
Dreamliner. The company employs more than six thousand workers in the region (Boeing.com).
The aerospace industrial clusters in Charleston and SJC were also selected for a
comparative study due to specific similarities besides the fact that both regions are marked by
processes of corporate capture in their regional training systems. At the national scale, both
countries are politically decentralized, having subnational states and local states with certain
degree of autonomy from their federal government. In both countries, therefore, subnational and
local states have the ability to foster initiatives and design regional development policies.
Furthermore, the Brazilian political decentralization—fostered with the 1988 Federal
Constitution—was inspired by the US model (Dos Santos & Gomes 2015). At the local level,
both places have influential—politically and economically—aerospace multinational
corporations and several clustered suppliers, facing skills shortages. Additionally, both regions
have developed workforce initiatives through state intervention and direct/indirect public-private
partnerships with aerospace firms, not-for-profit institutions, and educational institutions.
Similarly, both clusters have institutionalized forms of local governance, facilitating interactions
among the main players regarding skill and training problems and possible solutions.
Despite the similarities, there are some significant differences we must acknowledge. The
aerospace industrial cluster in SJC started to emerge in the 1960s, being a more mature cluster
than the cluster in Charleston. This also means that SJC has today a more significant skilled
aerospace workforce presence and training institutions than Charleston. Such differences suggest
that the challenges regarding workforce development and skills and their centrality in their local
forms of governance and state actions may vary. This is the case of Charleston, where skill
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deficiencies are much more drastic than in SJC, and thus, occupy a more relevant position in its
agenda.
Regarding my theoretical framework, this research takes a political economy approach to
understand the state, MNCs, labor and local forms of governance, and processes of corporate
capture in regional training systems. FDI studies and the GPN literature have explained corporate
capture in regional training systems based on how national states have low levels of institutional
coordination or based on how states and their regions lack assets that meet the strategic interests
of MNCs. Such explanations of processes of corporate capture are based on problematically
descriptive accounts, overlooking the underlying causes of such processes, and making broad
claims based on national types of state. Therefore, I sought to develop a more refined theoretical
framework that is capable to account for the political, economic and cultural mechanisms
through which MNCs interact with the state and advance their interests over public educational
policies and initiatives. The major influences over the development of this framework can be
divided in two main groups.
The first group is related to theories of the state and capitalism, and more specifically to
neo-Marxist theories such as the variegated capitalism literature, Jessop’s strategic-relational
approach, and the structural dependence of the state on capital. I have engaged with such
theorists and literature in order to understand how the state—in its varying scales—capitalism,
and MNCs function and relate. My goal was to contribute to the FDI and GPN literatures by
establishing a more refined explanation of how corporate capture in regional training systems
evolves in relation to different forms of state. In this regard, I sought to demonstrate how the
evolution of processes of corporate capture in Charleston and SJC is intrinsically related to how
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their state accumulation strategies privilege and provide advantages to MNCs strategically
advance their interests.
The second group is linked to neo-Marxist studies related to labor and labor market
governance, local inward investments, and critical pedagogy. By engaging with such studies, I
sought to critique the GPN literature and to frame my understanding of labor and governance,
and especially of how labor market governance operates and shapes workforce development
systems in the context of GPNs and industrial clusters. Mainstream GPN scholars
problematically approach governance as collective modes of coordination and as autonomous
arrangements from the state. The formation and functioning of workforce development systems
are also problematically theorized based on market relations according to the demand and supply
of skills. Therefore, I sought to contribute to the GPN literature by revealing not only how local
forms of labor market governance (and their tendency to reinforce processes of corporate
capture) have to be understood according to their state form and type of state selectivity, but also
by disclosing how workforce development systems operate and are shaped by different actors
and unequal power relations, scales, and often revolve around class issues. Such a theoretical
framework also led me to theoretically contribute to FDI and GPN studies, given that it led me to
expand the understanding of corporate capture in regional training issues. As revealed, the
concept of corporate capture is too narrow, and neglects important characteristics around class
relations, scale, and issues of transparency/illegality.
Therefore, by revealing the underlying causes of why state and MNCs relations often result
in processes of corporate capture in regional training systems, my research directly addressed
some of the GPN literature deficiencies, having the potential to advance and contribute to studies
regarding the “dark side” of firm relations, i.e., in regard to how firms’ relations with other firms
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as well as with the state, workers, and institutions, among others can result in negative outcomes
not only for regions, but also for workers (see Mackinnon 2012; Coe & Hess 2011). As
Rutherford et al (2018) and Werner (2018) stated, GPN research still tends to overlook the
tensions that emerge from the differential powers of key actors, for example, in respect to the
uneven power relations between MNCs and subnational states.
Empirically, this research not only brings a rich empirical cross-national comparative
analysis of state and MNCs relations around processes of corporate capture in two different
countries, but also important insights that can be used by state managers, unions and community
representatives, and other organizations to resist corporate influence and to foster better
outcomes for workers in regard to policies of attraction and retention of MNCs. While states
provide all types of incentives to attract corporations to their regions such as land donation, infrastructure,
customized training and tax breaks, corporations rarely have to meet clear requirements (established by
the state) regarding the jobs they will create, or regarding processes of externalization. In this regard, one
major empirical contribution of my research was the elaboration of pro-worker requisites related to public
workforce development initiatives (like cost-free customized training), which can be used as guidelines
when regions are bargaining with MNCs, or when establishing training partnerships with businesses.

This research is based on a qualitative cross-national comparative methodology, which
contrasts the similarities and differences in the object of study in more than one country in order
to examine social reality (Kohn 1987). According to several scholars, qualitative methods are
used to answer questions based on the values and perspectives, experience and meaning of
participants. By deploying such a methodology, researchers are able to access information that is
not generally amenable to measurement (Kitay & Callus 1998; Hammarberg et al. 2016). As
Rosenthal (2016, 510) stated, in general, qualitative methods are employed when researchers are
“interested in understanding the “why” behind people’s behaviors or actions.”.
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In regard to the present research, a qualitative approach was selected, given that this
dissertation approached, and had to collect as well as to interpret information that are often
informal, abstract, complex, variable, involving matters related to power relations, actors’
interactions, negotiations, experiences, values and perceptions, among others. Such an
information can be hardly quantified, and as Rosenthal (2016) affirmed, qualitative methods
enable researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the “underlying reasons, attitudes, and
motivations behind various human behaviors.” (p 510). Therefore, this research opted for a
qualitative comparative method due to its valuable and well-established research method for
industrial studies in topics such as workforce development and governance (Kitay & Callus
1998).
This research draws from fifty-nine semi-structured interviews. More specifically, I
interviewed twenty-five representatives from educational institutions (twelve in Brazil and
thirteen in the United States), six representatives from firms (three firms from each region),
fourteen representatives from non-public institutions such as chambers of commerce, unions,
agencies of development and research institutes, among others (seven in each region), and
fourteen state managers (eight in Brazil and six in the United States). Participants were chosen
on purpose based on their role and involvement in the phenomenon under study.
Semi-structured questionnaires were developed according to the following participants:
state managers, public educational institutions, firms, and not-for-profit institutions. The
questionnaires had a mix of semi-structured questions, which were designed according to each
group of participants. In general, the questions were designed to approach issues such as the
creation and expansion of workforce development initiatives and programs in the aerospace
sector; the existence and development of educational strategies and goals; local governance
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relation with workforce development strategies and initiatives; existence, development and
functioning of public-private customized training partnerships related to Boeing and Embraer;
the provision of subsidies and grants; workforce development challenges and firms’ issues in
regard to skills and training deficiencies; questions related to the characteristics of processes of
corporate capture in regional training systems, among others.
Most interviews averaged one-hour in length, and in some cases were conducted more than
once. The majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face between 2014 and 2017,
although in five cases (five firms’ representatives), interviews were conducted via telephone.
Interviews were recorded, except in one interview with an educational institution representative
in Charleston. Besides recording the interviews, field notes were taken.
Using open code, I categorized and coded all the data according to their different themes
and patterns. After coding and categorizing the data, patterns and connections across the
interviews and documents were identified, analyzed, and information summarized. This was used
to develop the research. Besides interviews, I collected and downloaded from the internet
reports, studies, newspapers’ articles, and secondary census data, which were analyzed in the
same way of the interviews. Using triangulation, I crossed different sources in relation to
different interview statements (see Yeung 1997). Triangulation was important to provide
consistency and validation of the statements given in the interviews.
During fieldwork and in relation to the collection of data, this research encountered some
challenges. One major challenge was to contact and arrange interviews with firms’
representatives. The use of phone recording machines by firms’ representatives made it difficult
to directly contact them. However, some successful attempts and interviews were made, which
was not the case for Boeing’s representatives. While in Brazil, Embraer’s staff was more than
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willing to participate in this research, in Charleston, Boeing’s representatives, who were invited
for an interview several times via phone calls, emails, and even in-person, declined all
invitations. This represents one important limitation of this research, which made more difficult
the task of directly comparing Embraer and Boeing, and of understanding Boeing’s workforce
development strategy, labor/skill issues, and influence over South Carolina’s/Charleston’s
educational agenda. To mitigate this issue, questions related to Boeing were directed to
educational institutions’ representatives, state managers, and local governance actors. Such
participants, who were in contact with Boeing in the region, were able to provide substantial
information in this matter.
In order to answer my research questions and to develop this research, my dissertation was
structured in seven chapters. The second chapter is structured into two main parts. In the first
part, I critically examine how FDI studies and the GPN literature have not only problematically
conceptualized corporate capture but also insufficiently explained the relationship between the
state, MNCs, and the evolution of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. In
the second part, engaging with Neo-Marxist theorists, I argue that the evolution of corporate
capture should be understood according to how the selective institutional context of national
and/or subnational states privileges MNCs, providing structural advantages to these companies
to strategically advance their interests to a point known as corporate capture.
In the third chapter, I turn my attention to whether local forms of governance are prone to
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. Critiquing the
GPN/GVC approach to workforce development systems, I elaborate upon the concept of regional
training systems to argue that the capacity of local forms of labor governance to minimize or
reinforce processes of corporate capture in training has to be comprehended alongside with their
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state form, accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. I conclude this chapter with a
reconceptualization of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems.
In the fourth and fifth chapter, this research looks at the empirical cases of Charleston and
SJC. Each chapter was divided in three main sections. In the first part of each chapter, I
demonstrate how the evolution of processes of corporate capture in their regional training
systems is closely related to their state form and state accumulation strategy. However, the
evolution of such processes, I reveal, takes place through different mechanisms and at different
scales. In the case of Charleston, state managers1 have designed educational strategies and
training initiatives intentionally targeted to be captured by MNCs. In this case, corporate capture
evolves mainly at the subnational scale and is related not only to South Carolina’s manufacturing
fraction of capital but also to single firms such as Boeing. In the case of SJC, I argue that the
corporate capture of training initiatives fostered by Embraer evolves through an organic way at
the local scale, based on synergistic informal one-on-one interactions.
In the second part of each chapter, I explore the evolution and main characteristics of the
processes of corporate capture in the regional training systems of both regions. In Charleston,
corporate capture is examined in regard to how South Carolina manufacturing fraction of capital
has influenced the educational strategy of the state as well as the creation of three programs:
Apprenticeship Carolina, ReadySC, and Career Academies. Corporate capture is also
investigated in regard to how Boeing was able to capture the institutional capacity of ReadySC, a
program from the state of South Carolina that offers, free-of-charge, customized training services
to firms interested in moving to the state. In São José dos Campos, processes of corporate

1 According to Fred Block state managers are “those at the peak of the executive and legislative branches of the state apparatus”
(Block 1987, 201). This includes the highest-ranking civil servants, advisors and administrators, and appointed and elected
politicians. (Block 1987).
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capture are analyzed in regard to how Embraer was able to influence two educational
institutions: the Aeronautics Institute of Technology, where Embraer established the program
called “Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering”, and the São Paulo State
Technological College, where the company established the program “Designer Embraer”. Both
programs provide highly customized skills, free-of-charge to Embraer.
In the third part of each chapter, I explore their forms of governance and whether they
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in its regional training systems. In the case
of Charleston, I argue that Charleston’s local form of governance fosters a contradictory
dynamic. It reinforces corporate capture by embracing, implementing, and expanding higher
state scale programs and initiatives, while trying to minimize some of its detrimental outcomes. I
also demonstrate how these attempts to minimize corporate capture are problematic, mostly due
to a lack of power of local state managers and to local governance actors’ attempts to solve
corporate capture based on market relations. In the case of São José dos Campos, I argue that its
local form of governance has also reinforced corporate capture. I reveal that this is due to a
combination of factors: How skill needs are identified and addressed based on clientelistic
relations, how the existence of a local aerospace professional bond among local governance
actors grants to firms easier access and cooperation with educational institutions, and how
Embraer’s economic and political power allows the company to take advantage of such features.
Finally, in the sixth chapter I compare the major similarities and differences between the
processes of corporate capture of both cases. By putting the processes of corporate capture in
SJC and Charleston regional training systems in comparison, greater details regarding corporate
capture in regional training systems are revealed. In this regard, I present the major findings of

13

my research, exploring how processes of corporate capture are related to the state and scale, local
forms of governance, and issues of class and uneven development.
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Chapter 2: State-Capital Nexus and the Evolution of Processes of Corporate Capture
This chapter is structured in two main parts. In the first part, I will analyze not only the
concept of corporate capture but also how mainstream literature has explained the relationship
between the state, MNCs, and the evolution of processes of corporate capture in regional training
systems. In this regard, two bodies of literature are critically examined: FDI studies and the GPN
literature. I argue that although both literatures provide interesting explanations, such
rationalizations are too descriptive, overlooking the underlying causes of processes of corporate
capture, and have a problematic approach to state, neglecting for example issues of scale2—more
specifically state subnational variations—and class relations. In the second part, I proceed then to
reveal how the variegated capitalism literature, Jessop’s strategic relational approach, and
theories regarding the structural dependence of the state on capital can tackle these issues. My
main argument in this part is that the evolution of corporate capture should be understood
according to how the strategic selective institutional context of national and/or subnational
states privileges MNCs, providing structural advantages to these companies
to strategically advance their interests to a point known as corporate capture. Corporate capture, I
reveal, is not just due to a lack of distinct assets, or low levels of public institutional coordination
as the FDI studies or the GPN literature would argue, but mainly due to structural and intrinsic
features of the capitalist state.

2.1 The Concept of Corporate Capture: FDI Studies and Debates Around Development

2

This research understands scale as a product of wider social, cultural, economic, and political processes rather than a pregiven
arena which these processes unfold (Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1998; MacKinnon 2011). It agrees with
Swyngedouw which claims that “[s]patial scales are never fixed, but are perpetually redefined, contested and restructured in terms
of their extent, content, relative importance and interrelations.” (Swyngedouw 1997, 141). This research uses the following
terminologies to address state scale: national, subnational and local. Important to say, while in SJC the term local scale will refer
to the dynamics at the city level, local scale in the region of Charleston will be used to refer to the dynamics of its three counties:
Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester.
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Intellectuals have theorized about the state for a long time. Many, mostly liberals, have
assumed the state to be a neutral entity or a neutral arbiter of social processes (Glassman 1997).
However, since the 1970s more and more scholars have acknowledged the fact that different
actors, or groups of actors, influence and shape the state and its policies and behavior (Jessop
2007). One particular stream of literature is related to foreign direct investments (FDI) studies
and aftercare policies. In this literature, a small but growing body of scholars have sought to
demonstrate how local states are able to attract and retain MNCs in their regions, and whether
regions are able, with the attraction of FDIs, to maximize spillovers in skills and technology
transfers, to foster industry cluster formation and processes of externalization (Rutherford et al.
2018; Markusen & Nesse 2007; Grabher 1993; Christopherson & Clark 2007; Phelps 2008;
Mackinnon 2012). In this context, some scholars have argued that when state managers negotiate
or bargain with MNCs to attract them to their regions, the outcomes are not always so beneficial
to regions, and often result in processes that have been conceptualized as corporate capture
(Phelps & Fuller 2001; Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps et al. 2005; Mackinnon 2012).
Corporate capture has been defined as a process in which the values and interests of
MNCs dominate local initiatives and economic strategies in relation to the interests of the local
business communities and local states (Phelps 2000, 2008). The term also implies how private
actors exert influence over local institutions through unidirectional bargaining processes with the
state (Phelps & Fuller 2001; Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps et al. 2005). In more concrete terms,
corporate capture occurs when MNCs influence and exploit the capabilities of local systems of
governance, receiving great amounts of public subsidy in the form of financial assistance and
human resources, support services, and customized packages of FDI support (Phelps 2000, 2008;
Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps & Fuller 2001).
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Regarding corporate capture in regional labor markets, scholars have explored this
dynamic in relation to: (a) how MNCs receive customized packages of training incentives; (b)
how MNCs distort or influence local skills agendas and strategies, lacking wider business
community involvement in education and training agendas; (c) how MNCs recruit from local
suppliers and the local business community the most talented workers (the fast ramp-up of
production can result in ‘off-the-shelf’ labor forces); (d) how MNCs recruit a significant
proportion of workers from outside the locality; and (e) how MNCs try to minimize workers’
knowledge exchange or sharing (Pavlinek 2016; Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps & Fuller 2001;
Dawley 2007).
In general, such studies contrast the interests of MNCs versus the interests of states
versus the local business interests (see Stigler 1971; Young 2012; Dal Bó 2006; Phelps 2000,
2008; Phelps and Fuller 2001). The interests of the state and of the local business community are
in general understood as the willingness to foster externalities, spill-overs, and consequent
development of industrial clusters, while the interests of MNCs are often matched with their
desire to influence local governments, acquiring incentives, and thus, externalizing their costs
(Phelps 2000, 2008; Phelps & Fuller 2001).
In this context, researchers have been interested in understanding whether some forms of
state are more prone to have processes of corporate capture than others. In this regard, in the
field of economic geography, two main bodies of work have attempted to provide explanations.
This subsection will focus on the first body of literature, which can be placed under the FDI
studies literature.
FDI scholars have sought to explain this relation mainly based on the levels and
efficiency of coordination among state institutions, although some other factors have also been
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taken into consideration. According to some scholars, processes of corporate capture occur due
to asymmetrical relations between the state and MNCs, which puts the state in a weaker position
when bargaining with MNCs (see Phelps 2008; Almond et al. 2014). Phelps (2008) claims that
such asymmetries reside in five main factors. First, such an asymmetry is due to the fact that
while MNCs have one single interest and target, which is to increase profit, subnational states
have to balance different goals, interests, and policy objectives that put state managers in an
inferior position when bargaining (Phelps 2008; see Boddewyn 1994). Second, while firms are
efficient in coordinating with their internal parts as well as with their subsidiaries and suppliers,
national governments often fail to efficiently coordinate initiatives among their subsidiary
institutions. More specifically, national governments often fail to efficiently coordinate
initiatives to ensure that FDI attraction will result in processes of externalization and
consequently industrial cluster formation (Phelps 2008). Furthermore, government institutions at
other scales can have dysfunctional behaviors from their national institutions (Phelps 2008).
Third, MNCs have greater capability in coordinating activities at the international scale,
while states often fail to do so within their boundaries (Phelps 2008). Fourth, MNCs are open to
opportunism, i.e., these firms are not only professionals in protecting and internalizing ownership
advantages, but also in taking advantage of opportunities from local states, which is facilitated by
asymmetric information (Alfaro & Chauvin 2016; Phelps 2008; see Williamson 1975). For
example, MNCs have more capacity to control the flow of information when negotiating with
governments. Firms can inflate the number of jobs and benefits they plan to bring to regions,
therefore influencing the size of the governmental incentive package (Weber 2002). Fifth, the
liberalization of FDI policies and the transferring of certain powers and competencies by nation
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states to supranational bodies have decreased the bargaining power of states while increasing the
power of MNCs and regional competition for FDI. (Hudson 2011; Phelps 2008).
In this context, as levels of coordination significantly vary among countries, scholars
have contended that national states marked by low levels of institutional coordination such as
liberal states are more likely to have processes of corporate capture than states characterized by
high levels of coordination such as developmental states (see Phelps 2008; Bakir 2015). As
Phelps (2008) points out, liberal states and developmental states vary in their densities regarding
their coordination between central governmental institutions, in their coordination between
central and decentralized governmental bodies, in their coordination between governmental
institutions and domestic and foreign firms, and to the degree to which such a coordination is
reinforced by different arms of government. Moreover, Phelps (2008) believes that corporate
capture is less likely to happen in regions that have developmental states due to the existence of
strong coordination that results in overall strategies and transparent strategy-making mechanisms
to couple FDI, externalization, and cluster formation (see also Bakir 2015).
To exemplify his argument, Phelps (2008) explores how the UK invests in FDI to attract
MNCs and to create jobs in declining regions, but it has no significant initiatives or strategies to
monitor its effects and to intervene, nor to develop industrial clusters. According to the author,
the lack of horizontal and vertical coordination among national and subnational scale institutions
increases intra-competition among subnational states and quasi-state agencies over a single FDI
project, hindering negotiations in the part of the state (Phelps 2008). The author goes on to
contend that in developmental states like South Korea, where the level of state coordination is
much higher than in liberal states, incentives related to regional policy are concentrated on
supporting domestic firms, which in turn are significant in fostering positive external economic
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effects such as the creation of industrial clusters. The developmental state, thus, is able to
coordinate initiatives with firms and other players in a better way, having a greater potential to
foster externalization and cluster formation (Phelps 2008).
Such approaches to explain the relationship between corporate capture and different state
forms foster an important insight regarding how and why corporate capture may happen, but they
have some issues. For example, although national state forms can play a crucial role in
explaining corporate capture, subnational forms—especially in federalist countries such as Brazil
and the United States—can also be important to understand such a process, given that
subnational states can greatly vary in terms of coordination, models of growth, and strategies
from their national forms (Peck & Theodore 2007; Zhang and Peck 2014; Schröder & Voelzkow
2016; Crouch & Voelzkow 2009). Therefore, one also has to comprehend corporate capture
according to the characteristics of local and subnational states.
Additionally, the degree of coordination among government institutions, and between the
government and firms per se is not enough to explain corporate capture. Corporate capture is also
heavily present in developmental states, which supposedly have high levels of state coordination.
For example, in Brazil, regional competition to attract firms has dramatically increased in the last
three decades, resulting in excessively large incentives packages that are not often accompanied
by processes of spillover, externalization, and cluster formation (see Rodriguez-Pose & Arbix
2001; Varsano et al. 2002). As stated in the introduction, in Brazil, the cost per job created in
forms of incentives has reached in the past the value of $340,000 (Oman 1999).
Moreover, such an explanation is based on a binary vision, which contrasts the
contradictory interests between states (willing to foster externalization) and MNCs (seeking to
externalize costs through corporate capture). This has two issues. First, when scholars depict
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regions as marked by processes of corporate capture, they tend to exclude the possibility that
processes of externalization can be concomitantly present. Regions are marked by processes of
externalization or by processes corporate capture, meaning that the existence of one process
excludes the other. Second, by focusing on states’ and MNCs’ interests, researchers overlook the
fact that bargaining events between states and MNCs heavily affect the working class and are
intrinsically associated with workers’ interests. Analyses of corporate capture have barely
addressed such a matter by giving priority to issues of poaching, skills and technology transfer,
cluster formation, and incentives per se. As this research will demonstrate in the third chapter,
processes of capture need to be analyzed with greater attention to class issues and can happen
concomitantly with processes of de-capture and externalization at different scales. As I will
reveal in the next subsection, this is not the only problematic explanation regarding how some
forms of state are more prone to have processes of corporate capture than others.

2.2 Strategic Coupling, State Theory and Corporate Capture
The second body of work, which has attempted to explain why some forms of state are
more prone to have processes of corporate capture than others is the GPN literature3. The GPN
literature is an important stream of research which has sought to understand the formation,
configuration, and/or upgrading4 of global firms and their suppliers across different countries and
regions (Yeung & Coe 2015; Neilson et al. 2014; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011, Henderson et
al. 2002; Barrientos et al. 2011). As this research will show in the following paragraphs, the state

3

Global commodity chains, global value chains, and global production networks have been addressed in conjunction as part of
the same literature. This research will address the three as the GPN literature.
4
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) identified four types of upgrading: 1) process upgrading, which refers to how firms are able
to produce more efficiently by reorganizing the production system or introducing a superior technology; 2) product upgrading,
when firms move into more sophisticated product lines; 3) functional upgrading, which entails firms acquiring new functions (or
abandoning existing functions) such as design of their own product or marketing and branding abilities; 4) chain or inter-sectoral
upgrading, where firms move into new but often related industries.
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has become a central player in their analyses.
In initial studies, the global commodity chains (GCC) approach focused on how global
industries are formed, configured across the world, and capable of capturing, creating and
enhancing value. Scholar gave attention to the types of relationships—or corporate
governance5—that suppliers and their lead firms had as well as to the outcomes of such
relationships in terms of value capture and upgrading (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark
2011; Henderson et al. 2002). As the focus of GCC scholars was on the relationship between
firms, such a literature was criticized for fostering a firm-centric approach, ignoring the role
played by other players like not-for-profit organizations and the state in firms’ value capture and
upgrading (Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2008). This was because this approach emerged in a
context when the state-centric analysis of the World-Systems literature was dominant (Smith
2015). Moreover, this literature was developed in the 90s, when neoliberalism was in vogue and
MNCs had gained power while national states were being weakened (Hudson 2011).
Consequently, the state had a less significant position than firms in their analysis, being analyzed
more in the realm of industrial and trade policy and regulation (Smith 2015; Mayer and Phillips
2017; Horner 2017).
GVC studies, drawing from the GCC literature, started to give greater attention to
institutional structures. Scholars recognized that forms of public–private governance were also
important for the formation and configuration of GVCs as well as to the processes of value
capture and upgrading (Smith 2015). However, scholars focused mostly on not-for-profit
organizations and private corporate players, lacking an adequate understanding of institutions

5

The initial paper was written by Gereffi (1994), where the author explores the relationship between firms and their suppliers,
identifying two forms of corporate governance: Producer-driven chains (for example, how producers in the automobile industry
coordinate their value chain) and buyer-driven chains (for example, how large retailers, marketers, and braded manufacturers play
a main role in their chain).
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regarding their role in the corporate forms of governance of GVCs (Smith 2015; Mayer &
Phillips 2017; Horner 2017).
In this context, geographers, influenced by GCC and GVC studies, sought to put the state
back in the agenda and to develop a more nuanced approach to questions of power, space, and
scale. At the end of the 1990s, when the neoliberal project seemed to have failed, GPN scholars
started to break away from the firm- and chain-centered analysis of GVC, giving greater
attention and importance to institutional contexts at different spatial scales (Smith 2015; Mayer
& Phillips 2017; Horner 2017; Henderson et al. 2002; Coe et al. 2008). One particular topic that
reflected such a break concerns studies related to strategic coupling.
Strategic coupling refers to the “dynamic processes through which actors in cities and/or
regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage strategic interests between local actors and their
counterparts in the global economy” (Yeung 2009, p. 213). For example, strategic coupling
occurs when regional actors are able to bargain and attract MNCs to their localities, or to how
local firms are able to become suppliers or global buyers of foreign firms inserted in global
production networks. Processes of strategic coupling are marked by a dependence on intentional
strategic actions, by time and space contingency, given that it involves the construction of
temporary coalition between groups of actors, and by a transcendency of territorial boundaries,
given that it brings actors across different spatial scales (Coe & Hess 2011; Yeung 2009; Yang
2013).
GPN scholars have distinguished the existence of three modes of strategic coupling6:

6

Mackinnon (2012) goes further to demonstrate how strategic coupling should be understood along with the concepts of decoupling
and recoupling. The author claims that a coupling process may point to a decoupling process somewhere else, as a result of regional
selection and abandonment processes. Therefore, regional development and uneven development happen simultaneously with its
processes of coupling, decoupling and recoupling (MacKinnon 2012). The author stresses that to understand processes of coupling,
decoupling, and recoupling there is a need to recognize ten key dimensions, as one can see in the table above.
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strategic (or international partnership); organic (or indigenous innovation); and structural (or
production platform) (MacKinnon 2012; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung 2016). Strategic coupling
happens when regional actors and domestic firms—who serve as strategic partners—establish
linkages with lead firms in GPNs (Yeung 2016). Organic coupling denotes a process that takes
place through a co-evolution of regional assets and global firms in the same region. For example,
the rise of national champions and new lead firms due to a strategic government industrial policy
(MacKinnon 2012). Structural coupling is based on proactive policies and strategies in which
countries (often developing countries) provide competitive cost structures, fiscal and financial
incentives, stable policy environment, and abundant labor supply to attract lead firms in GPNs
(MacKinnon 2012; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung 2015).

Table 1: Key Dimensions of Coupling Between GPNs and Regions
Dimensions
Scenarios
Mode of entry
Greenfield, repeat investment, merger/acquisition
Status of TNC affiliates
Autonomous – dependent
Type of region
Source, host
Regional assets
Distinctive – generic
Type of coupling
Organic, strategic, structural
Degree of coupling
Full – none
Depth/layering of recoupling
Deep – shallow
Power relations
Symmetric – asymmetric
Regional development outcomes
Development – dependency
Exposure to decoupling
Low – High
Source: Mackinnon 2012, 240.

According to Yeung (2006, 2016), in the East Asian context, three relational processes
and mechanisms have facilitated the strategic coupling of local firms with lead firms in GPNs: an
emergence of a transnational elite community of professionals and entrepreneurs that are able to
learn best management and manufacturing practices, and to develop strong links with their
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former employers; a fragmentation of production and vertical specialization in global industries
that provide opportunities for domestic firms to engage with GPNs through subcontracting and
partnerships; and state institutions fostering initiatives to meet the interests of firms (Yeung
2006, 2016; Coe et al. 2004). In regard to the state, the main task of GPN scholars has been to
analyze the role7 of different national and regional state policies and institutions in providing,
creating, and/or transforming regional assets in order to meet the needs of trans-local firms in
GPNs and foster a strategic, organic, or structural coupling (Yeung 2006; Coe et al. 2004;
Mackinnon 2012; Smith 2015; Horner 2017).
Although GPN researchers have not explored the concept of corporate capture, these
scholars have acknowledged the existence of power asymmetries and how coupling processes
can result in detrimental outcomes such as the exclusion of some parts of civil society, uneven
resource allocation, the disarticulation of existing regional economies, and growing gender
inequalities, among others (Coe et al. 2004; Coe & Hess 2011; Dawley 2011; Mackinnon 2012).
While FDI studies claim that national states are in an inferior position when bargaining with
MNCs due to information asymmetries and lack of coordination, GPN academics believe this to
happen when their regional assets are not complementary to the strategic needs of MNCs (see
Mackinnon 2012; Coe & Hess 2011; Yeung 2016). For example, regions are in a better position
when bargaining with firms when they possess highly specialized and distinctive regional assets,
like pools of knowledge and expertise, which match the interests of the firms. Coupling
processes are considered symmetrical when based on partnerships and reciprocity, or
asymmetrical when it involves the corporate capture of institutional capacities (Coe & Hess

7

For example, Dicken (2011) sees the nation-state as having four main roles regarding the formation, configuration, upgrading of
GPNs: Container of laws and practices, regulator, competitor, and collaborator. Lee et al. (2014) claims that the South Korean state
acts not only as a container of laws and practices, but also as an inter‐scalar mediator, a constructor of regional innovation systems.
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2011; Mackinnon 2012). Therefore, the GPN literature would explain processes of corporate
capture as a result of states lacking specific or distinctive regional assets that are of the interest of
firms. This lack of specific assets, as GPN scholars would assert, puts states in an inferior
position when bargaining with firms, and thus, vulnerable to having their institutional capacity
captured8. However, such an explanation of corporate capture is problematic.
Such an explanation of corporate capture is purely descriptive, lacking a theorization that
addresses its underlying or fundamental aspects within a context of social relations. The
insufficiency of strategic coupling approaches to comprehend and explain the underlying causes
of power asymmetries and processes of corporate capture lies in three main factors. One major
issue is that, as Glassman (2011) has argued, GPN studies have been based on a neo-Weberian
national–territorial conceptualization of the state, which sees national states and policies as
external to markets, to global production networks, and to the economy. Such a view of the state
directs scholars to focus on isolated state initiatives and policies, overlooking the fact that GPNs’
processes may be linked to broader national, subnational, and international political-economic
features, and related to specific state accumulation strategies (Smith 2015). This issue is also
related to the fact that GPN researchers have mostly based their analysis on an actor-network
approach, which relies on a thick description of the objects of study, overlooking their
underlying causes (see Yeung & Coe 2015). Through this approach, academics have placed
greater attention on human and non-human agency, overlooking the totality of social structures
(Sayes 2017).
Another concern is that their conceptualizations of strategic coupling overlook its link to
class relations, and approach labor in a human-capital perspective. For example, GPN scholars

8

As Phelps (2008) stated, the capture of the institutional capacity of regions is rarely full. So, corporate capture is always a
process in which the institutional capacity of states is only partially captured.
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focus on the importance of state policies in generating sufficient skilled labor force for firms (or
on the presence of a skilled labor force) to foster strategic, organic or structural coupling
processes (Selwyn 2016). As Selwyn (2016) points out, formulations related to strategic,
structural and organic coupling processes overlook their relation to the existence and formation
of an exploitable working class, which are normally established and disciplined by state actions
and endeavors to leave zones of labor militancy (Selwyn 2016). Labor markets are explained
based on market forces of supply and demand, ignoring how the labor force was established
originally (Selwyn 2016).
In conclusion, GPN strategic coupling studies explain why some states are more prone to
processes of corporate capture than others based on the lack or presence of specific regional
assets that meet the strategic needs of firms. The lack of regional assets creates power
asymmetries, which in turn puts states in an inferior position when bargaining with firms, thus,
increasing its tendency to have corporate capture. Although approaches to strategic coupling
recognize the detrimental outcomes that coupling processes can generate, they still lack a
theorization that explains well the underlying causes behind it. This is because of its actornetwork approach, which prioritizes the description of phenomena, its Neo-Weberian approach
to the state, and its approach to labor as human-capital.

2.3 Variegated Capitalism, The Strategic Relational Approach and State Structural
Dependence on Capital: Rethinking Corporate Capture
In the previous two sections, this research demonstrated that neither GPN analyses of
strategic coupling nor FDI studies deliver a satisfactory rationalization regarding how different
forms of state relate to processes of corporate capture. This research highlighted the need for an
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approach to the relationship between corporate capture and the state that: (a) recognizes the
subnational variances of national states, and approaches corporate capture as phenomenon that is
associated to multiple state scales; (b) further explores the underlying causes of corporate
capture, going beyond descriptive approaches; (c) expands the binary view of corporate capture
(states’ interests versus MNCs’ interests; corporate capture versus externalization). In this
regard, in the following three subsections (2.3.1-2.3.3) this research will draw from the
variegated capitalism literature, Jessop’s strategic relation approach, and theories of state
structural dependence on capital in order to address these two first issues. Regarding the last
issue (c), this research will address such a problematic only in the third chapter.

2.3.1 Variegated Capitalism and Subnational Models of Development: Processes of
Corporate Capture as a State Multi-Scale Dynamic
In this section, this research will demonstrate how the variegated capitalism literature can
provide a more refined explanation to understand the relationship between the state and
corporate capture. The variegated capitalism literature reveals how national states can have
deviating subnational modes of regulation and accumulation strategies. This means that
processes of corporate capture have to be understood according to these state particularities and
in consideration to states’ multiple scales.
The variegated capitalism (VC) literature has been developed in the last years, delivering
an interesting conceptualization of how states and capitalism function. Drawing from Marxist
theories and from the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, the VC literature has a refined
approach and explanation not only in regard to how and why national states vary from one
another across the globe but also in regard to how national states are marked by internal
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variations. Before turning in depth into this literature, it important to analyze the VoC literature,
given its influence over the VC literature. Therefore, first we will analyze the VoC literature and
critiques of the approach, and how the VC studies have been developed in an attempt to address
these matters. After discussing the main points of the VC literature, I will explore whether it can
be deployed to corporate capture studies.
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature has fostered an interesting approach for crossnational comparative studies. Bringing firms into the center of analysis, VoC demonstrates how
national institutional frameworks are important features that influence or condition firms’
performance. VoC explores how institutions improve the capacities of firms to coordinate with
other actors and consequently to solve their problems (Hall & Soskice 2001; Schneider 2009).
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), for firms to develop, produce, and distribute goods and
services profitably, they have to resolve problems of coordination in five main spheres:
1) Industrial relations: Firms have coordination problems with workers and unions related to
bargaining over wages and working conditions. At stake are wage and productivity levels that
condition the success of the firms as well as the rates of unemployment in the economy.
2) Vocational training: Firms have coordination problems with educational institutions in regard
to securing a workforce with suitable skills, and with workers who face the problem of deciding
how much to invest and in what skills. At stake is the fortune of individual firms and workers,
and the skill levels and competitiveness of the overall economy.
3) Corporate governance: Firms have coordination problems with investors related to how to
access financing and to assure returns.
4) Inter-firm relations: Firms have coordination problems with suppliers and clients regarding the
sharing of proprietary information, and the risk of exploitation in joint ventures.

29

5) Employees: Firms have coordination problems with employees concerning how to ensure that
employees have the desirable competencies and cooperate well with one another to advance the
objectives of the firm. Problems relate to moral hazards, adverse selection, and information
sharing (Hall & Soskice 2001; Schneider 2009).
In this context, Hall and Soskice (2001) developed an approach that compares national
economies according to how the problems in these five spheres are resolved. The authors, in
their initial study, developed an analysis of two types of national economies. On one side of the
spectrum, there are liberal market economies (LMEs) like the US and the UK, while on the other
side of the spectrum, there are coordinated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany and
Japan. Other scholars have added other types of national economies. For example, researchers
have examined how Latin American countries have types of national market economies that do
not conform with the LMEs or the CMEs models. Brazil is termed as a hierarchical market
economy (HME) (Schneider 2008, 2009; Saucedo et al. 2015).
In LMEs like the US, firms resolve their coordinating problems via competitive market
arrangements, or through price market and formal contracts, where supply and demand is
responsible for fostering equilibrium outcomes in the five spheres (Hall & Soskice 2001;
Schneider 2009). In HMEs, firms rely on hierarchical arrangements to solve their coordinating
problems and reach equilibrium. More specifically, business groups and MNCs unilaterally
organize coordinating problems via overall non-market hierarchical relations in order to reach
equilibrium (Schneider 2008, 2009).

Table 2: Liberal Market Economies and Hierarchical Market Economies
LME: United State of America
HME: Brazil
Industrial
- Firms’ relations with workers
- Firms’ relations with workers are
relations
are based on market relations.
structured by top-down regulations issued
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Vocational
training

- Managers have unilateral control
over the firms and has freedom to
hire and fire. They have no
obligations with trade unions for
example.
- The market controls wages as
well as inflation although
macroeconomic policies also pose
an important role. Few unions.
- Focus on general skills, firms
not willing to have
apprenticeships, given that they
have no guarantee that other firms
will poach their apprentices.
Greater amount of in-housingtraining. Short on highly
specialized skilled workers.
- Post-secondary or on-the-job
training is based on the market.
- Labor markets are fluid because
firms can hire and fire according
to their strategies. Therefore,
workers are encouraged to acquire
general transferable skills.

Corporate
- Firms are encouraged to be more
governance attentive to earnings and the price
of their shares. Regulatory
regimes are tolerant of mergers
and acquisitions.
- Access to finance depends on
their valuation in equity markets,
where investors depend on
publicly available information.
Firms focus on profitability and
performance.
Inter-firm
relations

- Based on market relations and
formal contracts. Mediated by
antitrust regulations to avoid the
control of prices.
- Firms get little assistance with
relational contracts. Technology
transfer then takes place with
scientists and engineers that move
from firm to firm, which a fluid

by national governments and enforced by
labor courts.
- Employees lack formal grievance
procedures and representation. Workers
lack voice because many jobs are
temporary.
- The state and employers set the wages.
Few unions.
- Post-secondary or on-the-job training is
often unilaterally decided by firms or
business associations and financed by the
state.
- Low productivity due to slow progress in
education, the failure of training systems,
poor labor relations, and the absence of
compensation mechanisms for workers who
stand to lose their jobs. Workers have few
incentives to invest in sector or firm
specific skills, and invest, if they do invest,
in more general skills.
- Low skills due to the fear of poaching,
which discourages investment, but this
problem sometimes is surpassed by public
investment.
- Most firms are directly controlled and
managed by their owners, either prominent
families or foreign firms. Diversification
and family control introduce hierarchy into
corporate governance. Without multiple
owners or stakeholders there is no need to
negotiations.
- Diversified business groups and MNCs
were the key conduits for organizing access
to capital, technology, and markets through
Coasian internalization and hierarchy.
Access to capital through public financing.
- Sometimes they are competitive, but some
sectors are oligopolistic, and others
regulated by the state. Inter-sector relations
of same firm group owners.
- Most inter-firm coordination focuses on
politics and policies rather than narrower
issues of sectoral governance.
- Because firms are too large, relations with
competitors, suppliers, and clients are often
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labor market facilitates. They also vertical, unequal, and imbued with a hint of
rely on sale of innovation.
coercive hierarchy.
- Research consortia and inter- Firms in general have little coordination
firm collaboration play a less
capacity to foster collaboration with other
important role in technology
firms, and to have processes of technology
transfer.
transfer.
Employees - Corporate structures that
- Atomistic and fluid/short term links.
concentrate authority in top
- Unions have little influence on hierarchies
management make it easier for
within the firm given that so few workers
firms to release labor when facing are unionized and where unions do exist,
pressure from financial markets
they are often distant from the shop floor.
and to impose a new strategy on
the firm to take advantage of the
shifting market opportunities that
often present themselves in
economies characterized by highly
mobile assets.
Source: Hall and Soskice 2001; Schneider 2008, 2009; Saucedo et al. 2015.

For Hall and Soskice (2001), institutions, organizations, and culture9 are important
because they provide support for firms to resolve their coordination problems. The authors state
that the institutional structure of national economies provides comparative advantages for firms
to engage in specific types of activities, allowing them to be more competitive. In this respect,
different modes of coordination develop different clustering of institutional complementary10.
For example, LMEs have labor market arrangements that allow companies to easily cut
costs in an economic down-turn by firing labor. Such a labor market arrangement is
complementary to financial markets, given that a firms’ access to funds depends on profitability,
and thus, rapid responses to economic downturns. Educational arrangements that privilege
general rather than firm-specific skills are complementary to these highly fluid types of labor

9 Hall and Soskice (2001) understand culture as shared understandings that accumulates from experience, or the ways things are
done usually.
10
Two institutions can be complementary if the presence of one increases the returns from the other (Hall & Soskice 2001).
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markets, where such a labor mobility is complementary to technology transfer among firms, and
benefits economies based on innovation. In the context of a legal system that works against
relational contracting, licensing agreements are also more effective than inter-firm collaboration
on research and development for effecting technology transfer (Hall & Soskice 2001).
Another example can be seen in HMEs. HMEs have general training skills that are
complementary to its short-term fluid labor market, where MNCs are able to poach skilled
workers from domestic firms, and the wages do not significantly increase according to levels of
skills. It is also complementary to the political and economic volatility and uncertainty of HMEs
countries, where high employee turnover and low unionization discourage firms to invest in
training since workers may not work for too long. The lack of unions, which could negotiate
distribution of gains over time for workers investing in training, discourages training as well.
Low skills discourage domestic firms to upgrade to higher technology sectors and encourage
them to operate in lower ones where skills are abundant. Such a characteristic, i.e., an abundant
labor market marked by workers with low skills and low wages, is complementary to commodity
production, which relies on fairly standard technologies and prices (Schneider 2008; 2009).
Changes in a national institutional framework are explained according to exogenous
shocks like liberalization and technological change, which disrupt the existing equilibrium
reached by firms in their relationships with the five main spheres already described. Firms
challenge this now problematic institutional structure; institutions change in one sphere,
consequently affecting the other spheres, and therefore, restore equilibrium (Hall & Soskice
2001; Peck & Theodore 2007).
Although fostering a rich and stimulating explanation of how national market economies
vary across space, the VoC literature has been criticized for five main reasons. First, VoC
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literature initially deployed an ideal-type reasoning which has two poles: liberal market
economies and coordinated market economies. The problem here resides in the fact that liberal
market economies are portrayed as the locus of ideal market relations as a disembedded selfregulating market (Peck & Theodore 2007). However, national market economies are not
characterized by market coordination or by non-market coordination, but by a combination of
both. Markets demand social, institutional, and political structures to function (Peck & Theodore
2007). In this regard, this pushes this research to adopt the conceptualization of the United States
as a “hidden developmental state”11 instead of liberal state. This does not mean that the US
behaves as a classical developmental state like Brazil12 from the 1930s to the 1980s (see BresserPereira & Theuer 2012). The US has been conceptualized as a “hidden developmental state” due
to its significant role in the economy, but not in “import-substitution” but in advancing, through
public-private partnerships, new technologies and innovation (Block 2008).
Second, VoC literature has a problematic explanation regarding institutional change. In
their perspective, harmonious agglomeration of institutions is the norm, where there is a steady
state or there is a state in change. However, institutional discordance and disequilibrium is much
more usual due to the contradictory nature of capitalism (Jessop 2014). VoC literature overlooks
processes of experimentation and cumulative transformation in relation to institutional change

11

Weiss (2014) argues that the US does not have a liberal and market-coordinated economy, but a “hybrid state” in which
institutional networks accommodate strategic policies fostering high-tech and defense related sectors and addressing emergent
shortcomings from liberal capitalism. Weiss (2014) and Block (2008) argue the US acts similar to a developmental state. Block
(2008) uses the term “hidden” because the US, different from developmental states, has not a clear formal industrial policy in which
investments, partnerships, goals are described.
12
The developmental state refers to states that are (or were) financially tied to industrialists, having a collective national
developmental goal. In the Brazilian case, the developmental state was in place from 1930s to late 1980s. In Brazil, the state used
its finance as a conduit of industrial policy to achieve industrialization through import-substitution. To do so, the Brazilian
developmental state established an institutional compromise with its industrial elite, urban workers, and with the non-exporter
agricultural elite in order to foster a project of development. To stimulate internal production, Brazil not only created many
national firms but also supported private businesses by establishing high import-taxes, socializing risks through low-interest
loans, inflationary refinancing and non-performing loans to bail firms out, and by expanding its share equity of banks to write off
bad loans ( Bresser-Pereira and Theuer 2012; Fine 2008; Woo-Cumings 1999). More details of the Brazilian case will be
provided on chapter 5.
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and disregards that institutions can be hierarchically organized, where some spheres are more
important than others for reforms (Peck & Theodore 2007). Moreover, institutional change is not
only fostered by external shocks. For example, neoliberal reforms are gradual and take place
from within (Peck and Theodore 2007; Jessop 2011; Jessop 2014).
Third, the rise of neoliberalism has pointed to a convergence in models of capitalism,
which challenges VoC scholars, given that there is an inclination in CMEs to lean towards the
market. VoC literature places neoliberalism under the LMEs, failing to comprehend how both
LMEs and CMEs converge towards neoliberalism (Jessop 2011). Therefore, there is a need for
VoC scholars to take into consideration the structural complementarities, connecting threads,
commonalities, and family resemblances in neoliberal restructuring programs; although
differences are expected even in deep neoliberalization (Peck and Theodore 2007; Jessop 2014).
Fourth, VoC privileges the political economy at the national scale, but studies concerning
the rescaling of political economic relations and state forms have demonstrated the existence of
models within models, trans-local spaces, and that national states are porous and interconnected.
In this regard and through the lenses of uneven development, geographers have rich theorizations
regarding the economic and political relations at the subnational and transnational scales (Peck &
Theodore 2007; Jessop 2011, 2014).
Fifth, when looking at states and their multiple scales, there is also a need to add
historical trajectories, class relations, and the development of capitalism as a world system,
moving beyond the pluralization of capitalism and reified enclosed sets of models. This takes
researchers to examine the principles, sources and dimensions of capitalism’s variegation,
addressing the causes and forms of capitalism’s dynamic polymorphism (Peck & Theodore 2007;
Jessop 2011, 2014).
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Facing this problematic, scholars have sought to foster a similar, but different analysis
regarding how capitalism differs. Peck and Theodore (2007) have argued for an approach that
draws from institutional theories of uneven development of capitalism, regulationist treatments
of accumulation and regulation, and Polanyian notions of institutional embeddedness. It would
approach not only the state at its national scale, but also at other scales (Peck & Theodore 2007).
In the same direction, Bob Jessop argues for an approach that considers capitalism as
contradictory and as an object of regulation. Jessop (2011, 2012) theorizes capitalism as a set of
social relations that due to the commodification of labor, permanently generates conflicts. This
characteristic of capitalism requires the state to establish modes of reproduction, regulation and
governance that ensure a smooth, crisis-free course (but temporary) for capital accumulation, or
spatio-temporal fixes when there is no stability (Jessop 2011).
By pointing to the contradictory nature of capitalism and to how it requires regulation,
Jessop (2011) challenges the VoC problematic view of equilibrium and institutional change.
While the VoC literature assumes that accumulation and equilibrium are likely to happen, Jessop
(2011) demonstrates that both are unlikely because of the inherent contradictions of capitalism.
The author states that when stability occurs, it will be related to zones of instability elsewhere
and/or to postponing problems into the future (Jessop 2011, 2014). In this regard, VC goes
further to analyze how zones of relative stability are related to instability inside or outside these
national economies in an ecology of accumulation regimes and modes of regulation.
Jessop (2011, 2014), in order to address the problems presented in the VoC literature,
argues for the adherence of four main concepts: variegation, compossibility, ecological
dominance, and the world market. For Jessop (2012) capitalism functions in a world market that
encompasses an ecology of economic spaces that interact and produce the uneven dynamic of
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accumulation on a world scale (Jessop 2012, 5). In this regard, the world market, as a totality of
production, fosters an uneven and combined development that integrates branches of capitalist
production and their respective social supports.
If national states are part of an integrated world market, VoC literature cannot explain
variation based on isolated and singular models of market economies such as liberal and
coordinated. National forms of market economies have to be understood according to their
interrelations as a series of hybrid variegations as global forces interact with local institutions
and actors (Jessop 2012; Sphar 2016).
In this sense, variegation attempts to go beyond the pluralization of capitalism and reified
models to investigate the principles, sources, and dimensions of capitalism variegation (Peck &
Theodore 2007; Jessop 2012). Through variegation, attention is turned to the structural coupling,
co-evolution, complementarities, rivalries, and antagonisms among national economies within
the world market (Jessop 2011). Due to competing in a world market, variegation happens
through co-evolution and co-dependency among national economies, not in isolation (Sphar
2016)
In order to explore variegation, Jessop turns his attention to the concepts of
compossibility and ecological dominance. Concerning compossibility, based on the work of
Leibniz, Jessop (2011, 2014) points that the VoC literature took into consideration
compossibility, but only within national market economies. Compossibility refers to how
individual nation states exist together in the global market and can contradict or mutually
reinforce one another (Jessop 2011). Raising the issue of compossibility between different
varieties of capitalism, the author asks: “[…] to what extent can different varieties co-exist in the
same economic space and, if they are compossible rather than incompossible, does their co-

37

existence have benign, neutral, or negative effects on their individual and collective economic
performance?” (Jessop 2011, p.4). One example is the co-dependent relationship between the US
and the Chinese state, or the Eurozone, which has been developed on the basis of compossible
relations under the leadership of the German model (Jones & Jessop 2010; Peck & Theodore
2007, Jessop 2011, 2014).
Concerning ecological dominance, Jessop (2011, 2014) notes that different varieties of
capitalisms are not just due to their “relative economic efficiency as models of rational
capitalism”, but also due to their articulation to different forms of political capitalism. In this
regard, the author claims that variegated capitalism exists under the influence of hegemonic
projects like neoliberalism. This is because the world is marked by differential global power
hierarchies and core-periphery relations in which some variegations are more influential than
others. Jessop’s (2011) concept of ecological dominance, therefore, considers the uneven
development of capitalism in a world system, bringing the idea that national states are porous
and interconnected at the transnational scale, as Peck and Theodore (2007) have also pointed out.
The VC literature allows this research to explore and explain state/processes of corporate
capture relation in more depth. The VC concurs with the FDI studies literature in regard to the
understanding that corporate capture is partially an outcome of asymmetrical relations between
MNCs and states due to trends in liberalization in the world economy (see Phelps 2008; Almond
et al. 2014); however, the VC provides a deeper explanation in regard to how processes of
corporate capture are related to variegation and the ecological dominance of neoliberalism. As
Jessop (2011) stated, the world economy is marked by an ecology of states that interact and
produce an uneven and combined dynamic of accumulation. Variegated forms of capitalism
emerge through a coevolution and codependency among national and subnational states (Jessop
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2014). Under the ecological dominance of neoliberalism, states have been influenced by certain
policy descriptions marked by liberal practices and commonalities across countries. These
practices and commonalities can be identified, for example, in regard to the creation of markets
in areas that did not exist before related to land, water, education, health care, social security, or
environmental pollution (Harvey 2005). In this context, processes of corporate capture can be
understood as a particularity of the capitalist state and its relationship to MNCs, a commonality
across states part of the neoliberal world hegemonic project. Corporate capture emerges due to
how states interact with MNCs and other states in a context in which accumulation—through the
attraction, retention, and development of firms—happens based on an uneven and combined
development. This means that all types of state such as developmental states and liberal states are
prone to processes of corporate capture, but this is not to deny that some states will give greater
attention to matters of externalization and have less drastic degrees of corporate capture than
others. Moreover, this researcher believes, as later will be discussed, that processes of corporate
capture and externalization can concomitantly happen at different scales.
Another important aspect of the VC approach is its explanation regarding how states
cannot be typified according to their levels of coordination—coordination versus market—,
given that even the so-called liberal states function based on social, political, and institutional
structures, which allow the market to function. This means that, as Poulantzas (1978) argued, all
states are required to have high levels of state coordination (“intervention”13) due to capitalism’s
contradictory nature. Therefore, it is theoretically problematic to analyze corporate capture in
relation to levels of coordination, given that what differs from state to state is not their levels of

13

Poulantzas (1978) claims that the economic sphere is not exterior to states and does not automatically reproduce itself. This
means that term state “intervention” is problematic, given that the state and the economy are mutually constituted (Poulantzas
1978).
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coordination, or degree of intervention, but how states structure their institutional apparatuses in
attempts to foster accumulation and to maintain their economies free of crisis (Jessop 2011). In
this regard, I argue that the relation between different forms of state and processes of corporate
capture should be conceptualized according to their accumulation strategies. However, before
developing such an argument, I have to explore how and why national states can have
subnational modes of development or accumulation strategies that drastically differ from their
national models. This is important because it will provide a framework which allows me to relate
processes of corporate capture to state accumulation strategies in its multiple scales.

2.3.2 Variegated Capitalism, Sector, and Scale
Researchers have also demonstrated the need to expand VoC discussions in scalar and
spatial terms, building a cross-scalar interpretation of the VoC approach. Under the variegated
capitalism rubric, some studies have pointed out how firms are enveloped not by a single
institutional national framework, but by a range of institutional layers at different scales. As
Jessop (2011) revealed, the state is built on subdivisions with certain political and administrative
powers as well as on some autonomy from the national state apparatus within which political
power is exercised to achieve policy objectives (Jessop 2011). In this regard, the VC literature
has called attention to the possibility of the existence of autonomous subsystems and governance
structures on the sectoral or local levels, what have been conceptualized as regional sub-models
of capitalism (Peck & Theodore 2007; Zhang & Peck 2014). Such an approach can be of great
use for this research to foster a more nuanced approach to analyze the relationship between the
state and corporate capture.
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Zhang and Peck (2014) claim that under capitalism and inside national states, industrial
expansion happens through an uneven development that is reinforced by an unequal distribution
of resources and linkages to the outside world. Such an internal, uneven development results in a
range of regional models of capitalism marked by political struggles—and shaped by firms—
over the design of policies. To exemplify their argument, Zhang and Peck (2014) analyze the
existence of different subnational models of development within China. These variations are
related to how such models of development are forged translocally and transnationally (different
insertions into the global market) through an uneven development. For example, the subnational
state of Sunan, China has a local state corporatism model of development, where local
governments were heavily supportive of collective township and villages enterprises through
guaranteed loans, favoring collective enterprises and ignoring private firms. As township and
village enterprises were privatized and integrated into GPNs, Sunan started to invest in the
creation of industrial parks, giving incentives to attract firms mostly from Taiwan. This became
the new source of investment. In the VoC style, the authors go on to explore and compare in
detail the five spheres of several Chinese subnational states (Zhang & Peck 2014, p.74).
Similarly, Rutherford et al. (2018) analyzed how two Canadian provinces, Ontario and
Quebec, have different models of development. More specifically, the authors explore the
accumulation strategies of these provinces in order to understand their outcomes for regional
development. The authors revealed how the accumulation strategies of Ontario and Quebec have
significant and differential outcomes in regard to policies to maximize FDI spillovers. As the
authors argue, the accumulation strategy of Quebec, a developmental state, has more power to
foster externalization in relation to FDI than the province of Ontario.
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In the same line of thought, Brenner (2003) has claimed that since the Fordist crisis,
many national states have transferred the responsibility of economic development to their
subnational states, which have to promote their local and regional economies. Therefore, the
national economy of many countries has been fragmented among local and regional economies,
which are in charge of developing their own glocalization strategies, and thus, their own placespecific assets and developmental trajectories (Brenner 2003). The author claims that subnational
glocalization strategies can vary within national states, given that such strategies are conditioned
by their state structure (unitary/federalist), inherited economic arrangements,
national/subnational political regimes, and processes of industrial restructuring. Moreover, such
glocalized state spaces emerge through an uneven development of state regulation, and intensify
intra-national socio-spatial polarization, given that economics assets, industrial capacities, and
infrastructure investments are concentrated in the most powerful regions (Benner 2003).
In the same direction, Schröder and Voelzkow (2016) describe why subnational state
variances exist. The authors go further to reveal how subnational variances do not stem only due
to their national structure (unitary/federalist) but from the interplay between national, sectoral,
and regional forms of governance. Therefore, subnational states and their strategies may differ
not only by country due to differential institutional legacies and distributions of national political
power, but also due to dynamics related to specific industrial sectors and regions. According to
the authors, firms competing in the world market search for regional economies that offer an
optimal regulation of their activities. What is optimal varies according to each sector.
Consequently, local states with specific industrial clusters have sought to offer an optimal
regulation to their sectors in order to attract and develop firms. Their models of development are
structured around such needs. Thus, it is not uncommon for local states to deviate from their
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national governance when national regulation challenges their sectors (Schröder & Voelzkow
2016).
In this regard, Schröder and Voelzkow (2016) argue that local states will replicate their
national institutions if their clusters are in the sector that is supported by its national institutions.
For example, regional economies with high technology clusters based on radical innovation will
mirror their national institutions if their national market economies are LMEs. The same goes for
a regional economy with a cluster in a sector based on incremental innovation and a CME. But if
they differ—LMEs with clusters based on incremental innovation—then regions will deviate
from their national states, adapting their own institutions to meet the necessities of the sector. For
example, in London, where there is a media cluster based on incremental innovation,
coordination around training and financing is higher than what is normal for a liberal market
economy (Schröder & Voelzkow 2016).
Variances between national and subnational states are also related to the autonomy that
national states give. Almond et al. (2012, 2013) analyzed the characteristics and behaviors
related to FDI initiatives of several liberal and coordinated market economies. One of their major
conclusions is that subnational states in these countries vary in their degree of autonomy, factors
that influence their degree of FDI focus, their responsibilities for FDI—for example in some
places, private or not-for-profit institutions are responsible for FDI, rather than the state—and in
their politics and developmental orientations. According to Almond et al. (2012, 2013),
subnational states with a low degree of autonomy means that FDI policies are entirely managed
by their national government, while a high degree of autonomy means that subnational states
have substantial power within the national framework to foster initiatives related to FDI. For the
authors, subnational states with a high degree of autonomy are more likely to embed MNCs and
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to reach positive outcomes such as externalization and cluster formation (Almond et al. 2012,
2013).
The VC analyses regarding the internal variations of national states bring a valuable
approach to the state and can greatly contribute to studies concerning the relationship between
the state and corporate capture, addressing some of the insufficiencies of the GPN and FDI
literatures. In this regard, the VC approach can contribute to questions of state/corporate capture
as follows.
As revealed, the FDI studies literature does not satisfactorily examine the relationship
between corporate capture and the state due to its analysis based on levels of coordination at the
national state scale. This is not only theoretically problematic, as pointed out before, but it also
overlooks the existence of state internal variations within national states in terms of
administrative, economic and political power (degree of autonomy), and accumulation strategies.
Understanding states according to the VC approach allows this research to analyze corporate
capture and in its relation to the state at multiple scales. For example, bargaining events with
MNCs as well as the design of policies of FDI attraction and aftercare do not always take place
at the national state scale, they can take place at other state scales such as the subnational and
local, or at multiple scales concomitantly. Therefore, processes of corporate capture—as well as
de-capture—can happen at multiple scales, and this is dependent on the degree of autonomy and
power of subnational and local states within specific national states. Such an approach allows
this research to break with corporate capture studies based on a binary view, whether there is
corporate capture or there is externalization.
Moreover, as this research will explore in the next subsection, subnational states can have
different accumulation strategies from their national states. For example, while policies of FDI
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attraction can prevail in the economic development strategy of some national states, their
subnational states can foster strategies that privilege the development of small and medium-size
firms or the creation of start-ups. While processes of corporate capture can happen at the
subnational or national state scale, local states, which receive these firms, can direct their
initiatives to foster externalization, processes of de-capture, which mostly target and prioritize
the local business community.
Furthermore, bargaining events can result in significant and different degrees of corporate
capture according to the position national states occupy in the global economy as well as
according to the position subnational states occupy within national economies, as Brenner (2003)
has stressed. The GPN literature is correct in asserting that the lack of specific regional assets,
which would meet the strategic interests of firms, places states in an inferior position when
bargaining with firms. This can be linked to how the uneven development of state spaces in
which some subnational states and regions are privileged—and thus more powerful—and able to
concentrate economics assets, industrial capacities, and infrastructure investments. This view,
along with an approach to state accumulation strategies can provide some underlying explanation
of the too descriptive GPN approach.
Furthermore, by approaching the national and subnational states through the VC lenses,
this research can analyze strategic coupling processes and corporate capture not only as a
consequence of single isolated bargaining events between MNCs and the state, as the GPN
would claim, but also part of broader models of development that play a crucial role in GPN
processes14. While the GPN literature claims that corporate capture happens when there is a lack

14

Smith (2015) has demonstrated how GPNs are articulated to particular national modes of development—which vary according
to their model of insertion in the world market, the accumulation strategies which are at the heart of this insertion, and how the
state regulates this mode of insertion and accumulation strategies. To illustrate his argument, the author demonstrates the
importance of the Tunisian “exportism” national model of development, which was crucial to attract GPN firms.
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of specific regional assets meeting the strategic needs of firms in processes of structural or
strategic coupling, this research goes beyond to acknowledge that corporate capture is related to
broader aspects, including the accumulation strategy of states at different scales, as this research
will explore in details in the next subsection.

2.3.3 State Power and Strategies, State Dependence, and the Underlying Causes of
Corporate Capture
In this subsection, I will advance the argument that the evolution of corporate capture
should be understood according to the state accumulation strategies of regions. I will reveal how
the evolution of corporate capture is related to how the strategic selective institutional context of
states and subnational states privileges MNCs, which in turn, have structural advantages to
advance their interests to a point known as corporate capture. As disclosed before, there is a need
to further explore the underlying causes of corporate capture. To do so, this research will draw
from Jessop’s strategic-relational approach and theories regarding the structural dependence of
the state on capital.
Bob Jessop is today one of the most influential scholars regarding state theory. Jessop’s
theorization, despite its high level of abstraction, has been disseminated in many different
disciplines such as geography, sociology, and economics. Jessop started to develop his state
theory and strategic-relational approach in a context where Marxist instrumentalist and
structuralist views of the state were under heavy criticism (Hay 1999). In this scenario, Jessop,
instead of elaborating a theory of the capitalist state, sought to develop a Marxist approach that
combines structure and agency in order to analyze state power (Jessop 1996, 2001).
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For Jessop, the state is a social relation and strategically selective in regard to its actions.
Understanding the state as a social relation means that there are complex relations underneath
state actions and strategies, which go beyond the state system and its capacities. State managers
are not isolated from wider society, and their behavior is not purely for their own sake, but
according to their links to the wider balance of forces (Hay 1999; Jessop 1990, 2007; Kelly
1999). In other words, state initiatives and strategies are founded on a configuration of social
forces and institutionalized compromises that underpin state support for particular policy
directions (Smith 2015).
Jessop (2014) believes that the state is not a neutral terrain, where political forces
compete with equal chances to pursue their interests and reach their goals. According to the
author, state action and strategies are always developed within a pre-existing structure—i.e., an
institutional context—that is selective and may privilege some actors, some spatial and temporal
horizons, some strategies, some paths, and some identities over others (Jessop 2001; 2014). For
example, states do not tend to pursue long-term, “patient capital” strategies oriented to strong
competition in a neoliberal regime that privileges short-term, hypermobile, superfast flows of
speculative capital (Jessop 2004; Gough 2004).
This strategic selectivity of the state15 favors the articulation of certain strategies and
tactics at certain time but does not entirely determine them. This is because while the
institutional context encourages specific paths of action, and influences the articulation of
strategies, actors within and without the state also behave strategically, having the ability to
reflect upon the conjunctural moment and to articulate their strategies and tactics according to
their capacities, assumptions, and knowledge (Jessop 2001; Hay 2002). This ability has been

15 As Hay argues “the strategically selective context is also discursively selective in that it is accessed through perceptions,
misperceptions and representations of the existing context” (Hay 2002, p.44).
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termed by Jessop (1996, 2007) as strategic calculation. In this sense, state policies, initiatives,
and strategies also rely on how actors strategically analyze the opportunities and constraints that
exist in a strategic selective institutional context.
In summary, the exercise of state power—i.e. its actions, initiatives, policies, and
strategies—is not explained by state managers taking isolated decisions according to their sole
interests and perceptions. Actions, initiatives, policies, and strategies are seen as an outcome of
the interplay between a specific, strategic, selective institutional context and actors’ strategic
calculations. The balance of forces and struggles of such actors play a crucial role in determining
which actions, initiatives, policies, and/or accumulation strategies will be fostered by the state.
Out of such struggles, the state will strategically select and privilege some actors, some actions,
and some strategies rather than others (Jessop 2002; Sphar 2016; Smith 2015). The figure below
summarizes Jessop’s strategic relational approach.

Diagram 1: The strategic-relational approach can be summarized as follows.

Source: Hay (2002, 131).
Therefore, how can one explain the underlying causes of corporate capture drawing from
Jessop’s strategic relational approach? As this research pointed out before, corporate capture
happens when the values and interests of MNCs dominate local economic strategies and
initiatives in relation to the interests of local business communities, workers, and governments
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(Phelps & Fuller 2001; Phelps 2000, 2008). Therefore, if state action and initiatives are
dependent on the interplay between a specific strategic selective institutional context and
strategic actors advancing their interests, then the underlying causes of corporate capture reside
in two main points.
First, it resides in understanding how or through which mechanisms MNCs and their
allied forces are able to strategically advance their interests over the interests of other forces.
Second, it resides in acknowledging how and why a strategically selective institutional context
may privilege such forces. In this way, corporate capture will not only be explained based on a
lack of specific regional assets, and/or low levels of state coordination that result in power
asymmetries and regions being in an inferior position when bargaining with MNCs. Corporate
capture will also be understood according to the interplay above described; thus, capture and
power asymmetries can be viewed as being structurally inscribed in the state.
Regarding the strategic selectivity of states, as stressed before, state action and strategies
are always developed within a pre-existing institutional context that is selective and privileges
some actors and actions, some spatial and temporal horizons and certain articulation of
strategies, and some paths, over others (Jessop 2001; 2014). As national and subnational states
vary, it is expected that privileged actors and strategic calculations can also differ. Some states
can be prone to privilege accumulation strategies related to inward investments, others to
developing start-ups, domestics firms, and/or industrial clusters. The accumulation strategy of
states plays an important role in understanding why some regions are more disposed to have
more drastic forms of processes of corporate capture than others.
For example, since the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation, the world has seen an
intense process of neoliberalization that allowed many national states to be more integrated into
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the world market (Harvey 2005). The deregulation of national states has enabled capital to
become more mobile than ever (Hudson 2011; Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017; Yeung 2016).
Such a deregulation has occurred in parallel to processes of national states’ decentralization
through which subnational states have received more economic responsibilities (Martin 2010;
Brenner 2003). This shift has left regions in a critical position (Florida & Jonas 1991). As MNCs
become more mobile, regions are challenged to find ways not only to retain their existing firms,
but also to attract new ones (Hudson 2011; Featherstone & Mackinnon 2017). In this context, in
many countries, subnational states have adopted inward investment strategies in which MNCs
are seen as the route to economic salvation (Wood 2003; Phelps & Wood 2006). In these places,
the strategic selectivity of states tends to encourage regions to address regional competitiveness
by adopting specific paths of action or strategies that will mostly privilege MNCs (see
Rutherford et al. 2018; Smith 2015; Brenner 2003).
According to Rutherford et al. (2018), the state, through its accumulation strategy, selects
and privileges certain segments of global value chains, designs policies to foster FDI spillovers,
determines the rules for regions to compete for investments, and empowers and arbitrates among
different actors in the dynamics of attraction and retention of FDIs (Rutherford et al. 2018). Such
characteristics are highly important to understand why and how processes of corporate capture
happen. These accumulation strategies influence whether some states may have pure inward
investment agencies, developing strategies solely related to attracting MNCs; while other states
may have agencies that mix FDI approaches with cluster development, and have strategies
extended to wider regional development. This can result in major differences with regard to
corporate capture (Almond et al. 2013). But as stated before, the presence of forms of
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governance with wider developmental goals does not exclude the possibilities of corporate
capture being fostered.
As observed, the VC literature reveals that subnational states can differ their models of
development from their national states, and in degrees of autonomy. In this regard, the strategic
selectivity of states and their effects over processes of corporate capture have to be analyzed in
consideration to such variances. In this regard, Rutherford et al. (2018), comparing the
accumulation strategies of Ontario and Quebec have revealed how the strategic selectivities of
Ontario are likely to privilege MNCs over the interests of other actors such as small- and
medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
But as Jessop (2007) and Hay (2002) indicate, the strategic selective institutional context
is not the only factor that will shape or determine how the state will act. Actors, within and
outside the state, strategically calculate and articulate their strategies and goals (Jessop 2007;
Hay 2002). Some forces will be more likely to advance their interests, influencing the state, due
to their strategies, tactics, and goals (Jessop 2011). In this sense, if corporate capture is to be
understood in this view, i.e., according to the balance of forces shaping and determining state
initiatives and accumulation strategies, where MNCs and allied forces are able to advance their
interests over other actors, then, there is a need to explore how and why—or through which
mechanisms—MNCs and their allied forces are able to strategically advance their interests over
other forces to the point of capturing the institutional capacity of the state.
Departing from the assumption that MNCs have structural advantages over other actors
like state managers, SMES, local business communities, and the working class, among others in
the balance of forces behind state initiatives and strategies, this research will explore four main
mechanisms: state managers’ self-interest in power, prestige and a healthy economy; specific
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techniques used to advance their interests; the emergence of a transnational class and inward
investment regimes; and cultural hegemony.
Fred Block (1987) develops an interesting analysis of the rationalization of capitalist
system in which state managers are seen as a distinct class. According to the author, there are
two subsidiary mechanisms and one fundamental mechanism that influence the state to privilege
individual capitalists such as MNCs. The fundamental mechanism resides in state managers’
self-interest in maintaining their power. For the author, in order for state managers to maximize
and maintain their own power, prestige, and wealth, they depend on the existence of a healthy
economy, given that a state’s capacity to finance itself through taxation or financing is based on
its economic levels. When the economy is not doing well, capitalists are led to decrease their
investments, states tend to have a lower tax income, resulting in state managers having
difficulties to behave effectively and successfully, and ultimately in a decline in business
confidence. In this scenario, state managers’ public support can decline, and may result in state
managers being removed from their jobs, or not being re-elected (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010).
Therefore, in general, state managers and MNCs have converging interests, resulting in MNCs
having advantages over other actors such as labor in the formulation of state policy (Hirsch
2010). State managers will likely favor segments of capital that can generate more tax income
and/or jobs than others perceived to produce less. This is even more important as capital has
become more internationally mobile and can play off different locations against each other.
In this context, state managers—where inward investment strategies prevail and where
states are highly dependent on FDIs/MNCs,—tend to pursue policies and initiatives that will
assure investment in their localities, meeting as much as possible the interest of MNCs, even if it
means having their institutional capacities captured. As Phelps and Wood (2006) claim, the
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interests of states and MNCs have become more and more mutual and coincident, transcending
the separation between public and private sectors. State managers move backwards and forward
between the public and private sector further blurring the two spheres (Phelps & Wood 2006).
State managers will be interested in not only having attractive assets, but they will also be
willing to develop policies that meet the needs of MNCs in order to increase business
confidence, easing and encouraging investments (Block 1987; Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988).
So, MNCs are not only able to capture existing institutional capacities, but they are also able to
capture institutional capacities in-the-making. MNCs propose, elaborate and demand state
initiatives that do not exist, and which still require institutionalization. This is because individual
capitalists base their decisions not only on fixed assets such as infrastructure, but also on their
evaluation of the general political/economic climate—such as stability, control of the working
class, taxes, business freedom, growth estimations, potential opportunities and constraints, etc.
(Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). Therefore, the power of states when bargaining with MNCs does
not only reside in the existence of specific or distinct regional assets, as GPNs scholars would
argue. It also exists in relation to its trustworthiness, flexibility, fluidity, and the willingness of
state managers to meet present and future MNCs’ interests by changing, adapting, and
innovating their institutional capacities and arrangements as well as by intervening in their
locality in order to create new assets.
Such a view that state managers act according to their self-interest in power, prestige, and
wealth has been backed by other scholars. Studies have shown that state managers, who seek to
keep their power and jobs, are more motivated in attracting inward investments than growing
their own industries and supporting SMEs because it creates a local buzz that brings fast name
recognition, calling public attention (Wolman & Spitzley 1996; Markusen & Nesse 2007).
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Moreover, state managers want to appear proactive in economic development. This is because
they are concerned that denying deals to FDIs will provide reasons for their political opponents
to contest their work in future elections and may give the region a bad reputation among site
consultants (Reid & Gatrell 2003; Wolman 1988; Markusen & Nesse 2007).
The other two subsidiary mechanisms refer to how MNCs are able to directly influence
the state, fostering their interests. These mechanisms are also able to explain how and why
processes of corporate capture may happen (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). The first subsidiary
mechanism is related to how individual capitalists pursue their interests through various means
such as campaign contributions, lobbying activities, and favors to state managers. Such
techniques increase the receptivity of state managers to capitalists’ interests and goals (Block
1987).
Academics have demonstrated how the representation of firms’ interests to the state is
unavoidably uneven. Firms depend on their capacity and resources to represent themselves to
others and especially to the state (Rutherford 2006), where major inward investors have more
opportunities and representativeness to influence politicians than SMEs or the local community
businesses. Small firms lack representation to push their agendas, and do not have the same
access to state representatives to shape or determine their actions and strategies as MNCs do;
thus, MNCs have higher chances to influence the state and dominate its economic development
strategies and initiatives (Phelps et al. 2005).
Moreover, individual capitalists are able to influence state managers through informal
mechanisms such as forums or committees, clubs, and meetings outside the workplace (Phelps et
al. 2005). Through such means, individual capitalists such as MNCs are able to apply pressure on
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the state for certain kinds of bargain, for certain kinds of incentives and actions, investments,
training initiatives, strategies, and attitudes towards workers, among others.
Nevertheless, such a receptivity goes beyond these actions. The existence of a
transnational class as well as subnational inward regimes have become an important factor in this
matter (Sklair 2002; Phelps & Wood 2006). The term transnational class refers to globalizing
professionals, state managers such as bureaucrats and politicians in different spheres of the
state16, non-state actors like merchants, the media, representatives of private or not-for-profit
organizations, site consultants, and those that control and own MNCs. These actors see one
another as allies, have similar beliefs, and are willing to meet the interests of MNCs (Sklair
2002).
In this regard, as Jessop (2007) and Poulantzas (1978) would point out, the state has
certain subdivisions that tend to favor particular forces like MNCs while other branches might
have a close proximity with other forces such as representatives of different businesses, or the
working class, among others. MNCs and their allied forces encounter great receptivity and work
closely with such state subdivisions and actors.
In particular, the emergence of site consultants as a third party in bargaining events
between firms and states and in such local inward regimes is a key element to understand why
states provide great amounts of incentives and subsidies, or why processes of capture may
happen. These site consultant firms behave as brokers and have been able to foster better deals
for MNCs, enhancing the rate of return for their clients (Thomas 2000; Markusen & Nesse 2007;
Phelps & Wood 2006). As site consultants work for MNCs and for regions, they acquire

16

Although, in any case, state managers who sympathize with a specific force, interpret their demands and interests in terms of a
particular ideology – that of the ‘neutral state’ (Poulantzas 1978). State managers do not look at policies from a perspective of the
ruling class, but from the perspective of state managers (Block 1987).
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knowledge about firms’ priorities—that state managers do not have—as well as about
governments’ fiscal situation and economic development strategies. The problem is that site
consultants earn their fees on a commission basis, where the higher the subsidy package and tax
break, the higher their commission. In this sense, site consultants will explore such information
asymmetries in order to get the best deal for MNCs, given that they have parallel interests. Yet,
site consultants are seen by state managers as gatekeepers to jobs (Reid & Gatrell 2003; Wolman
1988; LeRoy 2005; Markusen & Nesse 2007).
Finally, the other subsidiary mechanism through which individual capitalists directly
influence the state is linked to cultural hegemony. Individual capitalists such as MNCs use the
media and organizations to strategically foster their interests and to push state managers to accept
unwritten rules about what are legitimate state activities (Block 1987). Wood (2003) states that
institutions, practices, political and economic actors have been mobilized to reproduce a material
and discursive terrain that idolizes inward investors and advances their hegemony as a route to
economic salvation (Wood 2003). This is critical in shaping state managers’ perceptions of “best
practices” regarding how to attract and how much incentives to provide to FDIs as well as of the
public. As Rutherford et al. (2018) revealed, part of the process of attracting FDI is to secure
political legitimacy and consent, or more specifically, to draw in workers and the public into
viewing the attraction of FDIs also as being of their interests, for example, due to the generation
of jobs.
In this respect, MNCs and organizations related to inward investments have fostered the
establishment and institutionalization of practices that push states to accept ideas, unwritten
rules, conducts, and norms regarding bargaining events, inward investments, and inward
strategies (Phelps and Wood 2006). States have been educated by such corporations and
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organizations through several initiatives such as “business climate” rankings of regions,
conferences regarding inward investments and strategies, magazines like the “Corporate
Location and Site Selection”, and organizations such as the World Association of Investment
Promotion that exhibit why certain regions are more successful than others in attracting
investments due to their regional assets and initiatives, way of functioning, etc. (Raines 2003;
LeRoy 2005; Markusen & Nesse 2007). Such practices are not particular of one country like the
US but have also disseminated to many countries (Raines 2003). As Peck and Theodore (2015)
argue, due to the deepening of transnational interconnectedness among countries, policy
practices often exist in relation to near and far relatives, meaning that models of policy, such as
of FDI attraction, are often imported from “successful regions” and adapted in other contexts,
thus having many resemblances.
Such discursive construction also influences state managers’ perception of what is too
much in terms of giving MNCs incentives and subsidies. State managers’ perception in terms of
initiatives to attract inward investments relies mainly on the technical knowledge derived from
site consultants and bargaining outcomes of other regions (Lee 2011; Markusen & Nesse 2007).
For example, MNCs require states participating in bargaining processes with them to maintain all
the negotiations in secret (LeRoy 2005). As pointed out before, MNCs have more control over
the flow of information when negotiating with governments, and act opportunistically, taking
advantage of this aspect (Phelps 2008).
Researchers have demonstrated that state managers rarely have precise information
regarding investors’ real intentions, and that firms are able to inflate the number of jobs and
benefits they plan to bring to regions, and require confidentially over the bargaining process
(Weber 2002; Bachelor 1997; Markusen & Nesse 2007). As Phelps and Wood (2006) reveal,
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local political coalitions spread and disseminate such practices and ideologies, given that such
actors adopt a process of modelling to attract inward investment.
MNCs, through the media, stress the supposedly grandiose benefits of their investments
to the region, seeking to capture the regional popular perception and to legitimize the deal, while
compelling states to maintain in secret, the public investments required for it (Phelps & Wood
2006; Block 1987). All these initiatives and material as well as discursive constructions have
resulted in inward investment strategies to become hegemonic in many countries and regions,
where MNCs are privileged over other forces (Wood 2003).
Nonetheless, state managers establish economic development strategies and plans that
legally approach all firms as equals despite their sizes. In general, subnational and local states
base and justify their initiatives, incentives, subsidies, and strategies to attract and retain firms to
their regions on a legal system that specifies the incentives that are given to firms according to
the compensation that they will bring in number of jobs and/or size of investments. So, corporate
capture is not always so apparent in regions’ economic development strategies and plans. In
other words, as Phelps (2008) noticed, regional strategies and plans of economic development
may not explicitly place MNCs at their center, dominating their goals and interests. This is
related to how states are also dependent on other actors, having multiple goals.
State managers even approve economic development strategies that explicitly favor
smaller firms (Dewar 1998; Luger & Bae 2005; Wolman & Spitzley 1996). However, in reality,
when MNCs bargain with regions, such legal systems are ignored by state managers, where
incentives are bargained in secret and greatly exceed the amounts legally established in the
economic development plans of these localities (LeRoy 2005; Markusen & Nesse 2007). State
derivation debate scholars as well as Poulantzas (1977) have demonstrated how—due to class

58

struggles—capitalism requires the existence of a juridical form that embodies the principle of
generality or universality of law and equality of subjects. Nevertheless, it does so under the false
ideology that all individuals, such as capitalists and the working class, are equals and have the
same rights under the law. (Poulantzas 1978; Clarke 1991; Hirsch 2010). In processes of
corporate capture, where MNCs interact with the state, this false ideology is revealed, given that
some forces are privileged. Therefore, in processes of corporate capture, the bargaining events
between states and MNCs in general are guided by a special institutional system that circumvents
and works in parallel to a more general one.

Conclusion
In this chapter, this research sought to analyze not only the concept of corporate capture
but also how mainstream literature has explained the relationship between the state, MNCs, and
the evolution of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. In this regard, two
bodies of literature were critically examined: FDI studies and the GPN literature. I argued that
although both literatures provide interesting explanations, their rationalizations
are too descriptive, overlooking the underlying causes of processes of corporate capture, and
have a problematic approach to state, neglecting for example issues of scale—more specifically
state subnational variations—and class relations.
In the second part, I proceed then to reveal how the variegated capitalism literature, along
with Jessop’s strategic relational approach, and theories regarding the structural dependence of
the state on capital can tackle these issues. Corporate capture, I revealed, is not just due to a lack
of distinct assets, or low levels of public institutional coordination as the FDI studies or the GPN
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literature would argue but are also due to structural and intrinsic features of the capitalist state,
and thus, part of broader social relations.
My main argument was that the evolution of corporate capture can take place at different
state scales and should be understood according to a twofold dynamic: how the
strategic selective institutional context of national and/or subnational states privileges MNCs,
and how MNCs have structural advantages over the state to advance their interests. To
demonstrate how MNCs have structural advantages over the state, this research examined four
main mechanisms: state managers’ self-interest in power, prestige and a healthy economy;
specific techniques used to advance their interests; the emergence of a transnational class and
inward investment regimes; and cultural hegemony.
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Chapter 3: Local Labor Market Governance and Tendencies to Corporate Capture
This chapter will examine whether different forms of local governance reinforce or
minimize processes of corporate capture in regional workforce development systems. Focus will
be given to processes of corporate capture in regard to public training initiatives. It would be
insufficient to understand the evolution of corporate capture only by examining the state and its
relationship to firms. Researchers have in the last decades revealed how local governments have
shifted towards local forms of governance, where other actors have gained centrality in policy
design and public decisions (Lovering 2011; Florida & Jonas 1991; Peck & Tickell 1992; Painter
& Goodwin 1995). This chapter will be divided in four main parts.
In the first part (subsections 3.1 to 3.1.3), I establish my approach to and understanding
of labor, labor market, and to what is termed regional training systems. This is crucial, given that
the goal of this chapter is to analyze whether local forms of governance reinforce or minimize
corporate capture in training initiatives. To do so, I start with a critique of the GPN approach to
workforce development systems, demonstrating how it is problematically based on market
relations, and thus insufficient to analyze corporate capture. I then theorize the concept of
regional training systems, which I believe provides a better explanation of why regional training
systems exist including their main characteristics and how they function.
In the second part (subsections 3.2 to 3.2.2), the concept of local market governance is
explored and its main connection to regional training systems revealed. Local forms of
governance are examined and presented as crucial in regard to how regional training systems are
established, function, and are shaped. Then, I move to the third part (section 3.3) to argue that the
capacity of local forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture of
regional training systems has to be understood primarily according to its state form,
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accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. I also argue that even in regions where their
forms of governance tend to minimize processes of corporate capture, MNCs are still able to
partially capture the institutional capacity of regional training systems due to their economic and
political power, but in different forms and degrees.
Finally, in the fourth part (subsection 3.4), I conclude this chapter by demonstrating how
conceptualizing workforce development programs and initiatives as regional training systems,
prompts this research to rethink the concept of corporate capture. In this part, I provide a
reconceptualization of what should be understood as corporate capture in regional training
systems, exploring in detail the characteristics of corporate capture related to training initiatives
and to class.

3.1 Global Production Networks, Labor, and Regional Training Systems
As this research discussed in the second chapter, the GPN literature was initially
concerned with analyzing the dynamics and relationships between firms and their upgrading
processes (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Coe et al. 2004). However, in the last decade, there
has been a significant emergence of studies regarding the relationship between labor and GPNs.
Currently, the main GPN literature on labor studies has focused on three main topics. The first
topic treats labor as an object and is concerned with how processes of upgrading in GPN firms
affect labor (Smith et al. 2018; Bair & Werner 2015; Coe 2015). For example, academics have
analyzed how upgrading in different countries results in improvements of the labor force in terms
of wages, work safety, etc. (see Lee 2016).
In the second topic, researchers approach labor as an agent, and consider how the labor
process—its form and content—is constitutive of GPNs. In this case, studies have demonstrated
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how workers can foster collective actions to pursue an increase in their share of surplus (Bair &
Werner 2015; Coe 2015; Smith et al. 2018). Social upgrading has been explored as being a
consequence of workers’ collective organization, and not only as top-down firms’ processes of
upgrading as in the first topic (Bair & Werner 2015; Selwyn 2011; Coe 2015).
One important aspect of this literature stream is that labor and processes of social
upgrading or downgrading—when working conditions and wages are degraded—cannot be not
solely understood according to the GPN dynamics, or the networks that workers are part. For
example, as if the formation of a secondary labor force based on temporary, low-paid immigrants
and women workers was only due to buyers’ demands in the supply chain (Bair & Werner 2015).
As an alternative, academics have incorporated in their analyses the broader social relations
shaping the conditions under which labor is able to be exploited, or to take collective action
(Smith et al. 2018; Bair & Werner 2015; Coe 2015). Thus, studies have demonstrated how tight
labor markets, national and regional labor regulations, political conjunctures, everyday practices,
and struggles, among others can play a crucial role in labors’ agency and social up/downgrading
processes (Bair & Werner 2015; Coe 2015; Smith et al. 2018; see Baglioni 2017; Azmeh 2014).
One concept that has been explored in this topic is labor control regimes (Smith et al.
2018; Baglioni 2017; Coe 2015; Azmeh 2014). In this regard, researchers have analyzed how
different actors, intersecting in GPNs dynamics, shape local labor control regimes in order to
exploit and discipline workers through different forms, such as employing informal practices,
fostering gender and nationality segmentation and subordination, among others. Forms of
workers’ resistance have also been explored. In this regard, researchers have moved beyond the
workplace to show how production in firms inserted in GPNs functions and depends on broader
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spaces of labor control, with which the spheres of production and reproduction are intersected
(see Baglioni 2017; Smith et al. 2018; Azmeh 2014).
The third topic, which this research seeks to engage with, has also been marked by
scholars addressing labor as an object. GVC theorists have analyzed how processes of structural
and strategic coupling as well as firms’ upgrading trajectories in GVCs are followed by changes
in skills and workforce initiatives. In other words, how structural/strategic coupling and different
stages of firms’ upgrading processes demand different types of skills, and thus, workforce
development initiatives. Scholars have also been interested in understanding the role that
workforce development systems play in the insertion of underdeveloped countries in GPNs
(Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2016; De Vries et al. 2016; Chin & Liu 2014).
For example, Fernandez-Stark et al. (2011) analyzed how Chilean firms inserted at the
entry-level of the chain of the global fruit and vegetable industry—producers that grow fruits and
vegetables—are marked by an unskilled labor force, which does not require training or related
training programs. However, when firms upgrade from producing to packing, storage, and/or
processing (making juices for example), then they require a skilled labor force with formal
education and training, and thus, workforce development initiatives and programs.
In this respect, the GVC approach to workforce development consists of describing how
firms evolve through different stages of upgrading, requiring at each stage different skills and
consequently workforce development programs and initiatives (see Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark
2016; Vries et al. 2016; Chin and Liu 2014; Psilos & Gereffi 2011; Fernandez-Stark et al. 2011;
Christian et al. 2011; Gereffi et al. 2011). Focus is placed on how state policies can generate a
sufficient skilled labor force for firms, and the existence of a labor force is explained by market
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forces of supply and demand, ignoring how the labor force was established originally (Selwyn
2016). Diagram 2 summarizes the GVC approach to workforce development.

Diagram 2. Workforce Development Scheme Developed by the GVC Literature.

GVC
Upgrading

Skill Level

Formal Education
requirements

Low
Entry Level
Upgrading 1
Upgrading 2
Upgrading 3
Upgrading 4

No formal education
LowMedium
Medium
MediumHigh
High

Workforce development Programs
and Initiatives
Types of training (external and/or
internal, formal, informal, on-thejob, etc.).

High school Diploma
Time (short to long periods).
Technical Diploma
Bachelor diploma
Post-graduate diploma

Degrees (certificate, bachelor,
master, and doctoral degrees).
Institutions (private, public,
and/or not-for-profit).

Source: Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2016; Vries et al. 2016; Fernandez-Stark et al. 2011.

In this regard, the GVC approaches to workforce development systems, as Selwyn (2016)
points out, overlook the existence and formation of an exploitable working class, which are
normally established and disciplined by state actions (Selwyn 2016). As Gutelius (2016) argues
“the presence of a desired labor pool and the terms of inclusion for workers have been taken for
granted” (Gutelius 2016, 42). In other words, the labor market is approached without any
consideration to how it is socially constructed and reproduced in the form of an asset. Thus,
GPN scholars have given attention to labor agency in networks, but the labor market and its
production has been largely under-explored (Gutelius 2016; Coe 2015; Bair & Werner 2015).
Even studies which treat labor as having agency and consider other external conjunctural
factors besides the GPN network, have overlooked the fact that social upgrading in certain
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industry sectors involves and requires uneven workforce development practices. Practices that
are marked by class-based and segmented training systems, in which the best training courses
and consequently the best job positions are mostly accessible to the elite. Therefore, how can one
approach and analyze the relationship between GPNs, the labor market, and workforce
development programs and initiatives, moving beyond market relations? That is the task of the
next section.

3.1.1 Labor, Labor Control Regimes, and Regional Training Systems
In this section, this research will draw from labor geography, and FDI studies in order to
explore the concepts of labor, labor control regimes, and regional training systems. My main
goal is to demonstrate how regions are based on segmented and class-based training systems,
which are required in order to commodify, discipline, and develop an employable and
exploitable workforce as well as to serve as assets to recruit and retain businesses. This will be
an attempt to break with GPN conceptualizations of workforce development initiatives based on
market relations. To do so, this section will be divided in two sub-sections. First, I conceptualize
my understanding of labor, and the labor market. Second, I will develop the concept of regional
training systems.

3.1.2 Labor and the Labor Market
This research, influenced by institutionalists and neo-Marxist approaches, departs from
the assumption that labor should not be understood as a simple commodity, given that it does not
behave as one in the market as orthodox liberal economists would claim, but rather as a fictitious
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commodity (Polanyi 1957). In this regard, the market seeks to subordinate and discipline labor as
if it was a mere commodity, but it is not capable of doing so for several reasons.
First, different from any other commodity, labor supply is independent from demand,
being a product of extra-market processes such as demographic and socio-economic processes
and institutional rules of human reproductive activity. Second, market recognition of acquired
human skills cannot be the sole factor to explain the allocation of labor. This is because certain
social groups are in disadvantage in the labor market despite their achieved skills. Third, a
balance between consent and control in the workplace is not only due to a matter of wages, but
also due to the existence of constant negotiations. Fourth, the sphere of social reproduction is an
important part of the labor market and processes of production, where the supply of labor is not
regulated only by wages (Peck 1996).
The main point in this regard is that labor markets are not self-regulated by the market
according to the demand and supply of workers as if labor was just another commodity. Labor
markets result from the interplay of supply-demand as well as ideological, cultural and political
forces in opposition to the neoclassical view that education, training and workers’ formation in
general function via market clearing (Storper & Walker 1989). But these are not the only reasons
that require labor to be regulated through ideological, cultural, and political forces.
As Jonas (1996) revealed, the need for labor and the labor market to be regulated also
resides in contradictory aspects of capitalism. Due to capitalists’ need to increase their surplus
value by exploiting workers in a global exchange of labor power, there is a social need for capital
to foster reciprocities between places of production/consumption and labor reproduction in local
labor markets (Kelly 2002; Baglioni 2017, Jonas 1996). This means that to ensure capital
accumulation, capitalists have to develop place-based initiatives that encourage the participation
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of workers in production, and that influences the conditions under which labor power is
reproduced and integrated into the labor process (Kelly 2002; Baglioni 2017, Jonas 1996).
These place-based initiatives are needed because, while capitalists have potential power
to control labor at the level of production, they do not have control over workers’ consumption
or labor reproduction (Kelly 2002). Therefore, capitalists seek to influence the conditions under
which workers enter the labor market (Mackinnon 2017; Jonas 1996). To foster such local labor
markets reciprocities between production, consumption, and reproduction, local states develop
what Jonas (1996) has termed “local labor control regimes”. Such local labor control regimes
emerge in periods of crisis, not through the market but as part of an institutional fix, and allow
struggles to periodically go through periods of social and economic stability, and thus, ensure the
conditions for capital accumulation (Kelly 2002; Baglioni 2017, Jonas 1996).
A labor control regime is understood as a historical, cultural and spatial process that (1)
smooths the transition of labor from labor market to the site of production, (2) reproduces
productive labor, (3) coordinates conditions of pay and consumption, (4) and facilitates
conditions of accumulation (Jonas 1996). Social divisions of consumption and reproduction are
important in this framework and are marked by patterns of segmentation and territorial
segregation based on income, race, ethnicity, and gender (Coe & Kelly 2006; Baglioni 2017,
Jonas 1996). In this context, workers also have an important role in shaping local labor control
regimes, where resistance takes place not only at the workplace, but also through consumption
and reproduction. For example, threats to consumption can make labor struggle in production
(Jonas 1996).
One important feature in this framework is that strategies and discourses are understood
to play a crucial role in reproducing the local labor market (Coe & Kelly 2006). Business in this
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regard get involved with local players in order to foster their initiatives. Fractions of capital that
are not so mobile are interested in developing labor market conditions through strategies of local
involvement while mobile factions seek to transform labor conditions, co-opt resistance, and
smooth the process of spatial restructuring (Jonas 1996; Coe & Kelly 2002).
As stated before, GPN scholars have recently engaged with this framework to analyze
labor (Smith et al. 2018; Baglioni 2017; Coe 2015; Azmeh 2014; Coe & Kelly 2002). However,
focus has been placed on the intersection between GPN firms’ employment practices and
workers’ gender and immigrant status as well as household and informal dynamics17. Even
though Jonas (1996) does stress in his labor control regime framework that education and
training are important elements in the reproduction of workers, the “making” of the labor force—
i.e. workforce development programs and initiatives—has so far been largely ignored in GPN
studies.
In this regard, in the next sub-section, this research will further explore how regional
training systems are important place-based assemblages—part of labor control regimes—where
segmented and class-based training programs and initiatives are established and shaped in order
to commodify, discipline and develop an employable and exploitable workforce and to serve as
assets to recruit and retain businesses.

3.1.3 Regional Training Systems and the Commodification, Disciplining, and Development

17

For example, Smith et al. (2018) analyzed how the competitive strategies of clothing lead firms to influence its supply chain in
Moldova, and consequently, its labor control regime. According to the authors, clothing lead firms in Europe have based their
activities on contracts that establish the prices, quantities, and a fast-speed delivery time of production. Such a strategy has
limited the profit of its suppliers, encouraging Moldovan suppliers to foster a labor regime where employers pay low wages based
on piece rate norms and bonus payments, employ informal payment practices, and where social reproduction can only be secured
by working overtime. In this labor regime, workers’ resistance, although present in workers migrating to other countries, is
limited due to a lack of labor representation in the clothing sector, and a national state committed to liberal practices and to
employers’ associations (Smith et al. 2018; see Baglioni 2017; Azmeh 2014).
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of Workers
Several scholars have demonstrated that the labor market and training capacities of
regions are a crucial asset to attract and retain firms, and thus, to determine where they are
located (Coe 2015; Ron 2010; Christopherson & Clark 2009). However, as revealed in subsection 3.1, GPN studies have lacked a more nuanced approach concerning how the production
of workers’ skills intersect with GPN firms. In this regard, in this section, after presenting and
critiquing VoC studies of skill formation systems, this study will theorize the notion of regional
training systems.
One important stream of the varieties of capitalism literature concerns its analysis to how
different forms of national economies are marked by different types and education practices. As
demonstrated in chapter two, the VoC literature categorizes models of capitalism according to
specific dimensions of which education is one18. One of the main critiques to the VoC approach
was that the differentiation between education types and practices in liberal and coordinated
countries was based on a very broad category of general versus specific skill systems, and thus,
failed to account how the same models of national economies can have different types of skill
regimes. For example, how such skill regimes vary among coordinated market economies
(Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012). More recent accounts of VoC
scholars have sought to advance such analysis, which has been termed “skill formation systems”
(Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012).
According to the VoC literature, the skills formation systems of national economies are

18

For example, according to Hall and Soskice (2001) educational institutions in liberal market economies such as the US are
marked by general skills (general education) that are complemented with on-the-job-training in the firm. Coordinated market
economies such as Germany are marked by educational institutions that foster more specific skills (vocational training) due to its
vocational schools combined with workplace-based training (Hall and Soskice 2001; Emmenegger and Seitzl 2018; Busemeyer
and Trampusch 2012).
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designed and established according to the political struggles that take place in four main political
arenas: (1) The balance of power and interests among different fractions of capital, where some
sectors and firms have more power to influence educational and training reforms than others. (2)
The political power of trade unions and their consequent influence over political and industrial
relations, as well as, their potential preference for certain types of training such as school-based
training or apprenticeships. (3) The balance of power between labor and business. Employers
seek a high level of autonomy in the provision and implementation of training, so they can invest
in firm-specific skills as well as influence training institutions to do so, while workers and their
representatives seek to have investments in transferable and polyvalent skills with certification,
skills that can be employed in other firms. (4) The dynamic of state structure such as in
federalism and its consequent partisan competition (US for example has a two-party system), and
engagement with certain fractions of capital and/or labor (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011).
Such political struggles influence and determine (1) who will provide skills; (2) who will
finance training; (3) the level of firm autonomy in training and the degree of public oversight in
the firm training process/content; and (4) the degree of connection between vocational training
and the general education system. The results are also dependent on the current existing juncture,
such as neoliberalization, which puts countries on certain trajectories in terms of their skills
formation systems (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011). VoC scholars have identified several skill
formation systems such as liberal, segmentalist, collective, and statist, which are summarized in
the table below.
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Table 3. Skills Formation Systems and their Main Characteristics
Liberal
In liberal skill formation systems in countries like the US, the market provides
skill formation in the general education system. In this case, the general
education system delivers generic educational qualifications to individuals that
are often accompanied with internships, summer jobs during training, and
finally more specific on-the-job training. Vocational tracks at high schools are
considered less important in contrast to preparation for college admission. In
general, vocational skills are disconnected from high schools, being mainly
provided by vocational colleges, which demand students to pay tuition and do
not have a strong institutional linkage to the labor market.
Segmentalist The difference to the liberal skill regime is that the willingness of firms to
invest in the formation of their employees’ skills is much higher. A sizable
share of a typical youth age cohort enters the internal labor markets of large
firms immediately after leaving the general school system and subsequently
undergoes an intensive process of skill formation that entails job rotation
schemes and off-the-job training courses in in-house training centers and
vocational schools. Japan is a prominent case of a segmentalist skill formation
regime.
Statist
In contrast to both the liberal and the segmentalist skill regimes, public
policymakers are much more committed to supporting vocational and
educational training as a viable alternative to academic higher education in
order to promote the integration of young people with weak academic
qualifications into education and employment. Vocational and educational
training is fully integrated into the general education system, which allows and
encourages people with vocational qualifications to pursue tertiary education.
As a corollary, the involvement of employers in the process of skill formation
is very limited. The statist skill formation system is best exemplified by the
Swedish or French educational system.
Collective
They are characterized by a strong commitment of both the state and firms to
invest in the formation of vocational skills. It combines strong involvement of
firms in training and high public commitment of the state to support vocational
training. This skill formation system is best exemplified by countries such as
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria.
Source: Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011, 13-14.

Studies of skill formation systems have some major issues despite developing an
interesting approach to the relationship between different forms of national economies and
vocational and educational training. First, similar to the VoC approach to models of national
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), studies of skill formation systems tend to conceptualize their
skill models based on levels of market relations. Such a categorization, as the VC scholars have
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demonstrated, is problematic (Jessop 2014). For example, liberal market economies are
characterized as marked by a skill formation system, where the market delivers skill formation
through the general education system. However, markets require social, institutional, and
political structures to work properly (Peck & Theodore 2007), and this is not different for
education. The production and consequent delivery of workers’ skills are not decided based only
on market relations, but they also involve ideological, cultural, and political forces, as this study
demonstrated in the last section, including strong state intervention.
Furthermore, such categorizations are limited and enclosed, explaining the formation and
the changes in skill formation systems based on the national internal relationships among firms
and their representatives, unions, and the state. Such a literature neglects the fact that national
economies and their skill formation systems are not isolated, but part of an ecology of variegated
forms of capitalism, which are integrated in a world market (Jessop 2012). This global
integration has important effects on vocational and educational training, and therefore, on the
formation, shaping, and ongoing transformations of skill formation systems, and regional
training systems. Non-liberal skill formation systems such as the collective skill formation
system have converged towards the market due to the ecological dominance of neoliberalism
over educational policies and initiatives (Jessop 2014; Lakes & Carter 2009; Thelen &
Busemeyer 2012; Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018). Neoliberalism as the dominant world hegemonic
project influences the formation and transformation of training systems in particular ways, where
there is a need to consider the existing commonalities and differences across space, as Peck and
Theodore (2007) have demonstrated in their critique to the VoC literature.
Second, researchers have overlooked the internal variation in skill formation systems
within national models (see Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012; Thelen
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& Busemeyer 2012). Such a categorization is problematic because it is based on a high level of
generalization, which disregards the important ways that subnational states can deviate from
their national skill formation system model. Third, the skill formation systems approach is
indifferent to class relations, and to issues of uneven development (Streeck 2012). In this regard,
there is a need to understand how such skill formation systems play a role as important
mechanisms to the uneven reproduction of capital.
To address the problematics above discussed, in the next section, this research will
develop an approach based on the concept of regional training systems. This approach will go
beyond the goal of simply identifying and comparing how different national economies have
different skill formation systems in terms of training and skill types. To do so, first, this research
will explore the concept of local forms of governance, and how it influences and shapes regional
training systems. Second, this research will analyze the main features of regional training
systems. I will engage with theories of uneven development, regulationist approaches to
accumulation and regulation at the regional scale, and critical pedagogy studies.

3.2 Local Governance, Regional Training Systems, and Uneven Development
In today’s economy, the processes of production have become highly complex, requiring
in many job-positions a high skilled labor force that can only be prepared through years of
formal studies (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012). More and more, employers manifest their
discontent regarding how the labor market has not met their skill needs, pushing the public
agenda to meet their demands (Cappelli 2015).
In the last decades, local forms of governance have emerged, playing a crucial role in
how regional training systems are established and transformed. In this regard, labor market
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governance studies have demonstrated how training systems cannot be understood solely as the
result of domestic firms’ and workers’ representatives, and the state at the national scale. Such an
approach pays greater attention to the subnational scale, firms’ strategies and/or interests—be it
single firms or their representatives—, states and their accumulation strategies, and other actors
such as educational institutions, among other. Outcomes are understood according to the
differential and hierarchical power relations among actors in governance forms, or their balance
of forces, as some scholars of the skill formation systems approach claimed (see Busemeyer &
Trampusch 2012).
Different forms of governance started to emergence during the late Fordist period, when
there was a public disenchantment with government performance due to the world economic
crisis and fiscal pressures, which led governments to have budget deficits (Lovering 2011;
Painter & Goodwin 1995). In this neoliberal context, private actors started to participate in
regional planning decisions that before were exclusively public (Peck & Tickell 1992; MassonVincent 2008). As such, regions become quasi-individuals forced to find their own ways to
development, where many actors such as governments, academics, consultants, private
entrepreneurs and lobbyists, among others, started to work collectively to develop suggestions
about how local policies might be better elaborated (Lovering 2011; Painter & Goodwin 1995).
Mainstream literature has regarded and theorized local forms of governance as collective
modes of coordination, where the relationships of governance actors are predominantly marked
by trust and reciprocity, shared power and interests, and as having a strong autonomy from the
state (Blanco 2015). However, some studies have called our attention to the divergent and
contradictory sides of such relationships, which are often characterized by strong state
intervention and hierarchical power relations (Davies 2011, 2014, 2015; Davies & Spicer 2015;
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Blanco 2015). Davies (2011, 2014) for example, claims that governance practices are in general
part of the hegemonic neoliberal ideology as well as part of local ideological hegemonic blocs
seeking to legitimize and justify their actions through network ideology.
In this regard, this research adopts the concept of “regional service class”, which
approaches governance as mechanisms through which fractions of capital—normally represented
by a few powerful local firms—present and foster their interests, and are supported by the
creation of new regional institutions, programs, networks, and associations (Lovering 2011). For
Lovering (2011), such fractions of capital are generally unrepresentative of their regions and rely
heavily on state intervention.
Such an approach, although giving importance to fractions of capital in directing
governance actions, also acknowledges that other actors such as state managers, educational
institutions, and not-for-profit organizations have a crucial role in such mechanisms, being able
to present and foster their interests (Lovering 2011). Under this view, governance is also
understood as an important instrument in the construction of new imaginaries around regional
identities and plays an important role in the consolidation of a professionalized political class,
and of policies intended to persuade the local public rather than represent it (Lovering 2011).
One issue, however, is that the regional class approach, by emphasizing local fractions of
capital, gives little attention to the role and interests of state managers and international actors,
and to how regional governance is not isolated from other forms of governance at different
scales. As this research stated in the last section, it is crucial to have an approach that considers
how regional training systems are not only established and shaped according to national/internal
dynamics as the skill formation systems’ approach has stressed.
In this regard, first, it is important to acknowledge that state managers constitute a
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distinct class (Block 1987), have their own interests, seek to develop their regions, and are
increasingly more concerned with not only attracting firms to their places, but also with
developing and employing their local workforce in opposition to businesses hiring out-of-state
workers. Thus, state managers have a central role in local forms of governance. Second, local
forms of governance, involved with FDI policies can behave as subnational territorial coalitions,
which “translate the interests and ideologies of transnational capital and more local sets of
interests and agents” (Woods & Phelps 2006, 494). More specifically, Phelps and Wood (2006)
reveal how governance actors19 act as coordinating actors, or mediators, on behalf of inward
investors with local actors. Such actors transmit and translate the material and ideological
interests of MNCs’ agents to local institutions, facilitating their attraction to local states (Phelps
& Wood 2006). Adding this component to the concept of regional class service, governance is
interpreted not solely as representing the interests of local fractions of capital, but also as
mediators or translators of transnational capitalists.

3.2.1 Governance and the Establishment and Shaping of Regional Training Systems
The implication of such a view is that this approach allows this research to understand the
development of regional training systems according to the balance of forces and interests among
actors such as the state, educational institutions, and capital at different scales such as
international, national and local. In this regard, regional training systems are not only socially,
but also spatially constituted (see Peck 1996). Training systems are territorially constituted and
vary across space and time where particular forms of training practices are established,
naturalized, and predominant. Such differences depend on several factors such as global

19

Such actors vary from state managers, a transnational class, consultants, economic development and inward investment
agencies, firms and their representatives to educational institutions, among others (Phelps & wood 2006).
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production networks and regional fractions of capital that these regions are part of, the labor
processes and internal training they adopt, their national skill formation system, and their state
form and accumulation strategy, among others (see Schneider & Karcher 2010; Tregaskis &
Almond 2017; Almond et al. 2014; Christopherson & Clark 2009; Phelps & Fuller 2001).
Even though national formation systems are important to understand the functioning and
characteristics of regional training systems, local governance dynamics can result in regional
training systems greatly differing from their national formation systems. Schröder and Voelzkow
(2016) demonstrated that although regional forms of governance have gained power in the last
decades, they do not outplay national models of governance. In reality, national, sectoral, and
regional forms of governance have to be understood as an outcome of their interplay, given that
these forms interact and influence one another. For example, as firms in a world market search
for regional economies that offer an optimal sectoral regulation to their activities, regional
economies (with specific industrial clusters) have sought to offer an optimal regulation to their
sectors in order to attract firms (Schröder & Voelzkow 2016). In this respect, regional forms of
governance shape and are shaped by sectoral and national forms of regulation, where regions can
deviate or conform to their national form of governance. Regional deviation of local forms of
governance is common when the national forms of governance challenges the sector in which the
region is specialized (Schröder & Voelzkow 2016).
The same idea, this research believes, applies for regional training systems. Regional
economies can be marked by fractions of capital, strong sectoral specialization such as industrial
clusters, and by influential MNCs. Such features can demand regional training systems to deviate
from their national skills formation system. For example, Tregaskis and Almond (2017)
demonstrate how forms of governance are an important channel through which MNCs interact
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and influence labor market skill actors, and attempt to at least partially take ownership of the
resources of local labor markets. This can result in regional training systems drastically differing
from their national skill formation system (see Schneider 2009). But it is important to notice that
the levels of deviation are dependent on the degree of autonomy of states, where for example,
variations can be more frequent in federalist states (Almond et al. 2004).
Therefore, this research concurs with the skill formation literature, when scholars argue
that some sectors and firms have more power to influence educational and training reforms than
others, fostering some types of training (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012). However, this study
goes further to recognize that such power relations in local forms of governance are able to foster
variations at the local level.
As the skill formation literature demonstrated, the power relations at the national level
will decide: (1) who will provide training; (2) who will finance training; (3) the level of firms’
autonomy (i.e., having internal training without any public supervision, or content requirements);
(4) how much vocational training and the general education system will be integrated. Firms are
interested in having educational institutions delivering firm-specific skills, and in having
autonomy to internally train their workers without any state intervention, so they can also deliver
highly firm-specific skills. In contrast, workers and their representatives seek to have
investments in training that are transferable and with polyvalent skills with certification
(Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012). But, how can one interpret, or
understand this dynamic at the local level in regional training systems?
At the local level, the power relations concerning regional training systems are mostly to
decide: (1) which skills are provided; i.e. which programs, courses, training initiatives are
established, offered, and/or expanded, and how curriculums are designed. The state as well as
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workers are interested in having transferable skills that attend the business community in general,
while single MNCs and fractions of capital are interested in fostering regional training systems
that provides narrow specific types of skills that attend mostly their needs and reduces their
costs. Educational institutions thus encounter themselves intersected in this twofold interest
(Holborow 2012).
The existence of regional training systems resides in the fact that education is a capitalist
social form, whose goal is to produce a particular pseudo-commodity, labor power (Rikowski
1995). In this way, the profits of educational institutions as well as the existence and functioning
of workforce development programs, courses, and initiatives rely on their capacity to produce a
labor power that meets the skill needs of employers, and thus, can be hired in the market
(Slaughter & Rhoades 2010). Therefore, educational institutions, seeking to maximize their
profits/success and to keep their own programs/initiatives’ functioning, are opened to attend to
the interests of fractions of capital and single MNCs—through offering highly customized
courses and designing their courses and curriculums around their interests—as well as to the
interests of the local business community through generic types of training skills based on
industry sectoral assessments. As long as MNCs are hiring the students attending customized and
highly specific (skills) training initiatives, educational institutions can have their institutional
capacity captured.
Generic/customized skill provision is established and delivered according to how
representatives of educational institutions access labor market needs, according to the power of
actors to represent their needs in local forms of governance, and according to the form of the
state and governance in which it takes place. As Phelps and Wood (2006) demonstrate, MNCs
transmit their interests to state institutions in local forms of governance through a complex range
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of actors at different scales, where local actors translate the interests of transnational capital, but
still take in consideration their own (Phelps & Wood 2006).
Such a specificity makes regional training systems to be characterized as dual training
systems, which refers to how regions develop general workforce skills training practices
(occupational skills) in conjunction with firm-specific skills20 training practices (see
Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Thelen & Busemeyer 2012; Phelps et al. 2005). In the past, firmspecific training was offered by firms, internally, but there is a tendency in which educational
institutions are increasingly building customized21 training programs and practices in partnership
with firms, not only as part of incentives packages to attract MNCs, but as something more
permanent for MNCs that are embedded in certain regions (see Long 2009; Andrade et al. 2005).
Customized training programs and their practices involve the development of curriculum
and training according to the needs of firms, employers co-teaching disciplines, provision of
instructors to teach on-the-job, reimbursement of companies’ costs for their workers training,
travel funding to get training in other plants, and the use of the institutional apparatuses of
educational institutions for employers to have their workers trained, among other initiatives.
Such a phenomenon takes us to the second main feature, (2) Who finances training.
Power relations at the regional level are also to decide who will finance training.
Although decisions of who will finance training—the state, firms, workers, and/or a mix them—
are heavily decided at the national level (national skill formation system), at the regional level,
fractions of capital and single MNCs are interested in influencing the state and educational

20 This research considers general workforce skills as the ones that are transferable or portable and goes beyond the firm level,
thus, training initiatives provide training above the needs of single firms. Company-specific skills are understood as skills that are
non-transferable, provided to attend the needs of single large firms (Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018; Thelen & Busemeyer 2012).
21 “By definition, customized training is instruction for workers and job seekers provided by education and training institutions
working closely with employers. The training curriculum is developed or adapted to meet the education and training needs of the
specific firms, which often belong to a particular sector” (Long 2009, 2).
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institutions in order to have cost- and bureaucracy-free customized training and services. At the
regional scale, such power relations regarding who finances training take place at two fronts:
training initiatives to attract firms, which are temporary and dependent on the bargaining event
between the firm and the state—where a specific number of workers receive cost-free training
for firms—and training initiatives that are permanent, independent of bargaining events, which
function regularly as a way to retain existing firms and also according to the interests of
educational institutions (see Andrade et al. 2005).
Therefore, power relations at regional training systems are also around firms pushing the
state and educational institutions to offer costs- and bureaucracy-free training programs and
initiatives that deliver highly firm-specific skills, and thus, decreases internal training and costs.
As stated, educational institutions are interested in offering such courses as long as it maximizes
their profits, and/or success.
Local economies, or more specifically state managers, also have their own interests. In
this regard, state managers see regional training systems not only as important assemblages that
provide skills to local workers, but also as relevant assets that serve to recruit and retain
businesses. Local economies have developed, as part of their regional training systems,
institutionalized programs and initiatives that offer customized, cost- and bureaucracy-free
training services as a way to attract firms and to provide aftercare services (Nesse & Markusen
2007; Dawley 2007). Such programs and initiatives are used as a way to compete for firms in the
global market and have become a must-have asset for regions to be global players. In this
context, regions develop economic development plans, approved by their regional/municipal
councils, under which parameters are established regarding the types and amounts of workforce
development incentives available for firms according to their potential investment and creation
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of jobs in the region.
As revealed in the last chapter, capitalism demands the existence of a juridical form
based on the principle of universality of law and equality of subjects. However, this juridical
form fosters the false ideology that all individuals, such as capitalists and the working class, are
equals and have the same rights under the law (Poulantzas 1977; Clarke 1991; Hirsch 2010).
This same principle explains how regional incentive or economic development plans function.
Regions, by law, equalize all firms—be it small, medium, and large corporations—by providing
institutionalized plans of incentives according to the amount of investment of firms and the
number and specification of the jobs they will potentially generate. However, the interaction of
MNCs with local economies reveals such ideology to be false (Mascaro 2013). MNCs
circumvent economic development plans and are able to get training incentives that are way
above the established parameters, reaching a degree of incentives to which the local business
community has no access. In this regard, regional training systems, as regional assets to attract
firms, often disrupt such a false ideology by privileging MNCs (see Phelps et al. 2005). In other
words, MNCs push subnational states to have a parallel juridical form that benefits MNCs, which
should be considered in analyses of processes of corporate capture.
Third and finally, the power relations at the regional level are also to decide (3) how
much vocational training and the general education system will be integrated. However, at the
local scale, power relations are related to how single MNCs and dominant fractions of capital are
more influential in terms of which vocational courses will be offered at the secondary level.
Nonetheless, this feature also depends on the degree of autonomy of subnational states to
structure and rule their own educational institutions. But fractions of capital and single MNCs
have a great interest in integrating vocational training and the general education system, mostly
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at middle schools and high schools. To do so, MNCs have established partnerships with schools
in order to foster the development of STEM courses, and sectoral related-path careers (Lakes &
Carter 2009; Beder et al. 2009).
According to some scholars, in the current neoliberal period, schools are being
encouraged to be entrepreneurial and to have public-private partnerships, which advance
curriculums that are seen to bring competitive advantages for schoolers according to their
individual merits. Therefore, schools are going through a process of corporatization, where
business and state leaders work together to establish curriculum, testing standards, and
pedagogical practices (Baltodano 2012; Bender et al. 2009).
Fractions of capital and single MNCs are interested in integrating vocational training and
the general education system in order to influence which career training or skills schools foster,
given that prevalent skill training at the secondary level influences students, and their decisions
toward their future education and career-path. In this regard, schools are more and more tied to
the development strategies of regions, where the goals and strategies of schools and businesses
have been increasingly integrated (Baltodano 2012; Lakes & Carter 2009; Bender et al. 2009).
Therefore, regional training systems are highly influenced by neoliberal policies in which
schools are increasingly influenced by capital, and at the local level by fractions of capital and
single MNCs, which seek to establish partnerships and, in this way, to convince students to
follow specific career-paths that meet their interests and guarantee enough labor supply.

3.2.2 Regional Training Systems and Uneven Development
The labor market as a regulatory space, and its correspondent schooling and workforce
development programs and initiatives, are crucial for the reproduction of capitalism. Local
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economies, under the influence of such capitalists and other actors, develop regional training
systems, which attend the interests of the actors involved. Such assemblages are established in
order to commodify, discipline, and develop an employable and exploitable workforce (see
Rikowski 2000, 2004), and to serve as assets to recruit and retain businesses.
Under capitalism, regional training systems have three main purposes and characteristics.
First, it seeks to socially produce desired workers that meet the skill needs of employers.
Employers’ needs are basically a necessity for certain labor power attributes such as certain skills
and personality traits within a laborer who has the potential to deliver them (Rikowski 2000,
2004). As the value of a commodity is based on the socially necessary labor-time taken to
produce it (Marx 1867), schooling and training play a crucial role in firms’ competitive
strategies, given that changes in skills and consequently in productivity allow capitalists to
produce their commodities at a lower value, and even temporally sell them at a lower price than
the average price of the market. Moreover, schooling and training have an important role
regarding the quality of the commodities produced by workers (Rikowski 2000; 2004).
In this regard, education and training, as capitalist social forms, are the main processes
responsible for socially producing desired workers (Rikowski 2000, 2004), and therefore, it is
vital to understand how education and training function and are structured in relation to global
production network processes such as value creation, upgrading, strategic coupling, etc.
Capitalist schooling and training produce the most essential commodity, i.e. labor power. The
term social production of labor power refers to processes of compulsory education as well of
training (on- and off-the-job), of different forms of personal development programs through
schools, colleges, higher education, computer-based training, informal labor knowledge
exchange, among others (Rikowski 2000).
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Second, regional training systems are marked by processes that foster segmented
practices and class22-based inequalities. This means that even when regions go through processes
of firm and social upgrading, it involves and requires uneven workforce development practices
marked by class-based and segmented training systems. For example, it is not rare to find
regional training systems, where the best training courses and consequently the best job positions
can be mostly accessible to the elite.
Marxist and neo-Marxist theorists have greatly contributed to understanding the role of
education in our society (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Willis 1977; Giroux 1980; Reay 2018). One of
the major contributions concerns how the values learned at school correspond to the values
required at the workplace, and how schools influence working class students into working class
jobs (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Willis 1977). Some of the main roles of schools are to form a
reserve army of skilled labor and to produce docile workers – regarding social relationships of
dominance and subordination that take place at workplaces. For example, students’ learning to
accept the authority of teachers corresponds to accepting the authority of managers. Another
important role of schools explored by the authors is related to how schools reproduce class
inequality (Bowles & Gintis 1976; Willis 1977).
The above authors, directly criticize the prevailing US view of human capital theory and
that success is based on people’s educational merit related to degrees, credentials and years of
schooling, exploring how educational institutions (like schools) foster inequality. The authors
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This research adopts a relational conception of class, and understands class according to three main factors: (1) the ownership of
the means of production, (2) authority, and (3) skills and expertise (Wright 1997). In relation to authority, it understands that labor
positions with higher remuneration and power over other workers at work are tied and closer to the interests with those of the
capitalist class. Regarding skills and expertise, labor with such features can have higher salaries and more autonomy over their
work and their co-workers, resulting in a proximity with the capitalist class. This means that positions with greater authority, and
skills and expertise are more prone to be influenced by capitalist interests within this class position. These positions are in
contradictory locations within class relations (Wright 1997; Nylund 2012). Therefore, this study differentiates wage labor positions
according to their relation to the means of production as well as the attributes of their position, i.e., their authority, and skills and
expertise.
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show that the middle class has cultural and material advantages in relation to the working class,
being in a better position to guarantee that their children go to the best schools and consequently
get the best education and jobs, whereas working class children have access to poorer education
and low wage working class jobs. In this regard, the authors reveal how schools function in order
to shape students according to capital’s purposes and to legitimate class inequality (Bowles &
Gintis 1976).
In the same direction, Levin (1987) claims that in the workplace, “the most remunerative,
powerful, and highest status positions are generally occupied by person who themselves have
considerable educational advantages and come from higher social class origins” (p.149).
According to the author, in general, people from less advantaged backgrounds get less education
and schooling of poorer equality than students from more advantaged backgrounds and are
normally geared toward basic and vocational preparation. But different from Bowles and Gintis
(1976), Levin (1987) understands that schools are also an arena of struggle, where students
create independent dynamics, breaking with the correspondence between the schools and the
workplace. In this regard, Giroux (1991), although seeing great value in the Bowles and Gintis
(1976) analysis, criticizes the authors for not acknowledging that working class students are not
fully shaped by the capitalist system, being able to resist what they are taught. Moreover, Giroux
(1991) points out that education is not always in the service of capitalism, given that it can also
harm the bourgeoisie.
To date, the “correspondence theory” of Bowles and Gintis (1976), which strongly
stresses the sense of passive obedience by students/workers is no longer fully applicable. This is
because workers have recently been pushed to behave as entrepreneurs, being required to be
more creative and active in their tasks. However, their view on how schools reproduce class
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inequality, legitimating it through the myth of meritocracy, is still valid and reveals a current
phenomenon: educational achievement and job positions still have a strong correlation to
workers’ social class background (Reay 2018; Giroux 1991).
Strengthening the argument made by Bowles and Gintis (1976), in the last few decades
several labor segmentation studies have demonstrated how the segmentation of labor has been
broadened. Scholars have explored how production, social reproduction, and consumption are
characterized by patterns of segmentation and territorial segregation based on income, race,
gender, ethnicity, migrants, and disabled people, among others (Smith et al. 2018; Bair &
Werner 2015; Coe 2015; Jonas 1996; Peck 1996). For example, Estévez-Abe (2012) reveals how
the dual apprenticeship training model of the German collective skill formation system has
obstacles for women. Young women hesitate to adhere to this type of training due to the risks of
becoming unemployed after family-induced breaks in their career. Moreover, employers are less
inclined to recruit women for vocation training due to the potential loss of skill investment if
they decide to leave the workforce (Estévez-Abe 2012; Streeck 2012).
Some forms of regional training systems, highly influenced (or not) by industrial clusters
inserted in GPNs, can excluded or prioritize some workers according to their gender, race,
migrant status, and to the labor processes that firms adopt. For example, firms can base their
production on low-wage female workers, whose salary is a supplement income for households,
in order to produce competitive products (see Azmeh 2014). In this case, regional training
systems can be heavily based on informal training practices, and/or on-the-job, which prioritizes
women.
Third, in the current neoliberal context, as more firm-specific types of training
increasingly gain importance, the distance between academic and vocational routes are made
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more explicit. In this context, the major focus of vocational training is on the mismatches
between what employers need and what students learn. Thus, in vocational training more general
subjects have been considered less important. This poses issues to job mobility, and to questions
of who has the power to consider what counts as relevant knowledge and the power that
knowledge itself can provide (Nylund 2012). While education and training to the working class
are based on narrow curriculum, which delivers a knowledge that is problematic to transfer and
employ in different contexts, education and training for privileged classes are based on a
curriculum with less context-bound knowledge, which provides more space and time for
reflections concerning matters that are less apparent and regarding possibilities, features that are
crucial for critical thinking to exemplify. Vocational training, thus, considers theoretical and
critical thinking as irrelevant. Nonetheless, this type of knowledge is important for individuals
who will be positioned in vulnerable and subordinated positions (Nylund 2012).
One important difference between education and training is that training seeks to fit a
person towards a specific goal or end, and denies students other abilities such as critical thinking
and independent learning, or the role of work in society or about their rights, while education
aims at comprehending the reasons behind things. “The more employers influence and shape
education the more it will tend towards worker training and away from citizen education” (Beder
et al. 2009, 248).
In sum, narrow and firm-specific education in vocational training can prevent the
working class to access knowledge that stimulates a critical view of society and its political and
economic organization. Therefore, it contributes to the “unequal distribution of power and
knowledge between classes… [and] neutralizes the question of who gains the power to decide on
what counts as important knowledge in vocational programs.” (Nylund 2012).
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For workers, industry-specific23 training also poses additional problems. Often such skills
are not transferable to other industries, and when workers are able to switch industries, they
undergo wage losses (Smits 2007; Müller & Schweri 2015). In this regard, there is a conflict of
interest between capitalists and the working class. Firms are interested not only in having
educational institutions providing narrow firm-specific skills—given that they increase
productivity, and production quality—, but also in having general training skills as little as
possible because it gives the workers greater outside opportunities and pushes firms to pay
higher salaries. Workers, on the other hand, are interested in having not only firm-specific skills
training, but also generic skills training, which have wider transferability and applicability across
firms and industries, and thus, sectoral mobility (Smits 2007; Emmenegger et al. 2018). For
example, firm-specific training (or customized training) prioritizes the needs of certain firms and
results in limited mobility for workers (Emmenegger and Seitzl 2018). Customized training is
often detached from general academic education, and therefore, in overall does not provide the
opportunity from continuum education and mobility from vocational training certification to
academic education. It further emphasizes the idea of working-class education for the working
class. When specific and general training offer a great number of general subjects and thus
eligibility of integration with higher education, it avoids dead ends and gives students more equal
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“Generic skills will be defined as skills that have higher value outside the industry or occupation the worker is trained for than
within the industry. These may be skills that are directly applicable in another industry or occupation or skills that facilitate the
acquisition of the skills required in the new industry. Both types of skills increase the labor market flexibility of the worker. A first
group of skills that have a higher value outside the industry than within the industry are skills that are used in several industries or
occupations, but in different combinations and with different weights attached to them. For example, a hairdresser may need some
selling skills to sell the client hair care products after the hair cut but selling skills will have a higher value in other occupations
and industries such as a shop assistant in a drugstore or a sales representative in the hair care industry. A second group of skills that
may have a higher value outside the industry than within the industry are cognitive skills such as reading, writing and Mathematics,
problem solving skills and learning skills. Workers with a higher level of generic skills, which they define as a combination of
learning abilities, analytical abilities and problem solving abilities, have a higher change to work in an occupational field which
does not match their field of study and that in this case, the wage impact of generic skills is highest.” (Smits 2007, 655).

90

opportunities after finishing higher-secondary education (Nylund 2012). Diagram 3 summarizes
the concept of regional training systems.

Diagram 3. The Establishment, Shaping, and Characteristics of Regional Training Systems

Source: Author.
3.3 The Ability of Local Forms of Governance Actors and Institutions to Lessen or Amend
Corporate capture
Several studies have exhibited how varying state forms have different modes of
subnational governance, approaches to FDI, and outcomes regarding processes of externalization
(see Rutherford et al. 2018; Almond et al. 2017; Pavlinek 2016; Tregaskis & Almond 2017;
Almond et al. 2014; Almond et al. 2013; Almond et al. 2012). Such studies have sought to
demonstrate how local forms of governance can reinforce or minimize processes of corporate
capture. One particular explanation regards how these scholars have associated the capacity of
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local forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture to their forms
of state–types of coordination and state organization such as federalist and unitary systems–as
well as to their state accumulation strategies.
For example, Almond et al. (2014) claim that local forms of governance in liberal
subnational states such as Madrid and Ontario have a less active coordination with FDIs than
Asturias and Quebec, and thus, are less successful in embedding corporations, and consequently,
in maximizing spillover processes and cluster formation. On the other hand, the subnational
states of Asturias and Quebec possess a more coordinated approach to economic development
and have higher degrees of political consensus and more potential to create positive outcomes
such as meeting the needs of the business community in general regarding skills (Almond et al.
2014). Almond et al. (2013) also acknowledge that local forms of governance and their
approaches to FDIs (and extent such as pure FDI agencies or agencies with wider developmental
goals) vary according to the level of autonomy of their subnational states. According to the
authors, countries with greater levels of subnational state autonomy (like federalist countries)
have local forms of governance that are more active in attracting and embedding firms than
countries with less autonomous subnational states.
Moreover, Almond et al. (2013) assert that more coordinated economies have local forms
of governance with wider regional development goals, more likely to have positive outcomes
when bargaining with MNCs than the ones found in more liberal economies. In this sense and
with regard to how subnational states behave to attract, retain, and embed MNCs, Almond et al.
(2017) categorizes two types of approaches of regional forms of FDI governance – but
understands that in the real world such approaches can blend: market and state (or associationalcentered).
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Market-centered governance of FDI relies on a passive dependence on locational
competitive advantages. The state is mainly absent and does not foster industrial policies of any
kind. State action is limited to elaborating regulations that allow firms to effectively compete in
the market. State-coordinated governance indicates heavy interventions into the region and seeks
to increase firms’ international competitiveness. States seek to establish relationships with
foreign direct investors not only to attend to their needs, but also to foster processes of
externalization that develop the region (Almond et al. 2017). Such a relationship can entail the
political leadership of associational governance. Associational governance refers to the capacity
and desire of local actors to engage with local MNCs in ways that improve location-specific
advantages. In such cases, the provision of grants can be followed by requirements to embed
firms within the region, fostering cooperative practices between MNCs and local actors such as
SME, research centers, educational institutions, etc. (Almond et al. 2017). But what is not clear
in the above theorizations is why such forms of FDI governance have the shape they present and
behave differently.
In this regard, Rutherford et al. (2018) demonstrated that governance actions aimed at
maximizing FDI spillovers are related to state accumulation strategies through which some
sectors, firms, and institutionalized compromises are empowered and prioritized. According to
the authors, Quebec’s developmental state has stronger initiatives to maximize FDI spillovers,
and this is connected to its accumulation strategy, marked by an industrial policy that supports
domestic firms, and involves workers’ representatives. For example, Quebec’s subnational state
provides funds to develop regional patient capital and has unions with an active role in training
and in long-term collective agreements (Rutherford et al. 2018). In other words, workers’ as well
as domestic firms’ representatives have substantial power of representation in Quebec’s form of
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governance due to the centrality the state gives to such actors in its accumulation strategy.
Therefore, the form of national and subnational states, their accumulation strategies and
their consequent policies to economic development play a crucial role in determining the types of
local forms of governance and their approaches to attract, embed, retain, and develop firms as
well as in determining the developmental outcomes of such FDI policies. In this regard, the
capacity of local forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture
has to be understood primarily according to its relationship to its state form and accumulation
strategy, along with the unfolding consequences it has. These consequences have to be thought
of in terms of governance autonomy, its financial and political power, the magnitude of FDI
institutions to engage in aftercare of new investors and with already existing MNCs, and the
nature of FDI institutions as pure inward investment agencies or agencies with wider regional
development powers/goals.
As this research demonstrated in the second chapter, state accumulation strategies
prioritize certain actors and their strategic needs and demands (Jessop 2015), and influence the
outcomes of FDI policies. Consequently, the capacity of local forms of governance to reinforce
or minimize processes of corporate capture has to be comprehended along with an understanding
of which actors have their interests prioritized in state accumulation strategies. In other words,
the degree of corporate capture of regional training systems depends on the balance of forces and
consequently the power of representation of actors such as the working class and their
representatives, MNCs, fractions of capital, and educational institutions, among others at their
forms of governance.
As discussed before, local forms of governance are not marked by shared power and
interests, a collective mode of coordination, or a strong autonomy from the state but by a strong
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relation to the state, hierarchical power relations, and function as an instrument for capitalists to
foster their interests (Davies 2011; Lovering 2011). In this regard, as local forms of governance
are important mechanisms for firms and other actors to present their interests to the state in
regard to securing the commodification of workers, and thus, the development of training
programs, state educational policies and strategies, local forms of governance have to function
and are consequently shaped by their type of state selectivity in order to effectively present their
interests. This also reveals how the state shapes local forms of governance as well as why they
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture.
According to Claus Offe (1984), the capitalist state has an apparatus that is capable of
attending to multiple interests from different actors such as single capitalists, the working class,
business representatives, and fractions of capital. To receive and attend to different interests,
states have particular forms of selectivity, which are classist and tend to attend the interests that
will allow the valorization of capital (Offe 1984). Offe (1984) understands the concept of state
selectivity as how states establish an internal institutional configuration with criteria and
selective processes responsible for choosing which interests are mutually compatible with their
own interests and with the interests of capitalists (Offe 1984; Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). In
other words, states have mechanisms of selection that function as filters, which shape how
policies are formulated and implemented, how actors present their interests to state managers and
which interests are selected and prioritized (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). Hay (2002) adds that
habitual practices, routine, and intuition can play a key role in how actors strategically present
their interests to the state. This means that the institutional legacy and political culture of local
states play a crucial role in how actors’ coordination and interactions function, as well as in how
initiatives and strategies are elaborated and fostered. For example, the subnational and local
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states of some countries are marked by highly professionalized and tenured non-partisan
bureaucrats and technocrats, while in other countries, they are characterized by patronage and
partisan staffs, or are a Weberian bureaucracy based on meritocracy (Banfield & Wilson 1966;
Evans 2008). Such differences can result in different types of behaviors regarding how actors
pursue their interests.
In this regard, local forms of governance tend to be shaped by such mechanisms of
selection in order to present and have their interests attended. Forms of state selectivity lead local
forms of governance to function in certain ways in order to present and have their interests
selected. For example, some states like South Carolina select and foster initiatives based on
formal relations, studies, and lobbying activities, which lead local forms of governance and their
actors to formulate and present their interest through these ways and mechanisms. As we will see
in the cases of Charleston and São José dos Campos, their forms of state selectivity have
important outcomes to how and whether their local forms of governance reinforce or minimize
processes of corporate capture. As state selectivity privileges capitalists (Offe 1984), even in
regions where local forms of governance and state accumulation strategies prioritize SMEs and
processes of externalization, and/or the working class, MNCs are still able to influence and
capture public training programs and initiatives (see Rutherford et al. 2018).
According to Peck and Theodore (2015, 31) the world has seen a “deepening
transnational interconnectedness, in which local policy experiments exist in relation to near and
far relatives, to traveling models and technocrat designs, and to a host of financial, technical,
social, and symbolic networks that invariably loop through centers of power and persuasion.”
where models are imported and adapted. In this context, as Phelps and Wood (2006) revealed,
there has been a spread of ideologies and practices to attract inward investments. Such ideologies
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and practices have been replicated across the world and benefits the interests of MNCs.
For the authors, although the transnational capital has not general interests, the processes
in which their interests are translated or mediated by actors of local forms of governance present
certain patterns. Such patterns are converging “toward neoliberal national and local modes of
regulation and interest representation” (Phelps & Wood 2006, 498), and translate a degree
of convergence in pressures and challenges that test and bend existing rules at the state level.
Therefore, practices understood as characteristics of corporate capture have been replicated
across the world, even in regions which their state and forms of governance privileges domestic
firms and externalization.
This is not only due to states providing packages of training incentives, but also due to
the direct relationship between firms and educational institutions, and their mutual interest in the
commodification of education and workers. Representatives of educational institutions
frequently assess labor market studies and interact with firm owners, recruitment agencies, and
other labor market intermediaries in order to determine which skills are in need (see Almond et
al. 2017; Clark & Christopherson 2007). Thus, educational institutions, concerned in maximizing
their profits/success24 and to keep their own programs/initiatives’ functioning, are interested in
concomitantly attending the interests of single MNCs25 (given their political and economic
power as well as scope of employment) through highly customized courses as well as the local
business community through generic types of training skills (see Emmenegger & Seitzl 2018;
Phelps et al. 2005). However, the opening, design, and expansion of MNCs-related courses and
programs are often prioritized over the needs of other sectors.

24

Meeting the skills needs of employers means that students will be hired, which in turn increases enrollment in programs.
In many cases, firms find difficult to articulate or define medium- or long-term skill needs, giving to educational institutions
some relative autonomy to design courses, meaning that educational institutions are not so heavily influenced by corporations.
25
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To conclude, the capacity of forms of governance to reinforce or minimize processes of
corporate capture has to be understood primarily according to its relationship to its state form,
accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. This is because the state form and its
accumulation strategies shape the way forms of governance function and the initiatives and goals
they foster. Importantly, the type of state selectivity of states influences who receives centrality
in mechanisms of representation like local forms of governance, and how governance actors
represent their needs to state managers—formal strategies, studies, informal interactions, etc.—
which in turn influences whether some forms of governance reinforce or minimize processes of
corporate capture.
Moreover, even in regions where their forms of governance tend to minimize processes
of corporate capture, MNCs are still able to influence and capture regional training systems
despite subnational states’ accumulation strategies and local forms of governance prioritizing
domestic firms or SMEs. This is related to the multiple interests of governance actors involved in
the commodification of education and workers, as well as, the economic and political power of
MNCs. Therefore, processes of corporate capture in regional training systems have to be
understood in a different perspective, taking into consideration power relations and initiatives at
different scales, as this study explains in the next sub-section.

3.4 Rethinking Corporate capture in its Relation to Regional Training Systems
In this section, this research will reframe the notion of corporate capture. Conceptualizing
the GPN approach to workforce development systems as regional training systems prompts this
research to rethink corporate capture. As this study will reveal, processes of corporate capture in
regional training systems have to be understood in a different perspective, taking into
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consideration the power relations and initiatives at different scales, and in relation to uneven
development and not sole externalization.
To do so, first I will briefly summarize the main discussions of corporate capture of the
labor market. As this research focuses on the capture of regional training systems and not the
labor market per se, there is a need to lay emphasis on capture in this matter specifically.
Therefore, second, in this section, this research will expand the literature in the topic of corporate
capture, but specifically regarding regional training systems.
Studies regarding institutional or corporate capture of the labor market have
demonstrated how MNCs are able to impose their values and interests, influencing and
sometimes dominating the initiatives and strategies of local governments. Scholars understand
that corporate capture happens when the relationships between MNCs and local governments are
marked by unilateral negotiations, i.e., MNCs fostering their private interests over public
regional general interests. The regional or general interests of governments are pictured as their
willingness to maximize the benefits that a MNCs can bring to regions aside the generation of
jobs. For example, in return for subsidies, regions can push MNCs to have a certain percentage
of suppliers at the local level, thus, encouraging their embeddedness and the development of
industrial clusters.
Therefore, for researchers, corporate capture happens when regions provide human
resource and support services, and subsidies to attract or retain MNCs to/in their places, but do
not receive a same-level return from such firms in terms of externalization such as spillovers.
MNCs basically influence and exploit the institutional capabilities of regions, making their
private interests to prevail over the public interests of regions (Phelps 2000, 2008; Pavlinek
2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps & Fuller 2010).
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Thus corporate capture occurs when MNCs receive (1) customized training packages, (2)
are able to distort local skill agendas and strategies, which thus, lack wider business community
involvement, (3) recruit most talented workforce from the local business community and from
outside the region, and/or (4) avoid knowledge sharing/exchange. However, how can this
research approach, analyze, and understand processes of corporate capture specifically related to
regional training systems? In this regard, this research will argue that corporate capture should be
understood according to three main aspects.
First, this research will, as studies of corporate capture have argued, analyze corporate
capture of regional training systems according to which skills are provided at the regional level,
and to who finances training services and initiatives. Regarding which skills are provided, this
research will analyze how MNCs are able to influence the state and educational institutions to
receive customized training. In this regard, processes of corporate capture in training systems
should be understood in relation to the existing degree of duality in regional training systems, i.e.
the existence of firm-specific customized training initiatives and general initiatives. It also
requires looking at the types of skills that are taught in customized programs; do they provide
very narrow firm-specific skills, or a mix of specific and general?
It demands as well examining how MNCs are able to control, develop and design courses
and curriculums in partnership with the state and educational institutions, to place their staff as
part of the teaching staff, and to establish a contract that identifies such students as their workers.
Regarding who finances training services and initiatives, corporate capture also has to be
analyzed in relation to how MNCs influence the state and educational institutions in order to
receive cost- and bureaucracy-free incentives for customized training initiatives and services,
which involves not only free training, but other practices such as free provision of instructors to

100

teach on-the-job, reimbursement of companies’ costs for their workers training, travel funding to
get training in other plants, and the free use of institutional apparatuses of educational
institutions for employers to have their workers trained.
This research will differentiate two types of corporate capture through customized
training initiatives: Temporary26 and permanent capture. Temporary capture of customized
training programs refers to how regions provide customized training in order to attract firms to
their localities. In general, this happens when regions are bargaining incentive packages with
firms. Such a capture is momentary and exists until states train the number of workers
established in the negotiation with the firms. Permanent capture of customized training denotes
how embedded firms capture the institutional capacity of educational institutions, establishing
customized types of training initiatives that are perennial and intended to last as long as
companies and educational institutions are mutually interested (see Andrade et al. 2005).
Corporate capture in this regard would be understood as happening at some scales—for
example, customized training can be provided by the subnational state, or by the national state—,
for some industry sectors, and for specific firms, where training is focused on specific-firm skills
and based on customized programs, courses, and initiatives. However, it does not mean that the
whole training capability of educational institutions will be captured. As stated in chapter two,
corporate capture is always partial (see Phelps 2008). The existence of customized training
programs and initiatives is given in conjunction with generic skill training programs and
initiatives. This conjunction is also related to the fact that firms can have difficulties to predict
their long-term skill needs.
This also involves analyzing the level of integration between customized vocational

26

Momentary forms of capture can be renegotiated and renewed, thus, lasting many years.
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training and the general education system, and how MNCs have influenced public educational
policies and agendas at different scales, fostering their skill agenda, and/or influencing schools to
advance their interests through training programs. However, this is not to deny that educational
institutions have autonomy, given that their interests must also be taken in consideration.
Second, corporate capture of regional training systems has to be understood according to
how MNCs are able to circumvent the juridical form of national, subnational, and/or local states
in regard to established institutionalized training incentives for the business community in
general. In this respect, it would require looking at how MNCs influence the state and
educational institutions in order to receive more training incentives than the regional
institutionalized training incentive plan has established for the business community in general.
Such an approach involves, understanding how capture also involves low levels of transparency
in the bargaining incentives given to MNCs and accountability.
Third, corporate capture of regional training systems has to be analyzed in relation to
processes of uneven development and not only in relation to processes of externalization as
mainstream literature has done. While mainstream literature has predominantly stressed how FDI
does or does not result in wider cluster benefits, in benefits to the business community in general,
focusing on uneven development will enable researchers to analyze the state MNCs nexus, and
their outcomes to education and training initiatives as well as to issues of class, gender, and race,
among others. In this respect, this research proposes to explore three main features.
First, how the processes of corporate capture of regional training systems reinforce, or
aggravate the segmentation of the labor market, and class-based inequalities through training
initiatives and practices. In other words, how the influence of MNCs over schools and colleges
result in training programs and initiatives that further unequal class relations and labor
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segmentation. As pointed out, some types of training programs and initiatives as well as their
provision of knowledge are designed for the working class, while others for the ruling class. For
example, when subnational states agree to recruit and train a number of workers for MNCs—as
part of their incentive package—, it may require state managers to persuade students and workers
to take a certain career path, what often involves convincing the working class—and their
children—to get working class training and jobs.
Another example concerns how regional segmented labor markets are marked by the
existence of a secondary workforce based on gender, race, migrant status, with temporary
positions and low-paid wages (see Bair and Werner 2015), workers who are excluded from
receiving certain types of education such as academic, but not from others like vocational, and
excluded from opportunities delivered by public customized training initiatives due to their
gender for example. Such features take us to the second point, which consists analyzing whether
the provision of public cost-free customized training and training services for MNCs are
followed by prerequisites, and how customized training is designed.
Do customized training initiatives involve the state requiring MNCs to pay competitive
wages, to have career plans, to be gender, race, and ethnical inclusive, and to have benefits for
workers such as health insurance and paid vacation? In other words, does the state demand
MNCs to provide benefits for workers in exchange of the cost- and bureaucracy-free training
incentives they receive? This aspect is important to evaluate whether the institutional capacity of
regional training systems is captured by MNCs. Moreover, are the design and content of the
curriculum of customized training initiatives broad enough to provide transferable skills? Does
the content of such training initiatives provide opportunities for continuum education in
vocational and academic education, thus offering possibilities for social mobility in terms of
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education?
It is important to notice that processes of institutional de-capture are also possible to take
place at regional training systems. For example, while states develop training initiatives at
regional training systems to attract firms, state managers at the local scale can develop initiatives
that seek to reverse such capture by fostering more inclusive, permanent, and generic training
initiatives that target the local business community and the working class. For example, Phelps et
al. (2005, 575) demonstrated how processes of capture create “an associated counter-movement
in which public sector agencies are obligated, to some extent, to broaden these benefits to other
parts of the business community.” Moreover, as the working class are able to advance their
interests, and influence education strategies and policies, processes of corporate capture can be
reversed (see Streeck 2012).
The examination of the three features above presented requires one to look at processes
of corporate capture at regional training systems through a multi-level approach to governance
that considers its different scales. It allows this research to understand how processes of capture
can happen at some scales but not in others, and how it can be followed by processes of decapture.
To conclude, examining corporate capture based on the notion of regional training
systems, prompts this research to explore such a process in a different perspective. A perspective
that (a) considers its multi-scale nature, (b) breaks with its dualistic view of capture or
externalization, (c) takes in consideration the hierarchical power relations and interests among
governance actors, and (d) acknowledges the connection between capture and class relations.
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Table 4. Main Characteristics of Corporate capture of Regional Training Systems.

Source: Phelps 2008. Author.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to examine whether different forms of local governance reinforce or
minimize processes of corporate capture in regional training systems. Critiquing the GPN/GVC
approach to workforce development systems, I elaborated upon the concept of regional training
systems to argue that the capacity of local forms of labor governance to minimize or reinforce
processes of corporate capture in training has to be comprehend alongside with their state form,
accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity.
In regard to the state form, it was explored how countries can attribute different degrees
of autonomy to their subnational states, which can affect the role, relevance, and extent—like
pure inward investment or wider developmental goals—of local forms of governance in the
attraction and retention of FDIs and MNCs. Concerning the accumulation strategies of states, I
argued that they shape the way forms of governance function and the initiatives and goals they
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foster. Importantly, I asserted that the type of selectivity of states influences who receives
centrality in mechanisms of representation like local forms of governance, and how governance
actors represent their needs to state managers, which in turn influences whether some forms of
governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture.
Moreover, it was also claimed that even in regions where their forms of governance tend
to minimize processes of corporate capture, MNCs are still able to influence and capture regional
training systems despite subnational states’ accumulation strategies and local forms of
governance prioritizing domestic SMEs. This is due to the multiple interests of governance
actors involved in the commodification of education and workers, as well as, the economic and
political power of MNCs.
This understanding regarding why local forms of governance may reinforce or minimize
processes of corporate capture demanded this research to reconceptualize how corporate capture
is understood. Therefore, in the last subsection of this chapter, this study sought to conceptualize
corporate capture in regional training systems as a process that goes beyond the binary view of
states’ interests versus MNCs’ interests, or corporate capture versus externalization. This
research sought to expand what is understood by corporate capture and to frame it as marked by
uneven development and uneven class relations, which is related to different state scales and
multiple outcomes.

106

Chapter 4: Variegated Forms of Corporate Capture: The Case of Charleston, South
Carolina and Boeing
In the last decades, the state of South Carolina, in the United States, has been able to
attract several manufacturing corporations. Bosch, BMW, Boeing, Mercedes-Benz, and Volvo
are just a few examples. In this regard, the region of Charleston (composed by Berkeley,
Dorchester and Charleston counties) has gained attention for receiving many of the newly
established companies in the state. One well-known example regards how the state of South
Carolina was able to attract Boeing South Carolina to the region of Charleston through the
provision of nearly one billion dollars. To be able to attract such corporations, state managers
have designed several mechanisms and initiatives—many related to training incentives and
programs—which have definitely positioned the state in a competitive position when bargaining
with firms. Amidst such aggressive policies of FDI attraction, processes of corporate capture
related to training initiatives are expected to take place.
In this context, this chapter will be divided in three main sections. In the first section, I
argue that the evolution of processes of corporate capture related to South Carolina’s educational
strategies and some training initiatives is related to how the state, theorized as a “hidden
developmental state”, has established a strategic selective state apparatus that privileges
manufacturing MNCs and their interests. I reveal that state managers have designed educational
strategies and training initiatives intentionally targeted to be captured by MNCs. Attention will
be given to the following initiatives: Career Academies, Apprenticeship Carolina, and ReadySC.
In the second section, the structural coupling process between Boeing and South Carolina
will be analyzed, where I will disclose how Boeing captured the institutional capacity of
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ReadySC, a state program that provides customized training free-of-charge for firms. This
section will comprehensively study the particularities of such a capture.
Finally, in the third section, this research will determine whether Charleston’s local form
of governance has reinforced or minimized processes of corporate capture in its regional training
system. I argue that Charleston’s local form of governance has reinforced corporate capture by
embracing, implementing, and expanding its higher-scale state initiatives and educational
agenda. Although, attempts have been made to minimize corporate capture. I explore how such
attempts to minimize capture are related to how the region’s formal sector-level strategy named
One-Region, reduces single-firms’ influence, such as Boeing over Charleston’s local regional
training systems. Moreover, I demonstrate how these attempts to minimize corporate capture
have been problematic, mostly due a lack of power of local state managers and to local
governance actors’ attempts to solve corporate capture based on market relations.

4.1 South Carolina’s State Form, Accumulation Strategy and Relationship to Corporate
Capture
This section will reveal how processes of corporate capture related to public training
initiatives in South Carolina have evolved as intrinsically related to its accumulation strategy. As
this research will show, structural coupling processes lie at the center of South Carolina’s
accumulation strategy, revealing the specificities of processes of corporate capture in three
training initiatives—Career Academies, Apprenticeship Carolina, and ReadySC. I argue that
South Carolina has established and designed training programs and initiatives, such as ReadySC
to be intentionally captured by MNCs. Nonetheless, classical processes of corporate capture
continue to occur in the state through bargaining events between state managers and MNCs.
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As revealed on the second chapter of this dissertation, the varieties of capitalism (VoC)
literature has classified different countries based on firms’ ability to solve coordinating
problems, categorizing the United States as a liberal market economy (Hall & Soskice 2001;
Schneider 2009). However, this framework has held problematic. One issue concerns its
disregard to how national states can have subnational variations. Thus, the variegated capitalisms
literature has demonstrated how subnational states can have sub-models of capitalism with
diverging coordination and accumulation strategies from their national states (Rutherford et al.
2018; Peck & Theodore 2007; Schröder & Voelzkow 2016; Zhang & Peck 2014). Such
variations challenge theorizations that claim liberal national states to be more likely to engender
processes of corporate capture than developmental states, and stress the importance of scale (see
Phelps 2008).
South Carolina exemplifies how subnational states can vary from their national
economies if one classifies the United States as a liberal market economy. South Carolina
resembles a developmental state, and as its “hidden developmental” national state form (Block
2008) is highly interventionist. Nonetheless it has significant similarities with the classical
developmental states. As developmental states do (see Fine 2008; Woo-Cumings 1999), South
Carolina has consciously enacted economic changes employing industrial governmental policies,
which opposes the idea of having a free market economy. Moreover, as in developmental states,
high institutional coordination levels mark South Carolina, where state managers continue to
focus strategically on specific sectors to establish growth policies.
Subnational internal variations in the United States, such as the one in South Carolina,
have resulted from the US federal system, which grants significant policy design autonomy to
subnational states. Moreover, the historical uneven expansion of industries in the country has
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resulted in varying subnational states in terms of policies and models of development. The
uneven process of industrialization in the US was mostly significant during the late 19th Century,
when some northern states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois developed their
manufacturing industries while several southern states such as South Carolina lagged behind.
South Carolina maintained their agricultural economy, and specialized its industry in textiles and
apparel, which were based on a low-wage nonunionized labor force (Rees 2016). Nonetheless,
after the Second World War, attempting to transform its economy into a manufacturing
powerhouse, as the northern states, South Carolina adopted an accumulation strategy based on
attracting mature industries interested in relocating to lower operating-cost regions (Ford &
Stone 2007; Porter 2005). As Jessop (2014) has argued about the nature of the state, South
Carolina started to develop a selective institutional apparatus, centered on attracting large
manufacturing corporations to foster accumulation and development. As Rutherford et al. (2018)
revealed, states can select and focus on various global value chains segments to design
developmental policies. In the case of South Carolina, state managers have established attractive
pro-business mechanisms and initiatives, such as low taxes, land donation, low wage workforce
provisions, right-to-work state policies, training incentives, minimum government regulation,
and heavy subsidies and financial incentives to privilege, and thus, attract manufacturing
corporations (Ford & Stone 2007; Porter 2005; Villa 2010). Therefore, structural coupling
processes laid pivot around its accumulation strategy. Indeed, as some interview participants
articulated, subsidies and incentives were, and remain, vital to South Carolina accumulation
strategy. One interviewee from the Berkeley Chamber of Commerce declared:
[..]South Carolina was a poor state, so what they did is that they put their money in what
they think would get the best outcome […]. We did not have any industry until…our first
industry was in 1973. Part of that was the lobby. They state decided “that is all we got,
we need to get the most for this”, and doing that we can try to bring big industries to
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bring jobs and get rural South Carolinians up. So, we have already been growing since
1950. It is a short time especially compared to other areas. But before that very poor.
While still in place, this strategy has altered since the 1980s regarding its sophistication
and mechanisms employed to foster structural coupling processes. Such changes are related to
the neoliberalizing process that the US has been undergoing since the late 1970s, which has
fostered and shaped interactions among state managers and manufacturing MNCs subnationally
(Harvey 2005). Interactions that have advanced in South Carolina, a pro-business institutional
apparatus and programs crucial to foster structural coupling processes. The neoliberal movement
gained prominence in the end of 1970s when the US Keynesian state encountered increasing
problems due to the crisis of Fordism. By the early 1980s, President Reagan promoted American
neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy (Harvey 2005), resulting in three processes:
1. Statehood denationalization, reorganizing US national state apparatus functioning on
subnational, national, supranational, and trans-local levels (Jessop 1997).
2. “Destatization” of its political system, where the private sector becomes a key political actor
in public decisions and strategies (Jessop 1997).
3. Internationalization of its policy regime (Jessop 1997), meaning that the US state apparatus
increased its orientation toward facilitating internationalized investors’ accumulation
(Glassman 1999).
Due to these three processes, the US Schumpeterian Workfare emerged (Jessop 2002).
This new US state form started to place greater attention on policies that could advance
technological development, innovation, enterprise, and human capital (Jessop 2002). Due to the
internationalization of its policy regime in the 1980s, competition from low-wage offshore
countries increased, challenging South Carolina’s developmental strategy.
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In the 1990s, the augmented international competitiveness manifested in primary South
Carolina industries, with textiles and apparel losing half their employees. Until the end of the
1990s, South Carolina stayed at nearly 80 percent of the national per capita income average,
making one of the ten poorest states in the nation (Ford & Stone 2007; Porter 2005). Thus, South
Carolina altered its state accumulation strategy in the 2000s, becoming much more aggressive
and embracing a developmental project that could competitively situate the state in the new
knowledge-based global economy (Ford & Stone 2007; Vila 2010).
Topics such as human capital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics
(STEM), innovation, and research became central in South Carolina’s political agenda. But this
state agenda was difficult to accomplish given the state’s under-funded and deficient public
education system, lack of innovation and patents, the absence of tier-one research universities,
and overall poor skill levels (Ford & Stone 2007; Porter 2005). South Carolina state managers,
MNCs and their representatives, and Michal Porter’s cluster-based developmental plan
influenced the design of this agenda. This new accumulation strategy maintained its heavy
reliance upon subsidy provisions and incentives but developed more sophisticated and aggressive
mechanisms and initiatives to attract and retain firms, representing significant shifts. This will be
explored in the three following subsections.

4.1.1 Flexibility, Inter-Scale Fluidity, and Efficiency
First, South Carolina has established mechanisms or an institutional apparatus flexible
and efficient in attending to the interests of MNCs. As this research demonstrated in previous
chapters, state managers, as a distinctive class, tend to pursue policies and initiatives that will
result in investments in their localities (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). This pursuit of policies and

112

initiatives constantly results in institutional apparatus experimentations and shifts. Hence, South
Carolina has not only made the provision of fixed assets such as infrastructure, low taxes, and
incentives an important instrument to attract and retain MNCs to their regions but has also
developed an institutional apparatus that commits to “in-the-making” necessities and
possibilities, or potentialities. In other words, state managers are open and eager to develop
initiatives for MNCs that do not exist, that may be needed in the future, requiring or not new
processes of institutionalization. Such openness and willingness reduce uncertainty for potential
investors. Individual capitalists, such as MNCs base their decisions not only on fixed assets when
examining where to invest, but also on their evaluation of the general political and economic
environment of localities (Block 1987; Rooksby 2010). In South Carolina’s case, state managers
have acknowledged this fact. As one representative from the South Carolina Department of
Commerce stated, “we make ourselves available to listen to firms and to work collaboratively as
a team to attend to their needs.”
The South Carolina Department of Commerce has mostly exerted such a role, recruiting
MNCs and helping existing businesses to remain competitive. As one Berkeley County
representative asserted, recruiting MNCs requires the South Carolina Department of Commerce
to work closely with local states to develop attractive benefits packages and to offer corporations
various potential sites (Interviewee 10). Therefore, successfully enticing corporations takes
complex collective efforts involving various actors at different scales. This inter-scale collective
work has unevenly developed across the state, a characteristic that Brenner (2003) has
acknowledged in his theoretical work. Some regions have garnered more success than others in
attracting firms. As Interviewee 6 detailed, Charleston has become a relevant player in recruiting
firms only in the last 15 years, but “the Upstate, Greenville area, has been very aggressive in
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economic development before.” This is because Charleston has built a strong form of
governance, which has the capacity to compete for investments and to represent their interests
and goals to state managers at the subnational scale. The Charleston Metro Chamber of
Commerce (CMCC) and the Charleston Regional Development Alliance (CRDA) have remained
primarily responsible for Charleston’s local governance agenda. Interviewee 10, a CMCC
representative, professed:
we go together and try to be one-on-one with many legislators from our area and educate
them. Here is what is on our agenda. Here is why it is on our agenda. Here is why it is
important. Here is how it impacts the business. That is what needs to be done to fix this
issue. Will you help us? And because we have been doing that for a long-term, we got
good relations. So, with building lobbying, it is all relationships, it is building that
relationship with that particular elected official, so they know when you call […]
Interviewee 15, a representative from the Berkeley Department of Economic
Development explained the significance of existing channels of interaction between the local and
subnational scale in the recruitment process for MNCs stating:
The project came through the state. […] we got tied in with the state and soon we were
competing with the others (counties). These big industries when they are out there
looking, they hire site selection firms to do research of potential sites. They go through
the states’ department of commerce and tell them what the requirements are and what are
their needs and the state department of commerce has all the information on sites. So, if
there is a potential site that will work in our county, they will send a request for
information and we will have to submit all the information on that sight. If the site
selection firm presents our site to x y z companies, and they like our site, then they will
initiate a conversation with the state and the state will be negotiating.” (Interviewee 15,
2016).
Phelps (2008) contended efficiency in state institutional coordination is crucial to foster
externalization processes and avoid corporate capture. But in the case of South Carolina, the high
inter-scale capacity of state managers to coordinate actions has vitally facilitated the state to meet
MNC interests and consequently to attract such firms to their regions. At 2016 South Carolina
Manufacturing Conference, Philip Morgan, a senior project manager at the South Carolina
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Department of Commerce publicly asserted that the state has successfully recruited
manufacturing firms due to the state’s flexibility and capacity to work collectively:
We are a team; you can reach out to any one of us. So, we partner with regional
representatives, with county representatives, we partner with them all, with private
partners and utilities. Any company that wants to talk to us, please come and talk and we
will put the right people in front of you. “One of our skills is the ability to be flexible.”
(Aerospace Conference 2016).
Interviewee 9, a representative from Trident Apprenticeship Program, also attributed the
success of South Carolina in attracting companies, such as Mercedes Benz, Volvo, and Boeing,
to state managers’ capacity in working collectively to accommodate corporate needs. According
to Interviewee 9, “Charleston has grown to manufacture more than any place in the United
States…” and this is because
…[the state] gets people involved, when you get leadership, companies, high schools
together, you get the college, technical schools, whatever, together, you see results and
that is something else.
Researchers have explored such a role in several studies. For example, scholars like
Phelps and Wood (2006) have demonstrated how states’ and MNCs’ interests have grown more
mutually coincidental, transcending, or blurring the separation between public and private
sectors. Therefore, the power of states when bargaining with MNCs does not only reside in
specific regional assets, as GPNs scholars would argue but also on the trustworthiness,
flexibility, inter-scale fluidity, and the state manager’s willingness to meet present and future
MNC interests. Accommodating the immediate and future MNC interests requires constant
change, adaptation and experimentation of state institutional capacities and arrangements as well
as locality intervention to create new assets.

4.1.2 Greater Commitment to Keeping South Carolina’s Right-to-Work Status
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One second significant aspect of South Carolina’s accumulation strategy shift has
concerned South Carolina’s greater commitment to maintaining the state right-to-work27 status.
Although such a commitment is not new, South Carolina state managers have increased their
efforts at the state and local level to discourage workers’ attempts to unionize in the state. This
plays an important role in its accumulation strategy, given that such efforts, as Block (1987) has
pointed out, enhance business confidence in the state, encouraging potential investors like MNCs
to come to the state. To explain South Carolina’s success in attracting MNCs, Philip Morgan
contended that: “We are a right-to-work state. We have the lowest unionization labor rate. The
employees here don’t want to be unionized. It is a culture within the workforce” (SC Aerospace
Conference 2016). State managers’ commitment has been relayed mostly through speeches,
news statements, and online platforms, like Twitter. At an automobile conference in Greenville,
Nikki Haley, a former South Carolina governor, spoke out about the state’s view regarding
unions:
We discourage any companies that have unions from wanting to come to South Carolina
because we don’t want to taint the water. […] You’ve heard me say many times I wear
heels. It’s not for a fashion statement. It’s because we’re kicking them every day, and
we’ll continue to kick them.” (Bell 2014).
More recently, the current governor of South Carolina, McMaster, has also opposed
attempts of unionization in the state. Due to the International Association of Machinists (IAM)’s
unionization victory28 in 2018 at the Charleston’s Boeing plant, the governor contended, “Their
presence (IAM) in North Charleston is about as welcome as a Category 5 hurricane. […] we
aren’t going to let out-of-state labor unions ruin the wonderful working environment in our

27

The term right-to-work state refers to states that have passed a law which guarantees that no person can be compelled to join or
not join or to pay dues to labor unions (Niznik 2018).
28
In June 2018, flight line workers at the Boeing South Carolina plant voted in favor of organizing into a union with the
International Association of Machinists (Moxley 2018).
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state.” (Twitter, May 21st, 2018). As an IAM union representative, Interviewee 2, claimed, this
state manager anti-union commitment has remained a principal part of South Carolina’s
developmental strategy:
They (state managers in South Carolina) lend their face to the anti-campaign
(unionization campaign). […] She (Nikki Haley, former governor of South Carolina)
chooses to try to make South Carolina look more attractive to companies to move here so
she will help to keep the workers oppressed.
The anti-union commitment has extended to the local scale as this research will detail in
another section. State accumulation strategies prioritize certain actors and their strategic needs
and demands (see Jessop 2015). Regarding South Carolina’s accumulation strategy,
manufacturing capital fractions’ strategic needs and demands have remained privileged while
actors’ representational power such as the working class and their delegates have weakened. The
lack of workers’ representation has resulted in direct foreign investment policy not having any
significant involvement from the working class and their representatives. Issues like transparency
regarding incentives such as customized training, plus solid wage gains guarantee, and workers’
benefits have been left to state managers working with MNCs to decide.

4.1.3 Greater Alignment Between Education and Businesses
A third aspect of South Carolina’s accumulation strategy, and most vital for this research,
pertains to how South Carolina state managers have further aligned education with the interests
of manufacturing MNCs in the state, transforming education into a crucial part of its
accumulation strategy, or asset to foster structural coupling processes. State managers have
pushed the commodification of education to a new level, framing education as an economic
development matter, and the corporate capture of its educational system and educational
initiatives as a developmental mechanism to foster structural coupling processes. Three primary
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initiatives have revealed this further alignment: the development of career academies within
schools; the development of Apprenticeship Carolina, and the reorganization of ReadySC. These
three initiatives have been designed to foment structural coupling processes.
Further alignment between corporate interests and education does not hold unique to
South Carolina. In the last four decades, US neoliberalism has reoriented education’s purpose,
structure, and priority, basing educational decisions more heavily on free-market policies and
economic rationality (Saunders 2010). Such a reorientation has related to the American shift
from a Keynesian state form to a Schumpeterian one. The state started to advance policies
promoting labor market flexibility and developing flexible and enterprising workers suited to the
evolving knowledge-based economy (Jessop 2002).This new vision regarding the emergent
knowledge-based economy has held knowledge production, valorization, and application as the
principal driving of competitiveness, profitability, and development (Jessop 2017 p 854).
However, this does not mean that a new education model has emerged. American higher
education has continued to attend the capitalistic ruling class29. Nonetheless, neoliberalism has
drastically accentuated this previous model, increasing profit-driven, corporate ends, and faculty,
student, administrator, and policy maker adherence to market targets and priorities (Saunders
2010). This reorientation has resulted in trustee members at educational institutions increasingly
coming from the private sector, bringing their corporate logic to decision-making strategies
(Saunders 2010). Moreover, the vocationalization of community colleges in the US has advanced
to the point faculty in some departments have considerably lost their influence over curriculum
decisions. In this context, in some cases curricula continue to meet capital interests catering to
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The corporatization of the United States’ higher education is not recent and started in the 19th century with the emergence of
public education. Moreover, the vocationalization of the curriculum, the focus on meeting the demands of capital, and the
corporatization of governing boards started more than a hundred years before the emergence of neoliberalism (Saunders 2010).
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job training and career development (Saunders 2010). Although clearly represented in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), it also has also affected the arts and
humanities (Jessop 2017).
In South Carolina, the development of career academies at schools across the state
exemplify how education and the private sector have been further aligned. This reorientation
started in 2005 and was influenced by firms’ representatives such as the South Carolina State
Chamber of Commerce and the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce (CMCC), and by state
managers. The key aspect of this reorientation was Michael Porter’s 2005 plan entitled “South
Carolina Competitiveness Initiatives: A Strategic Plan for South Carolina”, which served as a
guideline and justification for MNCs to represent their interests to South Carolina state
managers, and to advance their goals regarding such an alignment. One primary recommendation
in Porter’s plan was to “align and link the educational system and local business so that
education meets the workforce requirements of business, and business appropriately supports the
educational system” (Porter 2005, 62). Porter’s plan was based on a cluster-approach, and placed
innovation and human capital at its center. One of the participants from the Aerospace Council of
Competitiveness claimed:
“…it really started when Michael Porter from Harvard came down and did a
study…They generated a report that had some co-foundational things that they
need to do to help the industry grow and evolve here, and the reason the
Department of Commerce did that was that the secretary (Bob Hyatt) had worked
for BMW.” (Interviewee 18, 2016).
In the same year, the South Carolina general assembly, influenced by corporate interests
passed the 2005 Education and Economic Development Act (EEDA), a document establishing
requirements for schools, colleges, and universities to work collectively with businesses in the
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state. Interviewee 12, a representative from the Trident Youth Apprenticeship Program,
observed:
The 2005 Education and Economic Development Act was driven into existence by the
State Chamber of Commerce, because the Chamber recognized a shortage of people with
particular skills sets, the baby boom that has the skills sets are retiring, there are not
enough students getting trained in these skills to fill these positions let alone to expand
what is happening in the region and across the state. So, the State Chamber of Commerce
pushed into existence this piece of legislation.
The 2005 EEDA moved significantly to further the state educational system’s
corporatization process by establishing that every South Carolina school must maintain a
standards-based academic curriculum structured around a career cluster system, and must require
students to take career-focused courses. The 2005 EEDA also determined the credits acquired in
career courses at secondary schools would be transferable to four- and two-year courses at state
colleges and universities. According to Interviewee 11, in the 2005 EEDA, career academies
related curriculum mostly to STEM courses and vocational training. According to one participant
from the South Carolina Department of Commerce, one major reason for passing this act held to
develop channels with students, parents, teachers, and companies directing learners to pursue
career paths that address existing skill gaps in the market.
This alignment is part of a broader US movement, where researchers, corporations, and
not-for-profit organizations have claimed for the existence of a skill gap in manufacturing
positions in the country (Lerman 2012). Yet there is debate in the US over the extent to which
firms confront actual skill shortages (Cappelli 2015), and whether these are the result of short
falls in firms’ investments, or the inability of public institutions to meet firm demands as training
becomes increasingly firm specific (Rutherford & Holmes 2011). This alignment epitomizes a
cultural problem. This is considered a cultural problem because students and parents associate
social and economic success with college degrees, creating disinterest in manufacturing-related
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careers (Lerman 2012); hence, the 2005 EEDA sought to tackle this issue. A participant from
the South Carolina Department of Commerce (Interviewee 14) remarked:
[…] it was really to make sure that students, teachers, parents, understood what kind of
industry we have and make that connectivity. So, the students could understand the kinds
of jobs were in the community, and potentially do internships and things in that nature,
not only manufacturing but outside manufacturing. […] With that law there was
established regional workforce education centers across the state […] really to make that
connectivity between K12 and post-secondary education and families with the types of
business and industries.
This further alignment seeks to support different fractions of capital in the state, attending
to their skill formation needs, but has also been framed as an important component of South
Carolina’s accumulation strategy. One state representative from Berkeley county, Interviewee
15, voiced:
I think a lot of times, what a business looks at a location to go to, they want to know how
serious is the commitment of the county, how serious is the commitment from the state,
but also how serious is the commitment from the education system to not only make sure
that if I move my business here, my kids are getting good education, but making sure that
we are going to have a workforce, not just for today, not just 5 years from now, but 20
years from now, well trained and well educated to handle our needs.
Worthy of notice, such a reorientation in education is not just about meeting the interests
of MNCs regarding skill formation. South Carolina state managers believe this educational
model to improve state educational quality in a state hosting one of the worst public-school
education US standards30 (Bowers et al. 2018). As Poulantzas (1978) pointed out, state managers
who sympathize with a specific force, interpret their interests in terms of a particular ideology,
that of the ‘neutral state’ (Poulantzas 1978). As Interviewee 7 from the Charleston Chamber of
Commerce explained:
[…] they (career academies) help engage students, high schools’ students are bored, don’t
30

According to a recent report, in the 2017-2018 school year, more than half of students in grades 3 through 8 were not able to
meet South Carolina’s reading and math standards. S.C. state test also reveals that one out of three students graduates unprepared
for the job market, number that is worse in rural and poor districts. In the test known as “the nation’s report card”, South Carolina
failed, in 2017, in almost every category (Bowers et al. 2018).
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see why they need that. So, they get into a point they drop out. They want to leave
because they see no relevance. So, if you can bring the relevance and engage them in the
learning process, they will stay. So, you increase the number of students that graduate
successfully. […] We found about career academies by doing research in other
communities Nashville, Tennessee. They have a very successful program. They went
from 68 percent graduation in high school to 82 percent in 7 years, and all the things that
changed were the implement career academy. […] It makes it relevant and then the other
part, the teachers are more like a facilitator than a lecture. So, the kids are working in
teams, which is what employers want. They work on projects. […] So, it makes them
excited about school and then the business community comes in and they offer jobs.
The reorientation of South Carolina’s educational agenda did not only create career
academies, but also established the programs Apprenticeship Carolina and ReadySC. Both
programs are housed at the Economic Development Division of the South Carolina Technical
College System, a System that administers 16 technical colleges strategically placed across the
state. According to Interviewee 13 from Apprenticeship Carolina, the program was founded in
2008. As in the case of career academies, South Carolina State Chamber of Commerce
influenced this program’s establishment and structure, as an interviewee from Apprenticeship
Carolina revealed in the following statement:
The history of that takes us back to 2003 when our state chamber of commerce made a
report on workforce needs, and the benchmark was when recommendations came out,
asking for a better apprenticeship system for South Carolina. So, it was staffed in 2008 at
the Technical College System. […] The state chamber of commerce was instrumental in
driving the initial conversations. The industry responded to their report, saying “that is
something we would support”, and here we are today.
As a participant from Trident Apprenticeship Program (Interviewee 9) noticed,
Apprenticeship Carolina sought to develop market-demanded skills, and as in the Career
Academies case, the program also engendered the goal to alter students’ perception regarding
manufacturing careers, “We have a generation of millennials that have no sense of pride in
becoming a welder or machinists. The problem is (…) the companies that are coming, this is
what they are looking for.” In the US, the apprenticeship system has remained decentralized,
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where states have the autonomy to develop programs and to choose whether to register their
programs in the registered apprenticeship system of the US Labor Department office (Lerman
2012). In the US, participation in apprentice programs has proven minimal when compared to
other countries, such as Germany (Levesque et al. 2008). For this reason, the VoC literature has
characterized the US vocational training system as focused on general skills training, lacking
firms’ participation in apprenticeships due to absence of mechanisms to avoid firms poaching
apprentices from one another (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, evidence suggests that South
Carolina varies from the US national state concerning vocational training. In the state of South
Carolina, apprenticeship has gained relevance in the last decade, where the number of
apprentices and apprenticeship programs across the state have greatly increased. This increase is
related to the recent shift in the educational agenda of South Carolina, which has demanded local
states to implement and expand apprenticeship programs. One feature in these programs is to
register apprentices in the U.S. Dept. of Labor. For example, the number of active apprentices in
the state increased from 3,198 in 2011 to 20,763 apprentices in 2018. This represents a rise of
649% in seven years. Moreover, South Carolina has the highest percentage of apprentices by
population size in the US (see table 5 and 6).

Table 5. Increase of Apprentices and Apprenticeship Programs from 2011 to 2017.
South Carolina 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2018
Active
3,198 4,791 6,412 4,485 5,367 5,297 17,609 20,763
Apprentices
Active
283
565
619
463
524
569
964
1,054
Programs
Source: US Dept. of Labor, 2011-2018.

Increase
%
649%
372%
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Table 6. Percentage of Apprentices by Population Size.
State
Population
Active
Apprentices/Population
Size
Apprentices
California
39,557,045
89,949
0,23%
Ohio
11,689,442
19,081
0,16%
Michigan
9,995,915
20,576
0,20%
South
5,084,127
20,763
0,40%
Carolina
Source: US Dept. of Labor, 2011-2018; US Bureau Census, 2018.
The reasons why the state of South Carolina had such a high increase in apprenticeship
programs and participants were not provided. However, in the last years focus has been given to
strengthen apprenticeship programs in the state. To encourage firms’ participation in the
program, South Carolina state managers have designed certain mechanisms. To design such
mechanisms, the corporate sector has played an active role as Interviewee 9 professed, “the State
Chamber of Commerce idealized the State Technical College System and convinced state
legislator to develop one division of apprenticeship.” As this participant explained, the program
has garnered success because the state adopted the State Chamber of Commerce
recommendations. Regarding the program functioning, Apprenticeship Carolina does not
perform firm training, but supports businesses to develop their own apprenticeship programs and
to register them with the federal government. Hence, Apprenticeship Carolina has consultants
meeting with company staff to guide them systematically in creating apprenticeship programs
(Interviewee 13). This means consultants will freely guide firms to first identify what education
or training the offered positions require. Consultants, after identifying the education type,
connect the business representative with a state technical college. Second, consultants help firms
to structure on-the-job training. For every 2,000 hours apprenticeship program, corporations
must complete 144 education hours (Interviewee 12 and Interviewee 9). Third, consultants assist
firms in setting up a scalable wage plan, completing bureaucratic paperwork, filling in forms,
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and completing federal registration paperwork. Consultants also present the resources available
for companies registered in the apprenticeship program, such as obtaining state and federal tax
credits. South Carolina offers firms U$ 1,000/month in tax credit per apprentice for up to four
years (Interviewee 12 and Interviewee 9). Apprenticeship Carolina is structured as follows:

Diagram 4. Apprenticeship Carolina.
Skills

•Identify firms' demanded skills.
•Design training curriculum for firms in a SC Technical
College.

On-theJob

•Design with firms the structure of
on-the-job training

Bureaucratic •Apply for state and federal
Registration.
Paperwork

•Design scalable Wage Plan.
•Apply for Tax incentives.

Source: Author.
Another program showing how MNCs have reoriented the educational system of South
Carolina is ReadySC, which clearly typifies a process of corporate capture. ReadySC started in
1961 and was initially called Special Schools. One of the oldest training programs offering
customized training for businesses, the program has trained more than 290,000 people and
attended to more than 3,600 companies (ReadySC.org 2018). The program was initiated when
South Carolina jobs were declining and young people were leaving the state, lacking training
services. Fritz Hollings, a former South Carolina governor, understood to attract new
corporations, the state would need to have an educational system providing the skills in demand
(Ford & Stone 2007). In this way, the South Carolina College System was founded in the 1960s
along with the program Special Schools, program which was created as a developmental
instrument meant to entice firms to the state. The program Special Schools, reformulated in the
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early 2000s, was named ReadySC, establishing a systemic, technical, and refined approach to
recruiting MNCs.
ReadySC program exemplifies a process of corporate capture because this program,
without the need of any negotiation, provides highly customized training and recruiting services
for firms interested in moving to South Carolina or planning to expand. Both services are not
only cost-free for firms, but also bureaucracy-free. According to one ReadySC’s representative,
firms can have access to ReadySC’s services independent of their size; however, the focus has
remained on large multinational corporations. For firms to receive services, they need to generate
at least 10 new permanent jobs, pay competitive wages for the region, offer benefit packages
with health insurance, and invest an appropriate capital amount (Interviewee 29).
Currently, ReadySC is a crucial mechanism to attract and retain corporations to South
Carolina and is intrinsically related to South Carolina’s accumulation strategy. As stated before,
central to South Carolina’s accumulation strategy is to foster structural coupling processes. Many
participants consider ReadySC the major “trump” in their assets when bargaining with MNCs.
Interviewee 9, a representative from the Trident Apprenticeship Program declared:
ReadySC is the carrot that gets them in the door, gets things going…We are very
attractable to foreign companies. It started with the leadership of the state. Leadership
realizing that apprenticeships, ReadySC, getting companies up and going is the most
important issue. In these cases, skilled labor. We are going to be really popular…It is not
just the sunshine in our port, is what we offer [referring to ReadySC free customized
training] to companies when they come. There is nothing wrong with building buildings.
We hear that a lot, “if we just had this building, this equipment” […]. I know places that
built places and have the equipment and they are empty […].
Generally, when working with businesses, ReadySC is structured in a 3D process:
discovery, design, and delivery. First, ReadySC discovers what the company training needs not
only from a technical perspective, but also from a cultural perspective, such as discipline.
Second, ReadySC designs the training program, developing the curriculum according to the firm
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specificities. Hence, ReadySC staff meet with the firm human resource representatives to
discuss needs and interests. ReadySC does not outsource training but delivers the corporate
training needed. Specific and customized training fits firms’ needs. The third program piece,
training delivery, depicts the company establishing standards, and ReadySC training accordingly.
Recruitment and screening are other two services ReadySC provides. Companies reveals
the skills’ characteristics for which they are looking, such as desired experience, diploma,
college education, and ReadySC, through several partners, recruits the people to receive training.
Project management represents a feature ReadySC offers. ReadySC assigns one project manager
to the company being attended, manager who will be the primary contact point between the
company and ReadySC.
ReadySC also tracks corporate metrics, varying according to firm requirements and
serving not only for ReadySC to improve its services, but also for companies to ensure they
attain the most qualified workers. Training can take place at the state technical colleges or at the
firms. The training location varies according to the entity interests, but usually, ReadySC
establishes a training center at a state technical college housing the necessary equipment.
ReadySC is structured in the following way:

Table 7. ReadySC Program.
Discover

•Discover what the companies' training needs are.

Design

•Design curriculum.

Deliver

•Establish a training center, and train customized workers.

Recruit and Screen

•Screen and recruit workers according to the skills'
characteristics provided by firms.

Source: Author.
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Therefore, this program typifies a process of corporate capture. However, ReadySC
differs from the classical processes of corporate capture in which state institutional capacity
capture results from bargaining events between state managers and MNCs. Rather, ReadySC was
designed to be captured as a mechanism to recruit firms at the subnational scale. To further
demonstrate how ReadySC represents a form of corporate capture, in the next section, this
research will analyze the structural coupling process between the state of South Carolina and
Boeing in 2009.
To conclude, the evolution of the corporate capture in South Carolina in training
programs such as ReadySC, Career Academies, and Apprenticeship Carolina demonstrates how
the specialized literature cannot fully explain how such processes evolve. On one hand, scholars
such as Phelps (2008) have argued that national liberal states are more prone to have processes of
corporate capture because their state apparatuses are marked by low levels of coordination.
However, as the variegated capitalisms literature revealed, national states have internal
variations, where their subnational states do not always comply with its national form. This is the
case of South Carolina, which although its national state has been analyzed by the VoC literature
as a liberal state, resembles a developmental form of state, having an accumulation strategy that
is marked by a high level of state coordination, heavy state intervention, and a clear industrial
policy. Still, corporate capture is a common practice in the state, which contradicts Phelps’s
(2008) argument.
On the other hand, the GPN literature has explained corporate capture based on the lack
of distinct regional assets in certain locations (see Mackinnon 2012; Yeung 2016). This means
that, regions that do not have distinct assets to meet the strategic interests of MNCs are in an
inferior position when bargaining with firms, and thus, more prone to corporate capture.
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Although such a rationalization sheds some light on how processes of corporate capture evolve,
it still provides an incomplete explanation, being based on purely descriptive accounts of such
processes.
As demonstrated, the accumulation strategy of South Carolina is based on mechanisms
such as ReadySC that were designed or institutionalized to be intentionally captured. The
corporate capture of ReadySC does not require negotiations and does not happen solely due to a
lack of distinct assets in South Carolina. Although, as this research will show in the next section,
in the case of Boeing and South Carolina, their bargaining event did matter in that it intensified
the process of corporate capture of ReadySC. The diagram below summarizes South Carolina’s
accumulation strategy:

Diagram 5. South Carolina’s Accumulation Strategy.

Source: Author.
Therefore, this section sought to argue that processes of corporate capture regarding
training in South Carolina evolve—and should be understood—according to South Carolina’s
accumulation strategy. In the case of South Carolina, the major goal of its accumulation strategy
is to foster structural coupling processes. Thus, state managers have aligned their interests with
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manufacturing MNCs. Such an alignment has allowed MNCs to advance their interests, fostering
processes that could be framed as corporate capture in the educational system and educational
initiatives of the state. More specifically in South Carolina’s educational agenda and initiatives
such as Career Academies, Apprenticeship Carolina, and ReadySC. Nonetheless, this alignment
has also enabled state managers to develop complex mechanisms and assets that have been
efficient in recruiting firms.

4.2 Boeing and South Carolina’s Strategic Coupling: The Corporate Capture of ReadySC
In 2009, the state of South Carolina announced the establishment of a new Boeing
Company’s plant in North Charleston to produce 787-airplanes. The Boeing Company, an
American multinational corporation, designs, manufactures and sells rockets, satellites, missiles,
and airplanes for the commercial and defense sectors. Considered one of the largest US exporters
in terms of dollar value and the largest aerospace company worldwide, the establishment of a
Charleston plant was acclaimed for its potential to generate thousands of jobs (Boeing.com
2019).
Boeing, founded in 1916, has continued to grow since World War I when the company
established close links with the US Army. During WWI and WWII, Boeing was a major airplane
and missile supplier for the US Army. After the end of World War II, the company started to
manufacture commercial airplanes. Today, the company manufactures several commercial
airplanes accommodating from 85 to 660 passengers, such as the models 737, 747, 767, 777, and
787. On January 1, 2018, the company employed 141,332 people across the world (Boeing.com).
The state of South Carolina played a crucial role in the attraction of Boeing. The GPN
literature categorizes its role as facilitator, and its coupling process as a structural coupling. As a
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facilitator, the role of the state is to promote, retain and attract firms, and to support the
participation of local firms in global chains (Horner 2017). Structural coupling processes are
based on proactive policies and strategies in which states provide competitive cost structures,
fiscal and financial incentives, stable policy environment, and abundant labor supply to attract
lead firms in GPNs (MacKinnon 2012; Coe et al. 2004; Yeung 2015).

Diagram 6. Structural Coupling Between Boeing and the State of South Carolina.

Source: Author.
The establishment of Boeing in the region of Charleston took place in a time in which
unemployment was near a record high in the state due to the 2008-09 financial crisis and
recession. The bargaining process was controversial, given the negotiations involving South
Carolina state officials and Boeing were conducted secretly and were not publicly undisclosed
(Brundrett 2012). Some reports have stated South Carolina provided almost $1 billion in public
incentives and subsidies to Boeing, which ranged from cost-free training services, promises of
infrastructure improvements and land donation, to tax credits and front money investments. The
state also granted hundreds of millions of dollars in public loans at low-interest rates (Brundrett
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2012; McDermott 2009; Slade 2010; Norman 2010).
As Mackinnon (2012) has asserted, regional coupling processes are connected to
decoupling processes elsewhere, and involve an uneven development. Another major reason for
Boeing’s decision to expand its production in Charleston was related to the constant strikes the
company had faced in Everett, Washington (Wojcik 2011; Slade 2010). A representative from
the Defense Association (Interviewee 6) professed:
Why is Boeing here? Because we don’t have unions. That is the biggest reason why
Boeing is here…They knew they couldn’t grow there [Everett] and it is cheaper to grow
here. A lot of their facilities were closed and opened here.
Another significant reason of Boeing’s decision to come to Charleston, South Carolina
was the formidable incentives and subsidies the state provided to the company, as well as the
existence of low-wage labor, a well-structured infrastructure, and the existence of a customized
training program, which could start from scratch the establishment of a skilled workforce for the
aerospace sector. The state, through ReadySC, committed to Boeing to recruit and train, free-ofcost, 3,800 workers, but the training has exceeded this number as one interviewee from ReadySC
stated in 2014, “We trained for new hiring 2700, but we probably provided some training, one
course or more, I be guessing close to 5000, all the touch labor…”. At the beginning of 2018,
Boeing had 6,749 employees in the plant located in Charleston.
In this context, since 2011 when the plant was launched, the region of Charleston has
experienced the formation of an aerospace industrial cluster, which has not resulted from
emergence of aerospace startups, but from Boeing’s pull effect for suppliers. In this regard, the
Charleston Regional Development Alliance has sought to attract aerospace-related companies,
including Boeing’s suppliers to Charleston region. However, as Interviewee 28 from the
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Charleston Regional Alliance Development claimed, the results have proven unsatisfactory, for
the aerospace firms in the cluster have not increased as expected:
In terms of the aerospace supplier growth, the growth hasn't been as 'fast' as anticipated
due to the new approach of Boeing's 787 program. The focus [of Boeing] has been
correcting supply chain issues, cutting production costs, and improving overall
production efficiency. As the production rate increases, we suspect more suppliers will
have a stronger business case to locate closer to the facility.”
Since the establishment of Boeing, South Carolina has received more than 400 aerospacerelated firms, hosting in 2018 more than 90 firms in the region of Charleston (SC Dept. of
Commerce 2018). Specialists have indicated aerospace jobs will grow drastically in the
following years (Avalanche Consulting 2014), although it is unknown whether such a growth is
related to the presence of Boeing.

4.2.1 The Evolution of ReadySC Corporate Capture
As stated before, the coupling process between the region of Charleston and Boeing is
conceptualized by the GPN literature as structural coupling. According to Mackinnon (2012),
this coupling has held more prone to processes of corporate capture than organic or strategic
coupling, especially when states lack the distinctive assets to meet the strategic interests of firm.
This is because the lack of regional distinctive assets leaves the state in an inferior position when
bargaining with MNCs, fostering asymmetric power relations. In the case of Boeing and South
Carolina, Boeing’s mode of entry was as a greenfield investment. Therefore, when bargaining
with Boeing, South Carolina had an unsubstantial aerospace industry, skilled aerospace
workforce, and aerospace training programs. This means that the state of South Carolina and the
region of Charleston did not possess distinctive or specific assets to meet the strategic needs of

133

Boeing. As a participant from ReadySC (Interviewee 8) noticed, when discussing the capacity of
ReadySC to deliver training to Boeing:
To be honest with you, I think within Boeing there was a good bit of doubt. There is no
aerospace industry in here, no background here. It is always been in Washington state. I
think there was a good “can I do it?”. So, [participant’s name] and I were both back in
2010, 2011 trying to get this thing stood up. There was always a light degree of that, but,
beginning about 2012 to now, that’s gone. They [Boeing’s staff] have total confidence in
our work.
This lack of distinctive assets regarding skilled workers and training initiatives, as the
GPN theorists have explained, resulted in South Carolina assuming an inferior position when
bargaining with Boeing, and thus more prone to process of corporate capture. Nonetheless, this
partially explains how the institutional capacity of ReadySC was captured. In fact, ReadySC was
designed to be intentionally captured as a mechanism part of South Carolina’s accumulation
strategy; therefore, Boeing captured the institutional capacity of ReadySC without having to
bargain with state officials. Corporate capture was fostered by the fact that the company meets
ReadySC’s criteria in terms of size of investment, and number and quality of jobs. Interviewee 9,
discussing the size of firms able to obtain incentives, stated: “It is an equal footing, we don’t care
as long as the company meets the requirements, we will do the training for them.”.
However, the bargaining between Boeing and South Carolina also played a significant
role in how the corporate capture of ReadySC evolved, given that the company was able to
further intensify capture, by receiving greater incentives than other businesses generally do.
According to one participant, MNCs such as Boeing receive more incentives for two reasons.
First, while small- and medium-size firms acquire training incentives through local state
managers or ReadySC’s staff, large MNCs like Boeing have direct access to the South Carolina
Department of Commerce and high-level state managers to manifest their interests and bargain
incentive packages. Second, MNCs receive more incentives because of the greater economic
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potential these firms bring to the state in relation to small- and medium-size firms. One
participant from ReadySC explained:
For big companies like Boeing, Mercedes, Volvo, it is through the Department of
Commerce, government affairs, those kinds of folks…Once they get a good idea of what
the company is looking for…then they will start reaching out to at a little bit lower level,
maybe to a county, county economic development, and or ReadySC…Companies are
going to provide 15 jobs we train them, but they are not going to get what Boeing gets.
Funding depends on the size and scope of the company. Boeing being who they are, it
was at a very high level. Boeing folks interact with the commerce, with state folks. I
don’t have visibility at that level of discussion…Incentives packages will be much more
significant for companies like Boeing, which by the way, sometimes generates a little bit
of challenge for folks at our level, because a company will come here and see what
Boeing gets, and that is what they want. Even though it won’t work in that way. That
sometimes creates a little bit of animosity.
In this context, state officials committed to invest U$33 million in the recruiting and
training of 3,800 workers at the entry-level according to the company’s needs. In exchange, the
company committed to generating a minimum of 6,000 jobs in the state (Shain 2009).
The 3D process of ReadySC was not applied in Boeing’s case. ReadySC did not have to
discover the company’s training needs, nor design from scratch a curriculum according to
Boeing’s interest. Boeing provided ReadySC with a very detailed curriculum with the courses,
encompassing not only technical and cultural/ethical courses but also the hours that should be
spent in each course, and the ways the ReadySC’s staff should evaluate student performance, as
a representative from ReadySC (Interviewee 29) articulated:
…the training pack we have with Boeing is very different than a lot of the other
companies that we worked with…Boeing told us, we understand your 3D process, but we
don’t really want you to design any training. We have been building airplanes for one
hundred years. So, we have the curriculum. So, our instructors actually delivered for
Boeing curriculum. A little bit unique. For the other companies, we had to design the
curriculum to meet their needs.
To deliver training for Boeing, ReadySC established a training center at the Trident
Technical College with a simulated factory environment. The state bought and brought from
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other technical colleges across the state aerospace equipment for training. To attend the needs of
Boeing, ReadySC “has 9 people to run the training project…60 plus instructors that are full time,
that teach over 100 courses…” (Interviewee 8, representative from ReadySC). The training
process is structured to take between 10 and 14 weeks, 40 hours per week but can be shorter or
longer according to the needs of Boeing.
Training takes place after candidates pass a phone interview, an assessment test, and a
face-to-face interview; all delivered by ReadySC and its partner institutions. The training process
at ReadySC is divided into three phases. Phase I – Pre-Employment Training consists of 32
hours of unpaid pre-hire training and completion of assessments. In this phase, the goal is to
screen and recruit potential employees for the company. Boeing provides the skill characteristics
of desired workers, such as their education level, experience, etc., and ReadySC recruits workers
that fit the description. To do so, ReadySC works with several local institutions who advertise
the open positions, conduct interviews, administer the assessment, and select the applicants
matching the demanded requirements. ReadySC, after recruiting workers, obtains Boeing’s
approval to start the training process. A representative from ReadySC (Interviewee 29) described
the recruiting process:
Recruitment is another piece of what we do. We are partnered with a couple of other
organizations around the state. We partner with the South Carolina Department of
Employment and Workforce to be able to recruit for the company. Again, we don’t come
up with what the companies are looking for. We work with the company. We have them
telling us what kind of workers they are looking for. What type of experience do they
want? Diploma, college education, all those types of things, and then we can build an ad
and recruit from there. Again, at no costs to the company.
Phase II – New Hire Training is comprised of specific training in occupations required by
the company, such as welding, machining, and assembly. This entails general curriculum and
basic manufacturing industrial skills training. In this phase Boeing hires workers, receiving a
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minimum of U$12 per hour during their training. After 10 to 14 weeks, the employees start
working at Boeing’s plant. Phase III – Factory Skill Enhancement consists of courses offered at
ReadySC for existing Boeing’s employees to enhance their existing skills, improve proficiency,
and quality level of production, encompassing onboarding processes, and on-the-job training.
Boeing staff often visits the training center to make sure training is delivered according to their
standards. Such visits are also marked by periodic meetings in which adjustments and changes
concerning training are required. Boeing’s staff, responsible for overseeing ReadySC training,
are also in constant contact with managers working in the manufacturing plant to attain
suggestions and feedback regarding skills and training.
In 2016, ReadySC had trained 2,800 entry-level workers for Boeing of which 94 percent
of which were from South Carolina. Training was free for students and for Boeing. In 2015, the
state of South Carolina had invested an average of U$10 thousand dollars per trainee in Boeing’s
program (Brundrett 2015). Although South Carolina was able to get many local residents to be
hired for manufacturing positions, the state failed to require Boeing, for example, to hire workers
from within the state in top job positions such as administrative or engineering positions.
Initially, ReadySC committed to Boeing training of 3,800 workers, but as Boeing expanded its
presence in the region of Charleston, new rounds of negotiation resulted in new training
incentives. For example, in 2013, Boeing announced a further investment of U$1 billion and the
additional creation of 2,000 jobs, resulting in more training services incentives. In 2016, Boeing
established a new regional painting facility, requiring ReadySC to develop a new training project
to deliver this specialized training. Incentives were not disclosed. A ReadySC staff (Interviewee
29) affirmed:
We are up to 2800 folks (trained people), newly hired folks that we trained for Boeing. It
is the number we are at. We have recently taken on an additional scope of work with
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them to train their painters. They are establishing a painting facility that is supposed to
open later this year. We are now training their painters for them.
Boeing’s influence has also caused Charleston regional training programs to expand. In
2019, the state of South Carolina will conclude the construction of its new S.C. Aeronautical
Training Center. The state, the Charleston region, and other not-for-profit institutions will invest
U$79 million in this construction. The center will accommodate more than 5,000 students per
year, where more than 100 faculty members and professors will teach aerospace-related courses.
The Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce played a crucial role in such an expansion as one
of its representatives, Interviewee 7, declared in 2014.
…one of the other things we were lobbying in Columbia was money to build an
aeronautical training campus at Trident College. That would be some really big building
just for aeronautical training because now they (Trident College) have a wait list to get
into it…Boeing has told us the long-term potential for Charleston is enormous. Our talent
and our workforce, if we can’t supply them the workforce they need, they are not going
to grow as they wanted to…
As stated, to receive training services from ReadySC, companies have to meet criteria,
such as generate more than 10 permanent job positions with benefits and competitive regional
wages. However, ReadySC has failed to demonstrate whether firms receiving its free training
services met the required guidelines. Bargaining processes involving ReadySC, such as the one
with Boeing, often happen secretly, lack transparency, and do not have mechanisms to guarantee
criteria is met.
For example, in 2000, a legislative audit of the program was performed, indicating
several irregularities regarding whether firms have met ReadySC’s criteria. The report analyzed
the projects delivered by ReadySC to 43 companies between 1993 and 1998 (SC Legislative Act
2000). The 43 firms failed to display whether wages for jobs added were competitive as required
by the program, and only 56 percent of the firms provided a commitment letter to South
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Carolina. Moreover, only six companies revealed whether the workers trained by the program
were hired (SC Legislative Act 2000).
More recently, the media has criticized the lack of transparency of South Carolina state
officials, for they failed to fully disclose the deal with Boeing (Brundrett 2012). During
interviews, ReadySC and South Carolina state representatives were asked to provide some
metrics regarding the Boeing trained workers at ReadySC. Metrics entailed their average wage,
the percentage of workers according to their gender, race and locale of origin, and the average
number of workers with benefits and career plans. None of the participants provided such
information. Interviewee 9 from ReadySC, after stating he would ask his leadership for
permission to share the data, emailed the following response, “I wanted to follow up with you
from our interview. After discussing your requests with leadership, unfortunately, I will not be
able to provide you any additional detail.”
This lack of transparency regarding incentives for MNCs typifies a common problem in
the US. According to Mattera et al. (2014), while nine out of ten states in the US have disclosed
at least some data online about companies receiving job subsidies, the quality of the disclosed
data has remained poor, especially pertaining to performance measures, such as job creation.
This means the states offering job subsidies have failed to publish documents identifying the jobs
created, workers trained, or wages earned. This deficient transparency poses a problem since it
impedes the conduction of studies weighing costs versus benefits. South Carolina, in 2014
ranked as one of the worst states disclosing subsidy programs (Mattera et al. 2014) because it has
failed to provide pertinent information regarding people trained, recipient names, and rarely
gives information pertaining the subsidized jobs created, such as wages, benefits, and number of
permanent job positions created (Mattera et al. 2014). Therefore, South Carolina has not released
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ReadySC data for Boeing regarding the wages, benefits, job status (temporary/permanent), and
trained workers’ benefits.
To conclude, this section examined how the process of corporate capture of ReadySC
evolved. The capture of ReadySC’s institutional capacity by Boeing was intrinsically related to
South Carolina’s accumulation strategy and thus, part of a structural coupling process. ReadySC
provides cost-free customized training services to firms meeting its requirements, and thus
automatically grants its capture. This means South Carolina state officials intentionally seek
having their training capability captured subnationally as a way to attract MNCs. Such an
“automatic” capture is advanced further once firms engage in negotiations with South Carolina
state officials, asking for more incentives or program adaptations. Although ReadySC requires
MNCs to meet criteria, they are problematic. As demonstrated, ReadySC has successfully trained
local people; however, in many ways, the program lacks transparency regarding whether Boeing
has met its required guidelines.

4.3 Labor Market Governance, Charleston Aerospace Regional Training System and
Concerns over Corporate Capture
In this section, the following question will be addressed: Does Charleston’s local form of
governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in its regional training systems?
It will be postulated that Charleston’s local form of governance has reinforced corporate capture
by embracing, implementing, and expanding its higher-scale state initiatives and educational
agenda. Although, attempts have been made to minimize corporate capture. I explore how such
attempts to minimize capture are related to how the region’s formal sector-level strategy named
One-Region, reduces single-firms’ influence, such as Boeing over Charleston’s local regional
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training systems. Moreover, I demonstrate how these attempts to minimize corporate capture
have been problematic, mostly due a lack of power of local state managers and to local
governance actors’ attempts to solve corporate capture based on market relations.
Every summer thousands of tourists visit the region of Charleston (see map 1). The
region, comprised of three counties, Berkeley, Charleston and Dorchester, has a good reputation:
nice beaches, good culinary dining, pleasant weather, and historical sites all make the region a
popular tourist site. However, since the 2000s, the economy of Charleston region has drastically
changed from tourism. The region has been transformed into a significant manufacturing hub,
attracting in the last 20 years many manufacturing MNCs such as Boeing, Volvo and MercedesBenz. As one participant noticed “[…] we are not the same community. We got this enormous
potential […]” (Interviewee 7, 2014), referring to the success that the region has had attracting
manufacturing companies, and consequently in increasing manufacturing jobs.

Map 1. Boeing South Carolina Plant Location:
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Between 2015 and 2017, the region generated 19,200 new jobs, achieving remarkable
growth rates and an unemployment rate as low as 4 percent (SCEAR 2018). This economic
growth held impressive, especially for a region in a state known for its fragile historical process
of industrialization as well as current economic and social situation (Rees 2016).
GVC experts have demonstrated how the establishment of new plants as well as firms’
upgrading processes result in a demand for new skills requiring new workforce development
initiatives (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2016). Due to several recent manufacturing firms moving
to the region, the aerospace/manufacturing local labor market of Charleston can be considered
still under construction. Therefore, the manufacturing local labor market, and more specifically
the aerospace sector, has faced challenges regarding skill gaps and training mismatches. As
Interviewee 1 from Berkeley Chamber of Commerce mentioned,
We have people that do not have the skills [manufacturing skills]…Right now we are
inundated with manufacturing jobs. That is the basic need. But Charleston (College of
Charleston) is a liberal school. We are not going to have a lot of manufacturing people
but liberal arts. Their needs are different.
Since the establishment of the Boeing South Carolina plant in Charleston, the regional
aerospace sector has rapidly expanded, not only due to Boeing’s presence, but also due to the
existence of newly established regional suppliers, resulting in a lack of a skilled workforce. The
primary skilled positions lacking in the market entail: general assemblers, aerospace assemblers,
technicians and mechanics, general machinists, industrial maintenance, welders, and engineers
with specialization areas such as industrial, aerospace, mechanical, and electrical (Avalanche
Consulting 2016). Several managers of aerospace firms’ human resource department claimed
they had to compete hard with other businesses to hire skilled manufacturing workers.
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Interviewee 26, an aerospace firm representative, remarked, “We struggle to compete for welders
based on the number of welder jobs and what they pay in the area.”
One clear discourse in many participant interviews regards how the region manufacturing
skill deficiency is not only related to the absence of technical and higher education programs, but
also to cultural issues. The Dorchester County representative, Interviewee 23, affirmed:
The biggest challenge has been mom and dad…I was trying to figure out why mom and
dad were so opposed to a career in industry…Most of the dads and moms I am dealing
with, when they were in high school, manufacturing was dirty, nasty, hot. They have no
clue that you can walk into Robert Bosch and eat out of the floor.
Therefore, according to participants, the lack of manufacturing skills has remained due to
the negative connotation toward a certificate, or two-year associate manufacturing degree. As
interviewees stated, students seeking to continue education after graduating from high school
want to pursue bachelor’s degrees. Interviewee 9 from Trident Technical College remarked,
In America parents aren’t telling their kids they need to be mechanics. They tell them
they need to be a doctor. You need to be a lawyer, an engineer. We have a generation of
millennials that have no sense of pride in becoming a welder or machinists. The problem
is that the companies that are coming to Charleston this is what they are looking for.
In this context, one regional concern has remained to develop a skilled workforce and a
regional training system capable of meeting manufacturing firms’ skill needs, including the
aerospace and automobile sectors. As demonstrated in the third chapter of this dissertation, local
governance plays a crucial role in these processes. The development of a regional training
system, and thus of a skilled workforce, happens through complex and uneven interactions
among actors from different scales, such as individual firms and fractions of capital, educational
institutions, public and not-for-profit institutions, and state managers, among others. Such an
interaction defines which firms or sectors will be benefited, which skills will be provided, in
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some cases who will finance training, which programs should be established and expanded, the
level of vocational/academic integration, and the degree of skill transferability, among others.
In this regard, one question emerges. Does the local governance of Charleston minimize
or reinforce the processes of corporate capture at its regional training system?

4.3.1 Charleston’s Local Form of Governance and its Contradictory Dynamic of Corporate
Capture
In the region of Charleston, the major educational institutions responsible for training
people for the aerospace sector are Trident Technical College, Clemson University, College of
Charleston, The Citadel, Lowcountry Graduate Center, and R.B Stall High School. The most
relevant training institution for the aerospace sector has remained Trident Technical College.
The region of Charleston has a strong and very active form of governance that represents
the counties of Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester. This situation did not come to fruition until
1993 when the US closed a Charleston Naval Complex, resulting in 20,000 people leaving the
state, and in a loss of 15,000 spin-off jobs. This event pushed local actors to rethink their
developmental policies, and to work collectively as one participant stated, “…it forced us to
diversify and form alliances, to sit together at the table.” (Interviewee 23, representative from
Dorchester County Department of Economic Development). As an outcome, the Charleston
Regional Development Alliance (CRDA) was created in 1995 under the Charleston’s Metro
Chamber of Commerce (CMCC) leadership. The naval complex closure “… put Charleston into
action” (Interviewee 28, representative from CRDA).
Today, the CMCC and the CRDA have retained the responsibility for leading the primary
initiatives of the local governance agenda of Charleston. Both institutions have identified
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regional economic development problems and have found and proposed possible solutions.
While the CMCC has represented and advocated for local firms, the CRDA, a not-for-profit
institution, has focused on recruiting firms and talent to the region.
In the last 10 years, the Charleston aerospace and automotive sectors have expanded,
where its local governance has sought to develop a regional training system that is capable of
delivering the skills demanded by local firms. The development of this regional training system
raises questions of whether the local governance of Charleston has reinforced or minimized
corporate capture. As this research argues, the way Charleston’s local governance has developed
its regional training system demonstrates a contradictory dynamic in which it has reinforced
processes of corporate capture, although fostering problematic attempts to minimize them. This
research will start examining how Charleston’s local form of governance attempts to minimize
corporate capture.
Fieldwork evidence reveals that the main reason for local actors to develop a regional
training system that is capable of delivering the skills needed by local firms is to prevent labor
being hired by large corporations like Boeing from outside the state. As Phelps (2008) pointed
out, one aspect of corporate capture concerns how MNCs receive high levels of subsidies from
regions but end up recruiting out-of-state workers. In this regard, state managers have worked
with the CMCC and the CRDA to establish and develop a training system that can train as many
locals as possible; thus, seeking to minimize Boeing’s corporate capture in this regard. In this
way, manufacturing firms do not need to look for skilled workers outside the state. One
representative from the CMCC (Interviewee 10), proclaimed the following:
The Talent Study really had us to change the conversation about the needs to build a
pipeline of workers and to really make sure we are doing everything possible to prepare
high school students. So, the jobs can be created in the region. If we are training
incorrectly, then they don’t have chances to get jobs. In the long term, it is not good for
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the community...It means we will have more people moving into the community and we
are left behind and that is what we don’t want.
To do so, local governance leaders hired a research group in 2014 to analyze Charleston’s
labor market and identify its primary skill gaps and lack of related-training initiatives at principal
local educational institutions. This study gathered information from the business community
according to five regional sectors: aerospace, automobile, advanced security and IT, biomedical,
and wind energy. When asked if the focus was given to the aerospace sector, one representative
of the CMCC (Interviewee 10) responded:
We got shortages in all kinds of sectors. So, we cannot just focus on aerospace. We need
to make sure we are offering programs for all levels. There is Trident College, higher
education, other areas for companies.
The key skill gaps found in these five sectors were included in Charleston’s four-year
developmental strategy, where goals and delineating initiatives such as opening of new education
programs and courses to tackle such gaps were established. Examining the list of participants
interviewed for the establishment of One-Region strategy, hundreds of actors from the business
community were involved in the process. Established in 2016, the One-Region strategy has been
widely adopted as a guide by state managers, educational institutions, the CMCC, and the
CRDA. The elaboration of studies and formal strategies such as the One-Region are important
tools used for local governance actors to represent their interests and needs to state managers.
Such tools are part of a dominant political culture in the United State, which scholars have
termed managerialism. Formal studies and strategies demonstrate to be some of the main
mechanisms of South Carolina state selectivity, through which state managers select which
demands to attend. Through lobbying, the Talent Study and One-Region strategy are used as
assets to convince state managers about the “real” needs of their region, and thus, to advance
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local firms’ interests. As Interviewee 7, a CMCC representative, stated, the Talent Study and
One-Region strategy are used to “educate” many legislators about the region’s needs and agenda.
However, although the One-Region strategy seems to minimize single firm’s influence,
such as Boeing, over the creation and expansion of courses, programs, and the local educational
agenda, thus, reducing corporate capture, this strategy has major issues. First, the One-Region
strategy only attempts to offer a long-term solution to skill gaps, overlooking more urgent needs.
As we will discuss later, aerospace small firms are having issues with a certain lack of skills and
with poaching, which require short-term solutions. Short-term solutions have been ignored by
governance actors.
Second, while ReadySC has committed to train South Carolinians in manufacturing
positions for Boeing, in this way preventing the company to hire workers from outside the state,
Boeing South Carolina has not been required by state managers to hire local residents for job
positions at the higher edge of salaries, the so-called white-collar workers. In this regard, the
state of South Carolina has neglected in its bargaining agreement with Boeing, the fact that a
high percentage of white-collar workers will be hired from outside the state, in this aspect,
reinforcing corporate capture.
Third, initiatives and goals established at the One-Region strategy and fostered by the
local governance to tackle skill issues are mostly based on training initiatives and programs
designed by the state South Carolina such as Career Academies and Apprenticeship Carolina.
Such initiatives and programs, as argued in the last section, represent a form of corporate capture
in which the state manufacturing fraction of capital has greatly influenced the educational agenda
and strategy of South Carolina, fostering their interests. Therefore, the local governance fosters a
contradictory dynamic. It reinforces corporate capture by embracing, implementing, and
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expanding higher state scale programs and initiatives, while trying to minimize some of its
detrimental outcomes such as workers being hired from outside of the state. In the next
subsection, this research will explore how Charleston’s local form of governance has reinforced
corporate capture with more detail by analyzing the development and functioning of two main
programs in the region of Charleston: the Charleston Career Academies Program and the
Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program. The major goal of both programs is to tackle the
regional skills deficiencies by altering the adverse cultural paradigm for high schoolers to join
vocational careers.

4.3.2 The Charleston Career Academies Program
In 2014, the CMCC established the Charleston Career Academies Program through a
partnership with Berkeley, Charleston, and Dorchester counties and school districts in order to
develop career academies across their local schools. As explored before, this program is part of a
process of corporate capture in the state of South Carolina in which the state manufacturing
fraction of capital have influenced South Carolina’s educational agenda and strategy in regard to
expanding vocational training at schools. The program in the region of Charleston, although
based on its state educational agenda and strategy, has its own characteristics. According to a
participant from CMCC (Interviewee 10) the program was developed based on a Nashville,
Florida program.
We have taken a group to go and visit academies in Florida in Nashville. That came
about after several years of studying how it works in how to implement it here, so that’s
where the academies come from. Nashville now is sort of a national model and they
actually do annual training sections twice a year in how to implement career academies.
In 2018, the CMCC had fomented partnerships with 22 Charleston high schools, creating
62 career academies focusing on science, technology, engineering, and math; business and IT;
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culinary/hospitality; and health sciences; however, a representative from ReadySC (Interviewee
29) professed the focus had remained on manufacturing careers:
The other thing that has drawn a lot of attention, a lot of focus, and funding, since we
talked last time, is the focus of school systems on STEM. A lot of the schools are making
changes to the curriculum to support those types of courses to help with the development
of the workforce.
One important component in these career academies concerns how businesses are also
major partners with schools, counties and the CMCC. To design career academies in local
schools, the CMCC interacts with teachers and counselors to structure the program to meet
community job opportunities. The CMCC also organizes meetings where regional teachers
interact with businesses to learn about the needed skills and training. According to one
representative Interviewee 10 from the CMCC:
We have engaged 160 businesses and partners in the [career] academies. STEM, business
and computers, hospitality and culinary, health sciences. The businesses are coming and
meeting with the teachers once a month and they talk about curriculum and
understanding how the teaching will be actually used in a job.
The Charleston Career Academies Program seeks to influence students regarding their
career decisions, so they pursue locally demanded careers. When a participant from CMCC
(Interviewee 7) was asked about the Charleston Career Academies Program goals, she
responded:
The jobs are being created in this country, you don’t necessarily need a four-year
degree…So, how can you help prepare students that may stay in the work or maybe go
into to tech, where they get a two-year degree? They can still be very successful…What
our goal is, is to have more students leaving high schools and being career or college
ready. That’s is a very difficult thing to get and we are struggling. We struggle to get
students to study in specific careers that we have a lot here. Our goal is to make sure that
local students are being prepared to be able to be hired in good jobs that are being
created. So, we are trying to align education with employers’ needs.
Explaining the obstacle to “get students to study in specific careers,” Interviewee 7
described how students and their parents have held a negative view regarding manufacturing

149

careers. In this regard, governance leaders have developed initiatives such as talks and meetings
with students and parents to de-construct this view and impression. Such an attempt to deconstruct their views on manufacturing careers is also present in the Charleston Youth
Apprenticeship Program, which will soon be demonstrated.
Although the Charleston Career Academies can be seen as an approach to minimize
corporate capture by firms, for it seeks to stop corporations from hiring out-of-state workers, the
program not only seeks to influence schoolers in following vocational careers of interest of
manufacturing corporations but also opens possibilities for schools to be influenced or have their
Career Academy Programs captured by individual firms like Boeing South Carolina.
One example regards how Boeing has influenced some schools in Charleston to establish
career programs related to the aerospace sector. Since 2014, Boeing has partnered with R.B. Stall
High School in North Charleston, creating aerospace courses. In the process, Boeing provided
grants for equipment, creating teaching partnerships, and designing the curriculum of aerospace
courses. When explaining the program development, Interviewee 19, a school representative,
claimed:
We invested money from the state and from Boeing, a combination [to structure the
courses]. More input from Boeing, advice regarding how we are going to set the room,
what kind of material we need. Boeing provided some consultants to come over here and
help our teachers, to set up the program, make sure we were on board, very
supportive…They are trying to create a good workforce, and that one way of doing it.
Currently, R.B Stall High School offers a wide range of aerospace courses, such as
computer integrated manufacturing, aerospace engineering, aircraft manufacturing 1/2/3, aircraft
digital electronics, computer system, and intro to engineering design. Boeing has also impacted
other schools’ career academies in the region, such as North Charleston Elementary,
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Morningside Middle, North Charleston High, Fort Dorchester High, West Ashley High, and
Berkeley High.

4.3.3 The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program
In 2014, Trident Technical College created the Charleston Regional Youth
Apprenticeships Program. This program, although functioning in conjunction with
Apprenticeship Carolina, also has its own particularities. The program resulted from local
governance initiatives in which representatives of the CMCC, several local businesses, the
Trident Technical College, and some high schools embraced its state program, understanding
that apprenticeship programs could be an efficient way to tackle skills gaps in their labor market.
The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program was created after the CEO of a German
corporation located in Charleston contacted the Trident College Adult Apprenticeship Program
to recruit youth apprentices, a participant from Trident Apprenticeship Program (Interviewee 9)
explained:
In 2014 a company called IFA Rotarian reached out to me. They said they had a new
CEO, German-born, when came to America, walked to the company and the first thing he
asked was, “where all my apprentices?”. He was not talking about adults but talking
about kids. In Germany, they start in 10th grade. In America, we don’t do that. So, he
reached out to me and said, “they want to do this, can you help?” I said you know we
have been trying this for years, but we never had an employer who was willing to hire 16
years old kids…I will figure it out, make it happen…We did a meeting and invited other
firms like Bosch. We threw this proposal, saying why don’t we work together as a
consortium of employers?
According to some participants, the Trident College department of adult apprenticeship
was able to get firms interested in hiring 16-year-old kids at the same time that CMCC was
developing and implementing the Charleston Career Academies Program. This resulted in
CMCC’s interest in being part of the program. CMCC acknowledged that apprenticeships could
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be an important piece of their own program. One participant from Trident Apprenticeship
Program affirmed:
When the Charleston Chamber of Commerce found we had these six companies, they
called us and said we want to help. Companies would have to pay the tuitions and books
and fees, and CMCC decided to give a scholarship. They got companies to donate for the
program to help kids. So, companies have only to pay the wages (Interviewee 9).
The next step was to hire an employee to promote partnerships with high schools in order
to recruit students for the program. This employee role is to recruit and “connect the kid with the
employers for interviews.” (Interviewee 9).
Today, the Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program works in the following way.
Charleston Youth Apprenticeship staff is responsible for connecting firms that are part of the
Apprenticeship Carolina Program with 16-year-old (and up) high school students who are
interested in participating in the program. The program has recruited students according to the
firm skill needs. To recruit students, the program has partnered with 26 regional schools, where
students can apply for the opportunities.
High school students go to school in the morning, take classes at Trident Technical
College two to three times a week in the afternoon, and work part-time for firms (full-time
during summer), gaining on-the-job training. After graduating, students earn a certificate degree,
transferable to an associate degree, a national credential, and two years of working experience.
CMCC provides scholarships to students/participants, paying tuition, fees, and textbooks;
therefore, companies only pay wages, which can fully or partially be covered by tax credits.
After concluding the apprenticeship program, the Charleston Regional Youth
Apprenticeship Program organizes a Signing Day event, where youth apprentices officially sign
their employment contracts. Hundreds of business leaders and students, media channels,
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educators, and politicians attend the Signing Day event. The event glamourizes students’ choices
for vocational careers and intends to counteract the negative view toward manufacturing careers.
The main goal of this program is to provide a long-term solution for firms in the local
business community, struggling to recruit workers with specific skills. Although finding specific
skills in the local market has been a general challenge for local aerospace firms, small- and
medium-size firms have experienced greater difficulties due to their competition with MNCs like
Boeing and Volvo. A participant from CMCC (Interviewee 10) articulated:
In the apprenticeship program…The majority of the companies offering apprenticeship
are actually small and medium-size companies. Many of the 160 partners we have with
the career academies are small and medium-size companies. So, they want to be
involved, and in many cases, they have a harder time selling a job. So, I think there are
efforts in all levels to make sure we are not dysfunctional.
One participant, talking about how large corporations receive access to the most skilled
regional workers voiced, “They [Volvo] just started recruiting and they already have 24,000
applicants. And they will start with 2000 jobs.” (Interviewee 9). Although MNCs, such as
Boeing have also participated in the program. A representative from Trident Apprenticeship
Program (Interviewee 9) continued:
we can change the mentality of their [students] work ethic sooner than when they become
adults and already have the perceptions of how they should work. And I can tell you that
is not the only reason why companies are involved, but everyone wants to help a kid.
Companies always have recruiters, but you are throwing a fishing line, when there are
other options, like grow your own.
To conclude this sub-section, Charleston’s local form of governance fosters a
contradictory dynamic. On one hand, it reinforces corporate capture by embracing,
implementing, and expanding higher state scale programs and initiatives such as Apprenticeship
Carolina and Career Academies. Such programs are part of a process of corporate at the
subnational scales, which has been fostered by manufacturing corporations interested in
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influencing schools to expand vocational training. Therefore, by embracing and implementing
such initiatives, this research understands that Charleston governance reinforces capture.
However, on the other hand, some attempts to minimize corporate capture have been made.
More specifically in regard to how local governance actors have sought to address long-term
skill gaps in order to prevent labor being hired by large corporations like Boeing from outside the
state. Such attempts to minimize capture can also be seen in how apprentices are getting
transferable skills, recognized outside of firms they train in. The initiatives of Charleston’s local
governance, and thus, its tendency to reinforce or minimize corporate capture, are related to
South Carolina accumulation strategy and to the mechanisms through which its state selectivity
functions.

4.3.4 Charleston’s Local Governance, Boeing, and ReadySC Corporate Capture
In the second section of this chapter, this research explored the process of corporate
capture between Boeing and ReadySC. As demonstrated, corporate capture resulted from
interactions at the subnational scale. In this section, this study will pay attention to the local scale
in order to analyze whether the local governance of Charleston has minimized or reinforced the
process of corporate capture related to ReadySC specifically.
In the second section of this chapter it was revealed that ReadySC requires companies
that receive its services to meet some criteria such as paying competitive wages. However, the
lack of any parameter to determine what is meant by a “competitive wage” poses a problem.
South Carolina is considered one of the ten poorest states in the United States. Moreover, the
state has one of the lowest real median wages in the country (U.S. Census Bureau 2018).
Therefore, corporations do not have to pay much to claim to be paying competitive wages.
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In the case of Boeing, evidence suggests the company has failed to pay competitive
wages compared to what aerospace workers make in other regions, such as Everett, Washington.
According to the local union, the pay rate at Boeing’s South Carolina plant has remained 35
percent less than the U$31.04 per hour workers earn in Everett.
Moreover, in contrast to Boeing Everett, Boeing South Carolina lacks a pay scale. Hence,
while material touch workers in Everett make U$36 an hour after six years of work, in
Charleston, workers at the same job position will earn U$20. Different from Everett, in
Charleston, raises in salary and career advancements are subjective and based on manager
appraisement. Interviewee 2, a representative from the IAM union remarked:
…a worker here working for six years, and a worker working in Everett six years…In
Everett, it would be a $36 an hour. Here [North Charleston] they do not have a pay scale
or anything. All based on forms of appraisement for managers, very subject you know.
All I can tell is that here somebody here, a MT [material touch], after 6 years would make
$20 an hour. Boeing brags about it because in this area wages are kind of low in general.
Furthermore, according to the IAM representative, Boeing South Carolina released
numbers that depicted the company to pay an average of U$23 per hour; however, most of the
workers, working in material touch positions, hardly earn U$20 an hour, he asserted. According
to the union representative, Boeing pays higher salaries to contractors than to their own workers.
An interviewee from the IAM union contended:
They [Boeing] say the workers here are at the 95 percent of the area wages and their
average wage there is $23 an hour. It is really not for that MT [material touch] group.
They are enrolled in with contractors. Boeing puts the numbers up. So, you are going to
hear $23 per hour from Boeing and from the newspapers, but I can tell you from meeting
with the workers and getting an understanding of how the plant is laid out. MTs are the
largest group, it is hard to find anybody near $20 per hour. They pay more the contractors
than they pay the workers (Interviewee 2).
Another criterion firms must meet to receive ReadySC’s services concerns offering a
benefits package. Besides not having a pay scale and a career advancement plan like workers do
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in Everett, Boeing in Charleston has provided a health insurance plan that costs more than twice
the price of the plan in Everett. This health insurance plan also has significantly fewer benefits.
Moreover, workers have also faced overtime issues, working 12 hours six days per week with
every other Sunday off. Overtime work has recently raised some issues regarding the quality of
production at the Boeing South Carolina plant with its own workers putting in check the safety of
Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner airplanes (Kitroeff & Gelles 2019).
In this regard, Charleston’s local governance has not attempted to foster changes in
programs such as ReadySC at the subnational scale, which would minimize the detrimental
outcomes of processes of corporate capture such as this one with Boeing. First, this is because
local actors not only lack the power to advance structural changes at the subnational scale, where
ReadySC is designed. This lack of power of local states is part of a tendency in the US, where
subnational states are shrinking their local capacity and authority to govern (Kim & Warner
2018). As Kim and Warner (2018) disclosed, there is a trend in the US, where subnational states
are increasingly transferring their expenditure responsibilities to local government as well as
fostering constrictive revenue tools and preemption of policy authority. Therefore, the local
forms of governance of Charleston finds itself in a position that, even if desired, changes are hard
to be implemented due to a lack of power.
Second, the local governance of Charleston has not attempted to foster changes in
programs such as ReadySC at the subnational scale because local actors problematically believe
that market relations, or more specifically, firm competition for labor and workers investing in
the right skills will fix problems related to wages. Governance actors share the belief that
through the market, South Carolina and Charleston, by attracting more and more MNCs to the
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region, will be able to increase wages due to firms competing for skilled workers. Additionally,
participants believe wages will increase as the skills of local workers improve through training.
Therefore, while local governance actors, such as state managers, have increasingly
embraced various responsibilities such as customized training to support business development;
state managers have transferred the responsibilities concerning wages and benefits to the market
and to individuals who are accountable for acquiring skills in order to have better wages. A
representative from CMCC (Interviewee 10) mentioned the following when asked about the role
of ReadySC in increasing wages as what has been done in this matter:
We believe that we will start seeing wage pressure and that will be a big thing. It is going
to find qualified workers, so companies will start to pay a higher wage. We want the
wages to go up. That is one of the challenges of our region is that our living costs are
really high, and our wages are lower than the national average. Part of our strategies is to
have wages to increase. So that is why the Chamber is with high schools and existing
workforce, to make sure that they can give the skills they need to be able to compete for
these jobs.
The potential and role of unions to increase workers’ wages in the region is heavily
criticized as well as attacked at the local scale. Boeing has received a full commitment from state
politicians to thwart unionization attempts. The IAM union has attempted in the last years to
unionize workers at the Boeing’s Charleston plant, resulting in Boeing and its supporters to
foster several initiatives to impede unionization.
According to an IAM representative, state politicians, and the local media have joined the
fight against unionization at Boeing’ South Carolina plant. For example, North Charleston
mayor, Keith Summey, has sharply criticized IAM unionization attempts. When Boeing’s
employees voted on April 2015, Mayor Summey discouraged unionization, stating:
[…] Charlestonians that work at the Boeing facility need to remember what that union
thinks of them. […] So, they're not concerned about our employees. They're concerned
about their employees on the West Coast and how they can keep the Boeing business
there (Rolo 2015).
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Moreover, the local media has played a crucial role supporting the anti-union discourse,
joining state manager efforts. Several media outlets have attacked the Charleston IAM union,
demonizing its intents. Interviewee 2, a representative from the IAM union claimed:
…when I first got down here, we participated in a Martin Luther King parade downtown.
We had the biggest bus and 25 people walking with the bus carrying the American flag.
We were singing songs for the race and labor movement and we never made in the tv.
The float in front and behind us was on the tv. We were not. When I first got here the
aerospace writer for the Post Courier, every chance he got bashed us…all these other
entities are powerful including the mayor of North Charleston, he summed today a press
release. He called one of those media things, where they all come out and lie. He said the
only reason we are here is to take workers back to Everett. But we don’t have that ability
even if we are organized here.
Another issue is that although any firm-size can have access to ReadySC, the program is
largely dominated by large corporations, reinforcing the view that ReadySC was designed to
foment structural coupling processes. In this way, most of the investments have been directed to
large corporations, such as BMW, Boeing, Continental, Volvo, Mercedes-Benz, Samsung, and
Michelin while small- and medium-size firms, creating most of the state jobs have failed to
receive similar attention.
In Charleston, human resource representatives of small- and medium-sized aerospace
firms professed they were facing shortages in several job positions. An aerospace human
resource representative, Interviewee 27, claimed many job positions confronted a lack of skilled
workers because “Boeing hires them, and training at Trident Technical College is for Boeing’s
needs.” The participant continued discussing about Boeing’s influential power over training and
state managers, “Boeing has got everybody in their pocket. Boeing says they [state managers and
Trident Technical College] do whatever they ask. We are at the mercy of Boeing.”
While local governance actors have attempted to address these skill issues through career
academies and apprenticeship programs, such initiatives engender a long-term solution. At the
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subnational scale, large corporations have captured what could be the short-term skill gap
solution, ReadySC, limiting for small- and medium-size firms its local access.
Among all 90 existing aerospace companies in the Charleston aerospace industrial
cluster, only Boeing, Senior Aerospace AMT (12 trainees), and TigHitco have benefited from
ReadySC—less than 4 percent of the aerospace firms. When a ReadySC representative
(Interviewee 29) was asked about why ReadySC has failed to provide substantial services for
small- and medium-size firms, he responded:
I will not be able to answer why…It is free, effective. It is proven. I would venture to say
that there is a fair number that doesn’t know about ReadySC, what we do and what we
are capable of doing.
Therefore, ReadySC has given centrality to Boeing South Carolina, overlooking the
short-term needs of the aerospace business community, which has struggled to recruit skilled
workers, like welders, mechanics, and assemblers, due to low unemployment levels and Boeing
poaching skilled workers from these firms. As another aerospace firm human resource manager
remarked: “The people we are looking for are already employed so we often have to use
recruiters to try to pull them out of other places, particularly for our salary positions.”
(Interviewee 26).

Conclusion
This chapter aimed at analyzing three main issues. First, this research sought to
demonstrate how the state of South Carolina has gone through some significant processes of
corporate capture related to vocational training. It was revealed how the state manufacturing
fraction of capital has influenced the design of South Carolina’s educational strategy and agenda,
and consequently, the creation of state programs such Career Academies, Apprenticeship
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Carolina and ReadySC. I argued that this process of corporate capture has evolved as an intrinsic
element of South Carolina accumulation strategy, which has placed its manufacturing fraction of
capital at the center of accumulation. In this regard, manufacturing corporations are structurally
privileged by South Carolina selective institutional context, having advantages to strategically
foster their interests.
Second, this research attempted to analyze how the structural coupling process between
Boeing and South Carolina resulted in the corporate capture of ReadySC. As revealed, ReadySC
“automatically” grants its capture to MNCs that meet its criteria. It was intentionally designed to
be capture. Nonetheless, as bargaining events emerge, as in the case of Boeing, the intensity of
corporate capture can be greatly advanced. In the case of Boeing, the company was able to
receive much more incentives than regular firms would get.
Third, this chapter analyzed whether Charleston’s local form of governance reinforce or
minimize processes of corporate capture related to the state manufacturing fraction of capital and
to Boeing. I argued that Charleston’s local governance has fostered a contradictory dynamic,
where local actors have attempted to minimize processes of corporate capture; however, these
attempts have been problematic and have actually reinforced such processes.
First, it was demonstrated that attempts to minimize processes of corporate capture at the
local scale are related to Charleston Talent Study and One-Region strategy. As revealed, such
study and strategy, based on sector-level demands, decrease single-firm influence, such as
Boeing, over the local educational agenda of Charleston. Moreover, one major goal of the Oneregion strategy is to prevent firms from recruiting and hiring of out-of-the state workers.
However, as claimed, such an approach gives provides a long-term solution, overlooking urgent
skills gaps, given that ReadySC capacity has been capture by large corporations.
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Second, it was demonstrated that Charleston governance embraces and expands processes
of corporate capture fostered at its subnational scale, thus reinforcing it, by implementing
programs such as the Charleston Career Academies Program and the Charleston Youth
Apprenticeship Program at the local scale. As demonstrated, these two programs are
contradictory. This is because while they reinforce processes of corporate capture that were
established at the subnational scale, at the local scale, they can be seen as attempts to minimize
corporate capture. As revealed, one major goal here is to prevent workers being hired from
outside of the state.
Concerning Boeing’s process of corporate capture in regard to ReadySC, the local form
of governance of Charleston has failed to minimize its detrimental outcomes because local actors
not only lack the power to advance structural changes at the subnational scale, where ReadySC is
designed, but also because local actors problematically believe that firms’ competition for labor
and individual workers investing in the right skills will fix problems related to wages. As stated,
this lack of power is part of a tendency in the US, where subnational states are shrinking their
local capacity and authority to govern (Kim & Warner 2018). Boeing’s corporate capture of
ReadySC presents problems related to a lack of transparency, low wages, poor benefits package,
and overtime work. Moreover, while ReadySC has been responsible for training and getting
locals hired by Boeing in manufacturing vocational job positions, whether Boeing is hiring white
collar workers from outside the state of South Carolina and Charleston is a subject that is
ignored. Corporate capture in Charleston can be summarized as follows (see next page):
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Diagram 7. Corporate Capture in South Carolina and Charleston.

Source: Author.
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Chapter 5: Variegated Forms of Corporate Capture: The Case of São José dos Campos
and Embraer in Perspective
São José dos Campos (SJC) is a medium-size city located 55 miles from the city of São
Paulo. SJC is known in Brazil as “the capital of airplanes” due to the presence of Embraer, a
manufacturing aerospace company specialized in the production of military, commercial,
executive and agricultural aircrafts. Embraer is one of the major employers in the region, being
responsible for the generation of more than 15 thousand jobs. This has granted the company
significant economic, social and political power. Therefore, Embraer as a major local player has
fostered processes of corporate capture in SJC’s regional training system, influencing many local
public educational institutions. In this regard, this chapter will be structured in two main
sections.
In the first section, this researcher will analyze how processes of corporate capture in
training initiatives in SJC, São Paulo, Brazil have evolved intrinsically related to the Brazilian
import-substitution accumulation strategy. Such a strategy privileged domestic industrial
capitalists, having organic and structural coupling processes as its principal goals. This research
argues that in SJC, the evolution of Embraer processes of corporate capture in training initiatives
is associated with the organic coupling process fostered by the Brazilian national state in the
1950s, which resulted in the establishment of Embraer and the Brazilian aerospace sector in the
city. Therefore, the capture of training initiatives does not happen through bargaining events, like
in South Carolina, but organically through synergistic informal one-on-one interactions. To
illustrate this argument, in this section, this research will explore the evolution of Embraer’s
corporate capture in two training initiatives, one at the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA)
and one at the São Paulo State Technological College (FATEC).
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Second, this researcher will examine whether the local governance of SJC minimizes or
reinforces Embraer’s process of corporate capture. I will argue that the SJC’s local governance
reinforces processes of corporate capture due to the nature of the interactions among state
managers and other governance actors. State managers and governance actors identify the
aerospace local training needs, and advance training initiatives based on informal relations and
personal/professional ties, which function as the main mechanism of state selectivity. This
combined with the economic and social power of corporations magnify single firm influence,
such as Embraer, over educational institutions and their training initiatives, reinforcing processes
of corporate capture.

5.1 The Brazilian Import-Substitution Accumulation Strategy and the Uneven and
Combined Development of São José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil
This section entails two subsections. In the first subsection, I will analyze the
particularities of the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation. First, the emergence of the
Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy will be analyzed, revealing how
accumulation was made possible and how domestic and international fractions of industrial
capital were central in such a strategy. In the second subsection, I will demonstrate how the
Brazilian developmental state promoted development based on top-down decisions, fostering an
uneven development that benefited the industrialization of the city of São Paulo, and later, of
SJC through a combination of structural and organic coupling processes. This is important
because the creation of Embraer in SJC is related to these processes.
After the Second World War, the import-substitution model of development gained
prominence in many countries in the Global South. In Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico,
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Uruguay, and Venezuela, among others, adopted this model with the goal to develop their
internal market by substituting product imports with domestic production. In Brazil, the importsubstitution accumulation strategy, remaining in place from the 1930s to the 1980s, was adopted
during the Great Depression when the Brazilian raw material exports severely declined. This
waning in raw material exports encouraged the Brazilian state to diversify its economy,
bolstering domestic industrial production to reduce foreign dependency (Oliveira 2004).
In this model, Dependency theorists played a crucial role not only by revealing how
accumulation was fomented but also by influencing the design of such a policy (Souza 2016).
The Dependency theory emerged in 1949 when Prebisch and Singer established the SingerPrebisch thesis. Subsequently, other theorists, such as Furtado, Frank and Cardoso, also entered
the scholarly discussion. According to Dependency theory, underdevelopment in Latin America
remained predicated on the development of the Global North because the relationship between
the core and periphery was based on an unequal exchange. In other words, less developed Latin
American countries with economies based on “backward sectors” would sell raw materials below
their real value, whereas core countries would sell their industrial manufacturing products at
prices above their real value (Larrain 1989; Peet & Hartwick 2009). Such a dependence created a
small elite as well as a vast population of poor peasants in less developed countries, where the
profits gained through exports were used for luxury consumption rather than domestic
investment (Prebisch 1950; Peet & Hartwick 2009). Dependency theorists understood that the
import-substitution accumulation strategy encouraged development because internal domestic
production would break the unequal exchange paradigm. In this regard, the backward sectors of
Latin American countries, such as subsistence agriculture, posed an obstacle, necessitating
industrialization replacement (Furtado 1964; Oliveira 1972).
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However, Dependency theory, emphasizing core-periphery relations to explain the
development (or underdevelopment) of Latin American countries, overlooked the role and
significance of internal class relations in the import-substitution development model (Oliveira
1972). As Oliveira (1972, 36) stated, “the expansion of capitalism in Brazil happened by
introducing new relations in backward sectors, relations that are not only unequal but also
combined.” International regulation, seeking to break with the unequal exchange relations
between core countries and Brazil, was not the only feature accounting for Brazilian
accumulation during this period. According to Oliveira (1972), under this model, development in
Brazil happened due to the combination of four main factors.
First, the internal industrial capital accumulation in Brazil did not result from the
modernization, or industrialization of backward sectors—through a break from the coreperiphery unequal exchanges—as the dependency theorists would claim. Accumulation was
made possible due to how the backward subsistence agriculture sector and its surplus production
was articulated with the interests of the newly emerging industrial fraction of capital. The new
modern relations of capitalist production took advantage of this backward sector, providing food
for urban workers at low-costs and enabling working class reproduction at low costs (Oliveira
2004).
Second, the existence of an urban reserve army of labor, working in informal sectors and
living in slums, also reduced the labor reproduction costs. Third, different from the US Fordist
accumulation regime, the Brazilian state did not assume a commitment to foster full employment
and to establish fundamental social rights as a way to sustain adequate demand. Labor rights
were established but with a low minimum wage. Moreover, gains in productivity were not tied
with increases in wages, like those in the US, which were based on an institutional compromise
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between unions and industrial capitalists (Souza 2016). In this accumulation strategy, but mostly
under its dictatorship period from 1964-1985, the Brazilian state coerced labor unions,
suppressing labor mobilization (Oliveira 2004).
Fourth, under this model of development, accumulation was made possible due to the
Brazilian developmental state. The Brazilian developmental state forged an institutional
compromise, where its national developmental project was mostly constructed along with the
interests of the emerging Brazilian industrial fraction of capital. However, foreign direct
investments also played an essential role in this project (Fine 1999; Oliveira 2004; Souza 2016).
Industrial domestic and international manufacturing capitalists gained a privileged and
hegemonic position in the Brazilian state.
This means that the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy developed
several mechanisms and initiatives to foment two types of strategic coupling: Organic coupling
based on the establishment of domestic firms mostly related to heavy industry and infrastructure,
and structural coupling based on the attraction of foreign direct investments related to
manufacturing firms of consumer and durable goods (Henrique & Muniz 2015; Santos 2015).
To enhance organic coupling processes, the Brazilian developmental state directed
investments to create, strengthen, and develop national firms, and to advance specific sectors
(Henrique & Muniz 2015; Santos 2015). The Brazilian developmental state also implemented
several measures privileging domestic capitalists, such as currency exchange devaluation and
increased import tariffs (Bruno 2005). In this period, the Brazilian state created several national
companies, such as Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (today Vale S.A), Companhia Siderúrgica
Nacional, Petrobrás, Telebrás, and Embraer (Santos 2015). As this research will reveal in the
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next section, it is in this context that SJC was selected by the federal government to host the
creation of Embraer.
While some Latin American developmental states limited or restricted FDIs in their
countries to promote national firms, the Brazilian state rarely imposed restrictions on FDIs.
Restrictions of FDIs were only imposed in some strategic sectors, such as the defense sector. In
other atypical cases, restrictions were associated with certain conditionalities, such as
requirements of association between FDI and Brazilian companies, or technology transference
(Motta Veiga 2004). The Brazilian state was also successful in promoting structural coupling
processes, and thus, in attracting FDIs—not only due to its lack of investment restrictions but
also due to the existence of a large domestic market in Brazil combined with its imposed high
import tariffs (Motta Veiga 2004). In the 1950s, the Brazilian state impressively attracted about a
third of FDIs in developing countries (Oliveira 2001a). A summary of this accumulation strategy
can be visualized in the figure below.

Diagram 8. Brazilian Import-Substitution Accumulation Strategy

Source: Author.
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Under the import-substitution accumulation strategy, the Brazilian state was highly
centralized, where the political decision-making reflected a top-down process. Mechanisms such
as planning, coordination, fiscal centrality, and public investments proved crucial for the state to
encourage development (Souza 2016). The autonomy of subnational states and municipalities in
countries based on a federal governmental system such as in Brazil and the United States, as
Ward et al. (2010) argued, behaves as a pendulum. In the Brazilian case, during the importsubstitution model of development, the federal government, which was already centralized—
given that under its dictatorship period, governors and many municipality mayors were political
appointees from the federal government—gained more power, reducing the autonomy of
subnational states and municipalities through the 1966 Tax Reform31. In this reform, the federal
government increased its capacity to collect taxes. Such a centralization started to decrease after
1974 and continued until the end of the 1980s when Brazil went through a process of
decentralization due to the 1988 Federal Constitution (Sallum Jr 1996; Souza 2016). The 1988
Federal Constitution reconfigured direct tax collection to subnational states and municipalities
and established the right for citizens to elect their politicians (Souza 2016).
The Brazilian developmental state, as Souza (2016) stated, was responsible for
elaborating and coordinating policies while subnational states and municipalities were tied to
these top-down decisions. As scholars such as Jessop (1990) and Jonas (1995) pointed out, the
state tends to privilege not only actors but also places through its accumulation strategy and
hegemonic project. In Brazil, the import-substitution accumulation strategy not only privileged

31

In the 1966 Tax Reform, the Brazilian federal government further centralized its fiscal system and thus power of decision by
directly receiving some taxes, such as the State and Municipal Participation Funds (FPM and FPE) and the Taxation on the
Circulation of Goods (ICM) that before would be collected by subnational states. Before the 1966 Tax Reform, subnational states
would collect the FPM and FPE taxes and transfer 30 percent to the federal government and 20 percent to their municipalities.
After this change, the federal government started to collect the ICM and transfer to states and municipalities 12 percent of total
collected (Piancastelli & Perobelli 1996; Souza 2016). After the process of decentralization in Brazil in 1988, the federal
government started to transfer 20 percent of the FPM and FPE taxes to states and municipalities of the total collected.
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industrial capitalists, but also fomented an uneven spatial development, which benefitted the
Southeastern subnational states32, but mostly São Paulo (Souza 2016). For example, in 1956, the
former president Juscelino Kubitschek launched the “Plan with Targets”, aimed at developing
five primary areas and industries in Brazil: food, transports, energy, base industries, and
education. This plan directed investment predominantly to São Paulo (Souza 2016). Such
investments resulted in the state of São Paulo receiving the greatest amounts of public and
private investments, and consequently, going through its most severe process of industrialization
in Brazilian history (Loureiro 2006; Pereira 2018). For example, organic and structural coupling
processes transformed São Paulo in the 1950s and 1960s into the largest Latin American
aerospace and automobile production centers. The state attracted firms such as Ford, General
Motors and Volkswagen (Takami 2018).
Subnational states and municipalities lacked autonomy to design significant regional and
local development policies to attract FDIs (Conceição et al. 2015). Therefore, FDIs’ locational
decision and the federal governmental assessments regarding where to establish state-owned
companies were dependent on aspects such as political ties with state and municipal politicians,
infrastructure, presence of a skilled labor force, and to a lesser degree, subnational states and
municipalities subsidies and incentives. Although, subnational states and municipalities subsidies
and incentives were made more critical after the 1988 Federal Constitution, which awarded states
and municipalities greater autonomy (Conceição et al. 2015).
Besides receiving large public investments, the São Paulo metropolitan region also
attracted and concentrated firms due to its significant presence of consumers and concentration

32

However, the Brazilian state also sought, although unsuccessfully, to decrease such an uneven development by creating regional
developmental programs to support some states and cities lagging behind economically. For example, the creation of SUDENE in
1959 aimed at supporting the development of the Northeast region of Brazil (Conceição et al. 2015).
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of skilled workers, state and municipal incentives, and a well-developed infrastructure previously
established for coffee production and exports (Loureiro 2006; Pereira 2018). However, while the
São Paulo metropolitan region enjoyed the highest agglomeration of firms in the country, the
state’s countryside, as well as other states, lagged behind regarding its industrial development
(Lencioni 1991).
In the 1970s, São Paulo sought to decentralize its industry to benefit its countryside. The
state invested in infrastructure, such as in the construction of modern roads connecting the
countryside with the São Paulo metropolitan region. The state also created the Financial
Coordination Committee of São Paulo Industrial Policy. The primary goal of this committee was
to develop jobs in countryside cities by stimulating industrial relocation and decentralization
from the São Paulo metropolitan region. The state also established more significant incentives
for firms located outside the São Paulo metropolitan region (Lencioni 1991). Two other factors
also promoted this industrial decentralization.
First, infrastructure problems related to fast, unplanned urban growth, pollution,
increased wages, strong union presence, and high land costs in the São Paulo metropolitan region
encouraged industrial decentralization (Santos 2015). Second, the federal government
established research and technology institutes in São Paulo countryside cities to promote the
development of specific sectors (Negri 1992). These institutions remained crucial for the
Brazilian developmental state to grow a highly skilled workforce as well as to develop the
required technology to foster organic coupling processes through the establishment of stateowned companies and specific sectors (Negri 1992). For example, one can mention the
development of the IT industrial cluster in Campinas, of Embraer and its aerospace industrial
cluster in SJC, and of the alcohol-related sector in Paulínia. This strategy, therefore, resulted in
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several organic and structural coupling processes taking place in the São Paulo countryside as
well as in other states.
The leading destinations for domestic and foreign firm in the countryside of São Paulo
were cities such as Campinas, São José dos Campos, Taubaté, Jundiaí, São Carlos, Piracicaba,
and Sorocaba (Henrique & Muniz 2015). This industrial decentralization began before the
promulgation of the Brazilian 1988 Federal Constitution; therefore, subnational and municipal
development remained mostly dependent on top-down decisions (Piancastelli & Perobelli 1996).
SJC became one of the major sites for firms leaving the metropolitan region of São Paulo due to
a combination of factors, which privileged its process of capital accumulation (Henrique & Ricci
2011; Henrique 2012). Besides providing incentives to firms, SJC also possessed a cheaper labor
force compared to São Paulo city and was located alongside the Dutra Highway, a major road
connecting two of the biggest consumption centers in the country: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
(Henrique & Ricci 2011).
To conclude, under the import-substitution accumulation strategy, the Brazilian
developmental state positioned domestic and foreign fractions of industrial capital at the center
of its accumulation strategy, fostering several actions and initiatives that favored such actors.
The Brazilian developmental state developed mechanisms and initiatives to promote organic
coupling processes as well as structural coupling processes. Under this strategy, development
reflected a top-down decision, where subnational states and municipalities like SJC lacked
autonomy to design policies and provide considerable incentives. In this context, the Brazilian
state advanced an uneven development privileging some states and municipalities over others by
directing greater private and public investments. This is the case of SJC, which had several
structural coupling processes, receiving companies such as Ericsson, General Motors, Parker,
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Kodak, Panasonic, Johnson & Johnson and Petrobrás. SJC also went through an organic coupling
process, where Embraer was established, as outlined in the next section. This organic coupling
process is crucial to understand how processes of corporate capture between Embraer and
educational institutions evolved in SJC.

5.2 Embraer and São José dos Campos’s Organic Coupling: The Corporate Capture of
Training Programs at the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA) and at the São Paulo
State Technological College (FATEC)
This section will be structured in three parts. First, I will provide a brief contextualization
of the city SJC regarding its economic and social situation as well as its labor market. Second, I
will analyze the aerospace organic coupling process in SJC. Third, I will demonstrate how the
evolution of processes of corporate capture between Embraer and public educational institutions
in SJC is intrinsically related to this aerospace organic coupling process. This section argues that
due to the Brazilian form of state and its accumulation strategy, and consequent aerospace
organic coupling process in SJC, the corporate capture processes of programs at the ITA and the
FATEC evolved organically through synergistic and informal interactions.
The history of SJC (see map 2) dates back to 1611, when Catholic Jesuit Priests
established the São José village to assist outcast indigenous tribes from other São Paulo regions.
Through the years, the village increased its non-indigenous population, becoming, in 1767, the
city of SJC (Borba & Silva 2011). Presently, with a population of 713,943, SJC is a mediumsized city located 94 kilometers from the São Paulo city and is nearby other cities like Jacareí,
Taubaté, Caçapava, Campos do Jordão, and Monteiro Lobato (IBGE 2018). Dubbed the aviation
capital, SJC is the birthplace of Embraer, one of the biggest national firms in Brazil today, and
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the third largest aerospace company worldwide. The city has remained admired for having one of
the best qualities of life and education in the country and being highly industrialized (Henrique
& Ricci 2011).

Map 2. The Location of São José dos Campos, São Paulo, Brazil.

Throughout its history, the city has had two distinct periods of development. In the first
period, from the 1870s to 1940s, the city was economically based on the production of coffee,
and in the provision of sanatorium33 services. In 1924, the state of São Paulo established a public
sanatorium named Vicentina Aranha in SJC, transforming the city into a national center for
tuberculosis treatment. In 1935, the former president Getúlio Vargas turned SJC into an Estância

33

SJC had several resorts and sanitariums to treat people with tuberculosis. This happened because SJC is located in the
countryside and in a mountainous region. In the past, the city received federal investments to develop this sector (Santos 2014).

174

Climática. Under this title, the city acquired the right to receive higher federal funding to invest
in infrastructure related to tuberculosis treatment (Borba & Silva 2011). However, after the 1929
Great Depression when the Brazilian state adopted its import-substitution accumulation strategy,
the city entered its second period in the end of the 1940s, shifting its economic base to industrial
production (Borba & Silva 2011). Under the import-substitution accumulation strategy, SJC was
able to emerge as one of the most developed and industrialized cities in Brazil. This is related to
how the Brazilian developmental state fostered an organic coupling process in SJC, which is
directly tied to the creation of the Aeronautic Technological Center (CTA). One participant from
the SJC Technology Park, describing the significance of the CTA to SJC, said the following:
SJC is a city that somehow was enormously benefitted by the federal government in the
40s with the creation of the Aeronautic Technological Center; today named Department
of Aerospace Science and Technology. In 1956, SJC had 1/3 of the population of
Taubaté. Today SJC has three times more than the population of Taubaté. Taubaté was
the “capital” of the “Vale Region”; nowadays it is SJC. The city of Jacareí had the same
level of development than SJC. Today Jacareí is undeveloped in comparison to SJC.
Amongst all the cities in Brazil with a population average of 700 thousand, SJC is
probably the city with the best socioeconomic rates […]. The creation of the Aeronautic
Technological Center generated DNA in the region of innovation and technology. The
Aeronautic Technological Center attracted firms…originated many firms…It has
important ingredients such as high skilled workforce, and the presence of the government
with its strategic orientation and potential opportunities to develop programs of foment.
(Interviewee 50)
The CTA dates to the 1940s when Lieutenant Colonel Casemiro Montenegro Filho, after
visiting the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the US, decided to establish a
Brazilian aeronautic research and education center (Coimbra & Hopfer 2017). Under the
selective institutional context of the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy,
Casemiro’s project gained support from the federal government, which had an interest in
developing its aerospace technological autonomy and aerospace defense sector (Henrique &
Ricci 2011).
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The federal government’s initial plan was to create the CTA in the city of Guaratinguetá.
Nonetheless, SJC was selected and privileged by the federal government as a site to receive the
CTA for three main reasons. First, from 1935 to 1958 and 1967 to 1978, the São Paulo governor
appointed SJC mayors (Coimbra & Hopfer 2017), which established a political tie between
federal, state, and SJC state managers. In the case of the CTA, a former mayor of SJC, Jorge
Zarur, worked with a local influential group to obtain a 500-acre donation from the state of São
Paulo, which was transferred to the Brazilian Aeronautic Force as an incentive to establish the
CTA (Coimbra & Hopfer 2017; Henrique and Ricci 2011). Jones (1995) argues that for a
national accumulation strategy to be successful and achieve hegemony, its state apparatus has to
mobilize forces of representation—strategically significant sectors and institutional agents—to
support its strategy, structure, goals, and mode of operation. In this setting, the national
accumulation strategy favors the places where forces of representation remain located. The state,
therefore, privileges its social basis, which SJC typified. Second, the Dutra Highway
construction in 1951 provided SJC a strategic locational position, attractive to firms, given that
SJC is positioned between the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Henrique & Ricci 2011;
Santos 2014). Third, as a sanitarium center, SJC established a well-developed infrastructure
using state and federal investments, serving as an essential asset to firms.
In 1946, the Brazilian Air Force founded the CTA in SJC, which established in 1950, the
Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA), a federal public university specializing in aeronauticrelated engineering courses, and in 1953, the Institute of Research and Development (IPD). The
CTA played an essential role in establishing Embraer34. As Mackinnon (2012) asserted, organic

34

The CTA was responsible for transforming SJC in a technological hub. After the establishment of the CTA, SJC started to
receive many FDIs. For example, in 1959, the former president Juscelino Kubitschek inaugurated the establishment of a General
Motors plant in city. Other examples are Johnson & Johnson in 1954, Ericsson in 1955, Kanebo, Eaton and Bendix in 1957, and
Engesa in 1958. Therefore, the CTA was a major aspect propelling the industrialization of SJC (Coimbra and Hopfer 2017).
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coupling processes happen through a co-evolution of regional assets and global firms in the same
region. In the case of SJC, the IPD and the ITA provided the necessary assets, including the
technological capacity and skills for the creation of Embraer. In this scenario, the IPD, funded by
the Brazilian developmental state—which had the goal of developing its domestic aeronautic
sector—hired 300 workers to develop a small-size airplane prototype in 1965. Workers included
graduates from the ITA. Therefore, in 1968, the IPD developed its prototype known as Embraer
EMB-110, Bandeirantes. One year later, in 1969, the federal government, along with some
private investors, founded Embraer and started to produce the Bandeirantes (21 passengers) for
its internal market but mostly for the government (Henrique 2012). One participant from the
Institute of Development and Technology described the role of the CTA in the creation of
Embraer as follows:
…when you already have experience [in producing airplanes], you are basically getting
your experience and transferring to another location. That is easier than when you want to
start from scratch. What did happen so that Embraer could be created? First, the federal
government created the CTA, and then the ITA in 1950. Nineteen years later, in 1969,
Embraer was created. So, we had an aeronautic labor market in SJC, who knew how to
work in the aeronautic sector. The first group of engineers in SJC graduated in 1955. So,
we had to wait for 19 years to form a sufficient labor market. It is a short time, but
enough to have the skills to start. (Interviewee 51)
The creation of the IPD and the ITA not only resulted in the creation of Embraer but also
in the emergence of an aerospace domestic production network. SJC hosts the highest
concentration of aerospace firms in the country with 94 firms, mostly Embraer’s suppliers,
forming an industrial cluster. The emergence of this domestic production network and industrial
cluster is related to significant technological spillovers that the CTA and Embraer enhanced35. In
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Moreover, the creation of Embraer under the import-substitution accumulation strategy resulted in several international
aerospace firms establishing production in SJC to supply parts to Embraer in a period marked by high import tariffs (Henrique,
2012). In general, the creation of the CTA by the federal government allowed SJC to become a technological hub with several
research institutes such as the National Institute for Space Research, a research institute capable to produce and launch satellites
created in 1971.
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the years following the creation of Embraer, many of Embraer’s former employees, researchers
from the IPD, and alumni from the ITA started their own business as Embraer’s suppliers but
also, and to a smaller degree, as startups based on innovations developed by the IPD. As one
participant explained, “Everybody who has an aerospace company here was from the IPD, the
ITA, from Embraer, or the National Institute for Space Research (INPE). The majority comes
from these institutions and Embraer” (Interviewee 57). Another interviewee from the ITA
claimed:
…the ITA came first. The government could have created Embraer first, and then the
IPD, the ITA, and the INPE, but the government did not. The skilled workforce from
Embraer induced everything. Through the history of the CTA, it has been created more
than 150 aerospace companies in SJC, some small, but others very large like Embraer.
The ITA received investments; it was created in a time and in a country that had nothing
in the aerospace sector, let alone in other sectors. People here always say “in the 1940s
we were not producing even bicycles”. Brazil did not have a mechanic or aeronautic
industry, so training had to come first. (Interviewee 35).
Another participant also from the ITA further voiced:
The Technology Park has around 100 firms, and many of them are related to the ITA
because they were founded by ITA’s alumni. Many aerospace companies in SJC were
founded by ITA’s former students such as Avibrás and Mectron. There are many
companies created by ITA’s former students. (Interviewee 39)
This aerospace organic coupling process in SJC can be summarized as follows:

Diagram 9. Aerospace Organic Coupling in São José dos Campos.

Source: Author.
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This organic coupling process in SJC, happening through the co-evolution of the IPD, the
ITA, Embraer, and then the SJC aerospace industrial cluster, established and fostered symmetric
and synergistic power relations among local actors—prevailing today and remaining critical for
this research to explain how and why processes of corporate capture in training related to
Embraer evolve in SJC. One representative from the ITA asserted:
Institutions in São José dos Campos have a high synergy among them. Look at the
director of CECOMPI, Marcelo; he is the dean of the ITA and a former student in our
master’s degree program. Look at the Secretary of Development of SJC, Cavalli; he was
the dean of the ITA and a former student. Look at the director of the SJC Technology
Park, Horácio Forjaz; he is an ITA’s former student and a former director at Embraer.
Look at Tozi, the dean of FATEC; he coordinates the expansion team at the ITA.
Embraer and Avibrás founded by ITA’s former students. Because of that, synergy is high.
This synergy among local actors is also related to how the Brazilian import-substitution
accumulation strategy was based not only on material and political practices but also on a
nationalistic developmental ideology. Under this strategy, there was a shared view of the
Brazilian state to be defending the nation’s interests (jobs through the support of national firms)
against dependency and subordination to developed nations and their influence (Bresser-Pereira
2018). Such a “nationalistic developmental ideology” propagated the view that development
required cooperation around common national interests, where the state was the major
instrument of collective action (Bresser-Pereira 2018). In the case of SJC’s organic coupling
process, local actors embraced Embraer’s establishment as part of this collective national—and
local—project in which cooperation towards a common good was required. One participant from
CECOMPI, talking about how collectiveness is essentially related to local actors’ connection to
the aerospace in SJC, professed:
We have strong interactions here because of the CTA. Inside the CTA today we have six
Institutes of Research and the ITA. There is also the INPE, which is a spinoff of the CTA
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founded in 1971. The ITA is a spinoff of the CTA. As spinoffs, we have Embraer,
Avibrás, Mectron, and others. The government believed 70 years ago, and that’s the
government success. Someone said “Let’s build an Aeronautic Center here? From where
do we start? From education, education of excellence. (Interviewee 49)
Interviewee 52, a representative from the Sao Paulo State Secretary of Development,
talking about the interactions among the actors in the SJC aerospace industrial cluster, and more
specifically, how aerospace local actors work collectively, mentioned: “Companies, educational
institutions, the municipal government, they interact, they are all involved (in collective
initiatives). They all interact. We don’t have problems with conflicting initiatives.” Another state
representative, but from the federal government, claimed that many actors related to the SJC
aerospace sector possess a great degree of articulation because they emerged organically in
connection to one another. The participant contended the following:
The São José dos Campos aerospace industrial cluster has a closer connection to the
government because everything started from a public initiative. You had the creation of
the ITA but also Embraer, which later was leading everything. Who pushed
development? The government is creating institutions and Embraer but also the
government buying airplanes. Because this cluster has always had a close relation to
public policies, they need to interact, to have articulation in order to work together to
reach the government goals.” (Interviewee 56).
In conclusion, as GPN scholars revealed, the state can have a vital role in the initial
development of GPNs and the configuration and restructuring of existing ones (Yeung 2016).
The GPN experts have sought to analyze how the state, as a mediator, meets the strategic needs
of firms in GPNs to foster strategic coupling, and consequently capture value (Horner 2017; Lee
et al. 2014; Yeung 2009). Less attention has been given to other state roles, such as states as
producers (Horner 2017). In this regard, this sub-section sought to reveal how the Brazilian
developmental state, as a producer and a buyer, played a crucial role in establishing Embraer and
its aerospace domestic production network through what researchers have conceptualized as an
organic coupling process. In SJC, organic coupling process happened through the co-evolution of
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several regional assets seen in the creation of the IPD, the ITA, Embraer, and in the subsequent
spillovers resulting in the emergence of several other local aerospace firms and related
institutions. Such an organic coupling process, related to the Brazilian import-substitution
accumulation strategy, was based on symmetrical and synergistic actions and relations under a
national—and local—collective project, i.e., the development of Embraer and of the Brazilian
aerospace sector in SJC. This researcher will argue in the next sub-section that this dynamic has
left significant imprints regarding how processes of corporate capture evolve in the postprivatization era.

5.2.1 The Evolution of the ITA and the FATEC Corporate Capture
In this sub-section, I will analyze how Embraer processes of corporate capture in training
initiatives evolved in SJC. According to the GPN literature, corporate capture happens as a result
of states lacking specific or distinctive regional assets that meet the strategic interest of firms.
This feature, scholars argue, puts such states in an inferior position when bargaining with FDIs,
making them vulnerable to having their institutional capacity captured (Coe & Hess 2011;
Mackinnon 2012; Yeung 2016). However, in the case of SJC, the process of coupling occurred
organically. Therefore, process of corporate capture in SJC cannot be solely explained based on
the lack of distinctive regional assets or due to asymmetric power relations through bargaining
processes between the state and FDI resulting in the coupling. I will assert Embraer’s processes
of corporate capture in training initiatives at the ITA and the FATEC evolved organically due to
its past organic coupling process. Capture evolves based on professional ties through synergistic
local and informal one-on-one interactions rather than through bargaining events like in
Charleston. In this sub-section, I will first provide a contextualization of Embraer’s privatization
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process and how its approach to skill formation has changed. Second, I will analyze the
processes of corporate capture mentioned above.
In the last two decades, Embraer underwent severe transformation from a state-owned
company with domestic production to a private global corporation. This transformation has
affected Embraer’s internal training, SJC aerospace labor market, and the company’s relation to
local educational institutions. Embraer represents one of the largest Brazilian companies,
generating more than 16 thousand national jobs, of which more than 10 thousand are employed
in SJC (Embraer Report 2018). While the company started manufacturing military cargo
airplanes, today Embraer also manufactures commercial small- and medium-sized airplanes (30
to 130 passengers), having subsidiaries in five locations: Brazil (the largest), the United States,
China, and Portugal.
Embraer was privatized in 1994, but its context dates back to the 1980s. The 1980s were
marked by important changes in Brazil. First, José Sarney, having assumed the Brazilian
presidency in 1985, restored democracy in the country, and three years later established the 1988
Federal Constitution. Second, neoliberalism gained significance in this period, driving the major
changes in this new Brazilian phase of post-democracy, as in many Latin American countries. As
scholars have revealed, since the 1970s, the ecological dominance of neoliberalism has advanced
across the globe through dramatic ruptures and through incremental forms, rebuilding stateeconomy relations in tendential, uneven, discontinuous, conflictual, and contradictory ways
(Jessop 2014; Harvey 2007, Peck and Tickell 2002; Brenner et al. 2010). This has resulted in
variegated capitalisms under the shadow of neoliberalism (Jessop 2014). Brazil has not been
immune to such influence.
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The neoliberal agenda began to influence Brazil after 1989, initially when Fernando
Collor and Itamar Franco assumed the presidency (Fine 1999). As Braga (2017) pointed out,
starting under the presidential administration of Fernando Collor and influenced by the
Washington Consensus, the Brazilian state adopted a new model of development, which the
author termed a “post-Fordist, peripheral and financialized” model of development. In 1990,
Fernando Collor launched an economic liberalization and privatization program; this was later
led by Itamar Franco, due to Collor’s resignation in 1992, and then in 1994 by Fernando
Henrique Cardoso. Under Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian state
sought to dismantle regulatory rigidity, to privatize state-owned companies and to decrease
protectionism bias. Industrial policy was abandoned, a mark from the older development model.
Under this new accumulation strategy, the Brazilian state also integrated its economy with the
global economy (Arbix & Martin 2010). This model of development received continuation with
the Workers Party under the presidential administration of Luis Inácio da Silva and Dilma
Rousseff. However, significant changes were implemented in regard to social policies such as
Bolsa Família, and in regard to a return of strong industrial policies (Braga 2017).
The emergence of this new accumulation strategy in Brazil directly affected Embraer.
Embraer had arrived in the 1990s on the edge of bankruptcy and became a target of the Brazilian
privatization program. Embraer’s economic problem was due to the world Fordist crisis, which
affected accumulation in Brazil and resulted in the “lost decade”. The principal buyer of
Embraer’s airplanes was the Brazilian federal government and due to the Fordist crisis,
purchases significantly decreased, affecting the company. Itamar Franco decided to privatize
Embraer during his presidential term, and Fernando Cardoso concluded the company’s
privatization in 1994. Although the company was on the brink of bankruptcy before its
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privatization, it only took two years after its sale for the company to turn impressive profits
(Henrique 2012; Souza 2008). However, to reach this position, changes were made.
After privatization, Embraer laid off 11 percent of its employees, invested in its
production process thus increasing productivity and quality, expanded exports, changed its career
plan and internal training practices, and outsourced services related to cleaning, security,
computing, and cooking (it had four internal restaurants). The company also reduced its average
salary and changed its private governance with suppliers (Bernardes 2000). The production of
the airplane ERJ 145, launched in 1989, was successful and resulted in numerous sales across the
world. The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) enabled the
insertion of Embraer into the global economy as a global competitor when it provided public
funding investments and incentives for Embraer to manufacture airplanes for international
buyers (Bernardes 2000; Catermol 2010). The internationalization of Embraer and its coupling
with the aerospace global production network were also made possible due to the federal
government’s creation of a special tariff regime: drawback and Recof, allowing firms to import
products tax-free. Firms remained exempt from significant tariffs if they imported products used
to manufacture products for export. Embraer’s privatization and insertion in the aerospace GPN
resulted in the company reconfiguring its private governance with suppliers, having 95 percent of
its 500 suppliers located outside of Brazil. In 1996, two years after Embraer’s privatization, the
company rose to status as a major international player in the aerospace sector.
Until 1995 Embraer maintained an effective educational policy with significant internal
training practices (Bernardes 2000). However, since its privatization, the company has
increasingly relied on external training. After its privatization, the number of Embraer’s
employees in the training department for technical courses decreased from 107 workers in 1990
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to only three in 1996. Before its privatization, Embraer even offered courses for workers to
acquire junior high and high school diplomas through partnerships with local educational
institutions (Bernardes 2000). Even though Embraer has a training center offering nearly 900
different courses, third-party organizations administer training. Currently, Embraer requires a
minimum of a certificate degree for touch labor (hands-on production); recently hired workers
must go through a 3-month training process, called Famiero, as one participant from the Union
of Metallurgists in SJC expounded:
In the 1990s, Embraer established some criterium. First, to work for Embraer workers are
required to have a certificate degree. Those courses that last six months, or a year. Touch
labor at Embraer they normally have electrician or mechanics certification from SENAI.
After they are hired, workers go through 3 months of internal training in which they are
under probation. Training focuses on getting workers familiar with aeronautics. When
Embraer has a volume hiring, workers instead of going to work in production, they go to
their study center in the morning and spends the day training. Sometimes training lasts
less than three months. It depends on their need. But normally training lasts three months,
and we learn about aeronautic manufacturing, concepts of avionic, structure, and many
other things. When Embraer has little hiring like 20 workers, then training is only in the
mornings, half of a period, and in the afternoon they work. (Interviewee 47)
Although internal training has remained a common practice due to the highly specific
nature of aeronautic skills, after the company’s privatization, Embraer has focused more on
external training than before (Bernardes 2000). Moreover, the cyclical aerospace sector is
characterized by peaks in which companies hire and lay off workers according to market
dynamics. Embraer represents a large corporation, employing “5,900 technicians, engineers and
technologists, the company has a 3 percent turnover, having to replace between 150 to 200
engineers and technicians that retire every year” (Interviewee 44). This requires the company to
intensify interactions with local educational institutions to present its skills needs and to shape
training according to the company’s needs. It is in this context of privatization and increasing
reliance on external training that processes of corporate capture in SJC have occurred.
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Currently Embraer and Boeing are negotiating a joint venture. As the Brazilian federal
government holds a ‘golden share’ in Embraer, it has the majority power over Embraer strategic
decisions. Therefore, for Embraer and Boeing joint venture to happen, it requires governmental
approval. While it is uncertain to know whether the Workers Party with Lula and Dilma would
have approved or denied this joint venture, the liberal government of Jair Bolsonaro has
announced in January 2019, it will approve the fusion of Boeing and Embraer. It is estimated that
the joint venture will be concluded by the end of 2019 (Venture 2019). Boeing will invest $3.8
billion to acquire 80% of Embraer (Jiménez 2018).

5.2.2: Embraer and its Training Partnership with the Aeronautics Institute of Technology
(ITA)
The business community has applauded the training partnership between the ITA and
Embraer. However, this research will not highlight it as a case of success, but as a case of
permanent corporate capture. In this sub-section, this research will analyze how the creation of
the Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering at the ITA evolved organically as a
process of corporate capture. As this research will reveal, this program offers highly customized
training designed to deliver specific skills for Embraer alone. The program lacks transparency
and privileges Embraer, rather than the general business community and also presents class
issues.
The Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering (PEE) was launched in 2002
through a partnership between Embraer and the ITA, a federal higher education and research
institute that focuses on aerospace science and technology. Ranked as one of the most prestigious
engineering schools in Brazil (“the Brazilian MIT”), the ITA offers 5-year bachelor’s degrees in
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engineering courses36 as well as master’s and doctoral degrees (ita.br). The PEE foundation is
related to the significant restructuring process Embraer underwent after its privatization in the
1990s, when the company laid off hundreds of engineers from 1994 to 1996. However, even
though Embraer was not performing well economically before its privatization, two years later,
the company started generating profits. In 1996 the airplane ERJ-145 reached international sales
success. An increase in sales required Embraer to hire workers, including aeronautic engineers.
However, the company encountered difficulties recruiting aerospace engineers in the market.
One participant from Embraer, describing the changes Embraer underwent in the 1990s, voiced:
In the 1990s, we (Embraer) fired many employees, decreasing to 4,000 employees, but
before (privatization) we had almost 20,000 employees. So, after privatization, Embraer
started to sell airplanes and obtained great success in a short-term. So, the company could
not find enough skilled people to hire. Moreover, Embraer has a turnover... (Interviewee
44)
According to some participants, from 1996 to 2000, the lack of aeronautic engineers in
the market forced Embraer to hire engineers from several different fields, such as electrical and
mechanical engineering, requiring months of on-the-job training to teach them aerospace-related
skills and the “Embraer way to work”. In 2000, a former CEO of Embraer decided to contact the
ITA to develop a short-term course to provide non-aeronautic engineers not only the basic skills
of aeronautic production, but also highly customized and specific skills according to the internal
interests and skill needs of Embraer. The program could drastically reduce on-the-job training.
One participant from the ITA explained:
“At the time, a former CEO of Embraer said “Besides not being able to recruit aeronautic
engineers in the market, I lose too much time training on-the-job…getting workers
familiar with aeronautics. So, the goal was to have workers trained before hiring them. I
hire an electronic engineer, from anywhere, and a mechanic (engineer), the guy does not
36

The ITA offers 5 undergraduate courses: Aeronautical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Civil-Aeronautical Engineering,
Computer Engineering, Electronic Engineering, and Mechanical Engineering. The ITA is so competitive and prestigious that its
admission rate in 2016 was 1.12% (ita.br), while Harvard University 2015-2016 admission rate was 5.6% (see
https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics).
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even not the aeronautic jargon. He gets here lost. So, he (former CEO of Embraer) said
“we need a program that helps all engineers to have a minimum common base (in
aeronautics), and to get to know the systems of Embraer, to learn the ways of Embraer.
Then once at the company, the worker can perform, work eight hours (Interviewee 34).
Therefore, the program initially entailed a three-month, short-term training initiative
offering a certificate degree, and the first graduates were hired as Embraer engineers during the
training process. However, in 2001 the federal government created a norm allowing public
universities to establish vocational master’s programs, enabling students in any Brazilian
postgraduate vocational training program to apply for public federal scholarships. Hence, the
ITA proposed to Embraer to shift the short-term program to a long-term vocational program with
a master’s degree. However, this training would require significantly more time, resulting in
higher salary costs for Embraer. The ITA suggested to stop hiring students as engineers during
training, and instead pay them as apprentices. The ITA committed to providing Embraer’s
students a monthly scholarship. This combination of salary and scholarship would reduce
Embraer’s costs related to salaries and labor contract taxes and benefits, making long-term
training viable. One representative of the ITA articulated:
“The first group of students, Embraer hired as engineers, but someone from Embraer
suggested to have students (in the next group) as trainees. Then I said “you are behaving
as a fool. If these students are engineers why don’t you (Embraer’s employees) typify
them as students, and so, you pay them as students and not as engineers. You (Embraer)
pay what the government pays as a scholarship to master’s degree students. In this way,
you won’t have to spend with payroll taxes and labor contract benefits.”…Then I added
“we can turn this training initiative into a vocational master’s degree program. These
engineers will then be typified as students from the ITA…studying full time…but also as
an apprentice of Embraer. In this way, you (Embraer) can have very low-cost training.”
(Interviewee 34).
Under this model, the PEE was launched in 2002, typifying a process of corporate
capture due to its structure and goal to provide highly customized training and specific skills for
Embraer. To meet this objective, the program was structured according to the interests of
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Embraer but with insights from the ITA. At present, the PEE has a long-term, 16-month duration
and provides a master’s degree. Student enrollment is flexible, varying from 30 to 120 according
to the needs of Embraer. Students are hired as apprentices, receiving a much lower salary than an
engineer and a scholarship from the ITA. The ITA and employees from Embraer teach the
coursework cooperatively. The ITA is responsible for teaching slightly more than 50 percent of
the curriculum while employees from Embraer deliver the remaining in the curriculum. A
participant from the ITA professed:
…the ITA was charged with teaching a little bit more than 50 percent of the total
curriculum grade. The curriculum includes lectures from Embraer’s employees, who help
students to understand how Embraer functions and also to understand some aeronautic
projects that could not be approached formally through academic classes. (Interviewee
34)
The program is divided into three phases, five months each. In the first phase, students
learn aeronautics production basics. In the second phase, students choose and further specialize
in specific careers. These two phases take place at ITA and Embraer establishes numerous
mandatory classes. In the third phase, students are grouped into teams and charged with
developing conceptual projects according to Embraer directives. This phase occurs at Embraer,
where students work as full-time apprentices. The outcome culminates in a master’s thesis
developed cooperatively under the supervision of a professor from the ITA and an engineer from
Embraer (Interviewee 44). One participant from the ITA contended:
This is a collective program, so, there is a part of the ITA and a part of Embraer. The part
of the ITA is to release professors to teach at the master program, to release professor to
advise students in their thesis, to provide classrooms and laboratories, given that research
is done in our labs. Embraer provides some employees to help advising students, to teach
some classes at Embraer. Embraer also helps the ITA in the recruitment process, and
offers employment for participants, aspect that gives credibility to the program and raises
students’ interest because they know that in the end they will be hired. (Interviewee 35)
Under this program, Embraer pays the ITA instructors by hours taught, creating problems
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and issues of transparency for two reasons. First, the ITA hires professors under a 40 hours per
week contract regime where professors prepare and teach classes, advise graduate students, and
perform ITA administrative tasks. Nonetheless, professors are dedicating some of these 40 hours
to teaching the Embraer Program of Specialization in Engineering. Although this is considered
legal since, theoretically, the PEE is an ITA’s program, in reality, the program is designed to
serve Embraer’s interests. Therefore, Embraer provides a partial salary to professors working in
this program. Second, it is illegal for public universities in Brazil to deliver customized teaching
for private corporations and to develop research for specific companies. Such a practice is
considered lobbying, which is not regularized in Brazil37. Thus, the ITA and Embraer had to
circumvent the law to obfuscate this issue. The ITA created a not-for-profit institution called
Casemiro Foundation, responsible for receiving funding from Embraer and paying professors
from ITA. Hence, the ITA is not directly receiving payments from Embraer, but through the
Casemiro Foundation, depriving it status as a lobby. One participant from the ITA stated the
following:
We have an algorithm for professors’ remuneration, from Embraer via the Casemiro
Foundation. We have a scheme that Embraer pays part of the hours taught by
professors…The Institute of Aeronautical Technology allows its professors to use some
of its 40 hours to teach, and professors will even receive for it. A professor is allowed to
use part of the 40 hours because if you do the math; professors do not use all these hours.
So, the Institute of Aeronautical Technology has zero-cost by allowing them to work
because professors will continue doing the same. But there is always that issue; nobody is
safe from having the Public Prosecutor’s Office to come and pressure us. If someone
reports then “oh, what is going on here? (Interviewee 34)
To recruit students Embraer uses ITA’s institutional support to attract applicants
countrywide. In this regard, while the ITA elaborates and administers the admission exam to
select students (a calculus test), Embraer interviews and recruits the students with the highest

37

Under the law at. 321, CP of the Brazilian constitution, it is considered illegal for any state manager to use the government
apparatus in order to sponsor private interests, benefiting one entity over others (Brazilian Criminal Code 1998).
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scores. Given that the ITA is portrayed as one of the best engineering schools in Brazil, Embraer
boosts its capacity to attract applicants in order to recruit the most qualified workers in the
country. Generally, less than three percent of applicants are selected to participate in the
program. One participant from Embraer asserted:
So, first, the ITA elaborates an admission exam and selects the best applicants. We
decrease 1,200 applicants to 200, and then after interviews, we recruit 30. At present, I
have 3,680 applicants for 40 vacancies. The magic of the Program of Specialization in
Engineering is that we have a great power of attraction for young people who like
engineering. (Interviewee 44)
Therefore, this program is remarkably beneficial for Embraer, for it not only selects and
recruits the best national market candidates but also receives customized training from the best
Brazilian engineering school at a meager cost. As one representative from the ITA claimed,
“Embraer invests in the Program of Specialization in Engineering, but many times, what
Embraer is investing does not pay even 5% of what the company should pay” (Interviewee 35).
Even though the ITA provides scholarships for Embraer’s students and allows Embraer to use its
facilities for the program without any charge, the program does not establish after-course
conclusion requirements, such as the payment of competitive and scalable wages or insertion in
career plans.
Moreover, another feature typifying this program as a process of corporate capture
resides in the fact the program reveals significant implications for class relations, given that the
program was initially a form of precariatization of work, used to lower wages and benefits by
replacing long-term employees. Long-term engineers were hired while Embraer was a stateowned company. Therefore, such employees were hired under a differential scalable wage plan,
where earning wage had greater increases over the years. This means many senior engineers
receive higher salaries than newly hired engineers. In this way, the program has replaced senior
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engineers with junior but highly skilled engineers at lower salaries. One participant mentioned:
“The program brought some problems because long-term employees felt threatened. They were
like, “there is all these new young employees, well-prepared, receiving lower wages than us. So
many related problems emerged” (Interviewee 34).
The program has become so entrenched that most of engineers at Embraer graduated
from the PPE. One representative of the ITA stated, “We trained through this program 1,500
students for Embraer. Soon we (the ITA) believe that at least 80 percent of all engineers at
Embraer will be from the ITA” (Interviewee 35). The same participant from the ITA explained
how the program displaced long-term engineers, saying:
But this is a matter of costs as well. The workforce is the main asset of Embraer…The
company brings young skilled workers and creates an internal pressure, and many
workers are replaced. The company has old engineers at the top of its career plan, and
Embraer is not able to maintain that. So, Embraer hires a skilled young engineer and
replaces older engineers. I think this is a tendency that companies have to increase their
profits. (Interviewee 35)
According to several participants, the process of corporate capture of Embraer of the PEE
at the ITA evolved organically, through symmetrical and synergistic relations locally, and is
related to the aerospace organic coupling process, which took place in SJC in the 1950s. For
example, when asked about how the ITA interacts with Embraer, one representative of the ITA
claimed:
With Embraer it easier to cooperate because many Embraer’s employees are alumni from
the ITA. When these employees have needs, they know who they have to look for at the
ITA. There is no need to bring Embraer and the ITA together. This is natural. When we
are done with one project, there is another start. Students get their master’s degree in our
program, go to work at Embraer and come back with ideas and proposals. They have
come with many projects such as a project in the metallic structure, one in composite
materials, another in aero-electronic systems… (Interviewee 39)
Therefore, given that Embraer was developed by people who graduated at the ITA, and
that most of Embraer’s engineers graduated at the ITA, the employees from Embraer and ITA
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maintained a high degree of interaction and predisposition to establish joint projects. The
development of this partnership did not face obstacles. One representative of Embraer explained
the establishment of the PPE, citing:
These things (partnerships) happen naturally because one (Embraer) is the son of the
other (the ITA). You have professors from the ITA as academic advisors and co-advisors
from Embraer coming with the company’s problems, and this comes from our DNA. So,
our (Embraer’s) interaction with the ITA is very easy because we have the same way to
teach classes, we were a state-owned firm, we were part of the Brazilian Airforce. The
guy from the ITA, who helps me to coordinate the program, was my professor at the ITA.
I know him for 40 years. It is a student-professor relationship. (Interviewee 44)
In this regard, although Embraer has shifted its nature and goal from a state-owned
company with a national developmental purpose to an international private corporation with
profit-driven targets, the ITA still supports the company as if Embraer were still a part of the
former national developmental and collective project. As one representative from the ITA stated,
“In reality, Embraer is just collaborating with the ITA in an activity that the ITA is doing
because it is of the interest of the state, Embraer is cooperating, but who financially sustains the
program is the government” (Interviewee 35). When representatives from the ITA were asked
about the existence of training partnerships with other corporations in the business community,
they claimed the ITA to have a purpose of benefiting the aeronautic sector, and thus, Embraer.
For example, one participant from the ITA professed:
Companies come to us to establish training partnerships, but the ITA is not interested.
With Embraer we do because our mission is to work in this sector; after all, we are the
Institute of Aeronautic Technology. Although we have other specialization, they are all
focused on aeronautics.” (Interviewee 34).
To conclude, this program typified a process of corporate capture due to three primary
elements. First, process of corporate capture was demonstrated in how such a program delivers
customized and highly specific skills for Embraer at a meager cost. Second, the program lacks
transparency and circumvents its illegality using third-party institutions to deprive issues related

193

to lobbying. Third, the program is marked by issues in which workers are typified as students
and later as apprentices, receiving much lower salaries. Moreover, the program was used to
replace senior employees with junior highly skilled employees, who receive much lower salaries
and were hired under a different career plan. Importantly, the evolution of corporate capture in
regard to this training initiatives happened based on professional ties related to participants
relationship to the ITA—as alumina, or co-creator of Embraer—through synergistic and informal
one-on-one interactions.

5.2.3 Embraer and its Training Partnership with the São Paulo State Technological College
(FATEC)
In this subsection, I will analyze how the process of corporate capture of the Embraer
Designer Program (PEE) evolved. As this research will reveal, process of corporate capture, as in
the case of the ITA, evolved organically. To do so, first this study will explore the establishment
of the FATEC in SJC, and second, this research will analyze how the PEE evolved, typifying a
process of corporate capture.
FATEC, founded in 1969, is the dominant higher educational institution administering
vocational associate degrees in the state of São Paulo. Under the administration of the São Paulo
State Secretariat of Economic Development, Science, and Technology, the São Paulo State
Technical College System consists of 71 college campuses located in 65 cities across the state,
offering a wide range of courses and skills (https://www.cps.sp.gov.br/#). As a state public
higher educational institution, FATEC delivers free education to students.
One of these 71 FATECs is located in SJC and seeks to attend to firms’ local skill
demands, having therefore many programs, courses, and initiatives related to the aerospace
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sector. FATEC at SJC also attends other sectors, such as IT. In SJC, the FATEC offers 3-year
courses, forming technologists38 with associate degrees in the following courses: system analysis
and development, database administration, industrial production management, logistics,
advanced manufacturing, aircraft maintenance, and projects in aeronautic structure. FATEC
pioneered in the Brazil the formation of technologist, a relatively unknown degree, where many
firms still have the view that technologists epitomize a better version of technicians.
The establishment of the SJC FATEC campus happened in 2006 and is connected to the
Technology Park in the city. In 2006, the state of São Paulo created a policy of industrial
development in which the establishment of Technology Parks played an important role. In such a
policy, Technology Parks were required to have three major components: research centers,
institutions of higher education, and firms. In this context, the Technology Park in SJC induced
local state managers to request that São Paulo establish a FATEC campus. Such a request took
place through a proposal elaborated by SJC state managers, ITA professors, and Embraer
employees. Including aeronautic courses, the proposal was sent to the São Paulo State Secretariat
of Economic Development, Science, and Technology, who established the FATEC SJC campus
in 2006. One participant from the FATEC detailed the foundation of the FATEC in SJC as
follows:
SJC and the state of São Paulo established an agreement. SJC committed to build a
building and invested 10 million reais to do so. The establishment of the FATEC here is
also related to the Technology Park. The state of São Paulo has a regulation saying that
Technology Parks need to have institutions of higher education. So, the Technology Park
was used to attract the FATEC. Regarding the creation of the courses, there was other
entities involved like Embraer. Embraer asked, or better, Embraer suggested and
supported the creation of some aeronautic courses. (Interviewee 40)

38

In the United States, technologists are known as practical engineers. Technologists in Brazil are able to continue their
education in master’s and doctoral programs.
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Since the creation of the FATEC in SJC, the principal purpose of this institution has
remained to attend to the needs of the aerospace sector, mostly represented by the needs of
Embraer. The first director of the FATEC SJC stated:
When the state of São Paulo decided to have a FATEC in São José dos Campos, the state
had the intention to attend the skill needs of the aerospace, industrial cluster. So, working
together, the ITA, Embraer, which gave some suggestions, and SJC state managers, they
elaborated a proposal, which had the clear goal of providing skills to the aerospace
sector…We talked to Embraer to see which course the company had more urgency.
Embraer is basically the aerospace, industrial cluster, right. Embraer recommended to us
a course in light structures to work with composite materials. (Interviewee 38)
The influence of Embraer over the existing aerospace courses offered at the FATEC was
expanded when the company proposed the development of a customized training partnership
with the college in the same model of the Program of Specialization in Engineering with the
ITA. This partnership between Embraer and the FATEC originated when Embraer was
experiencing difficulties finding a specific skill: aeronautical designers. Embraer had to hire and
internally train workers from scratch. One participant from the FATEC asserted:
Embraer started to notice that there was a skill gap in the area of design. Designers are
retiring and not being replaced. Educational institutions are not training people in this
occupation. So, Embraer looked for us and proposed the creation of a program similar to
the one they have at the ITA, but at the ITA Embraer has a master’s program, here we
have a specialization, an undergraduate course. So, we recruit a person who has a
technical degree, and then we provide a specialization. We do not give a diploma, but a
certificate. (Interviewee 40)
When one representative of Embraer was inquired about how the training partnership
with the FATEC was established, he noted:
When the FATEC came to São José dos Campos, they wanted us (Embraer) to give
suggestion about the courses. So, since then, every year, we (Embraer) have
conversations with professors from the FATEC to talk about the courses, to say what
needs to be improved in their courses. So, because the FATEC had this relationship with
us, we naturally saw the possibility to use the FATEC to train aeronautic designer.
(Interviewee 44)
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This significant ease for Embraer to interact and establish a partnership with the FATEC
is also related to how the ITA, Embraer, and then later the aerospace industrial cluster
organically emerged in connection to one another under the collective developmental view of the
Brazilian developmental state. In this regard, evidence suggests actors that are related to these
institutions have greater propensity to establish collective actions, such as a training partnership.
For example, one of the co-founders of the FATEC in SJC stressed one of the reasons for him to
be hired as the director was his relation to the aerospace sector and to the ITA. He indicated:
They (SJC state managers) invited me to be the director. They did not invite me; they
impelled me. They said, “You are going to be the director of the FATEC. You are a
FATEC professor at the city of Guará. You worked in the aeronautic sector, and you
graduated from the ITA. So, you have all the skill requirements. (Interviewee 38)
Another participant from the FATEC also pointed out that this training partnership was
made possible due to the close ties between the director of the FATEC and Embraer; he
expressed: “…the director here, his father was a long-term employee of Embraer, part of the
board of directors. So, there is an interaction that goes beyond…” (Interviewee 32). Moreover,
this partnership was made easier because this former director of the FATEC—responsible for
working with Embraer to establish this training partnership—received his master’s and doctorate
degrees from the ITA and was a coordinator at the ITA’s Department of Expansion (Interviewee
39). A director from FATEC added, “Many professors are part of the aerospace industry…The
synergy is really high. There are professors who own aerospace firms; some professors work for
Embraer or worked for Embraer, or work for another aerospace firm” (Interviewee 37).
In this context, the Program Designer Embraer at the FATEC was founded in 2011. The
12-month program offers a FATEC certificate degree in aeronautical design, training highly
skilled aeronautic designers for Embraer. Therefore, as the goal is to attend to the interests of
Embraer, the course and its curriculum were designed by the company. Talking about program
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customization, one participant from the ITA remarked, “We had meetings with Embraer, and
Embraer had the curriculum designed” (Interviewee 38, former FATEC director). Another
participant from the FATEC further detailed:
It was a collective work, but Embraer said, “I need aeronautic designers, and this is what
aeronautic designers have to know…This is the number of hours: X hours. People from
our (Embraer’s) engineering department said they have to know this…”. We said, okay
we can do that, but some areas are too specific, so Embraer will have to teach these areas.
So, the structure of the program was collectively established, but Embraer basically said,
“Look, I need an employee like this. (Interviewee 32)
In this regard, the Program Designer Embraer, as typical of processes of corporate
capture, was customized to meet Embraer interests. Similar to the ITA program, the Program
Designer Embraer was structured in four phases. In the first phase, students learn the basic
aeronautic production. In the second phase, students choose between two career paths: systems
or mechanics. In the third phase, students develop joint projects in CAD, where they have to
design airplane parts. The fourth phase sets up students as apprentices who perform on-the-job.
Only after these four phases, which take three months each, will Embraer hire successful
students. The program is based on a full-time schedule. The program is taught at Embraer’s
office building, where professors from the FATEC and employees from Embraer work
cooperatively to teach several theoretical and practical courses. Such a customized and long-term
program allows Embraer not only to provide highly specific skills for its workers, but also to
evaluate the performance of these workers before hiring them as employees. As one
representative from Embraer noticed, “this program is a way to interact with workers for one
year before we hire them. So, we can be sure that these workers are fit to work for Embraer”
(Interviewee 44).
The recruitment for the Program Designer Embraer is also like the program at the ITA.
Embraer uses the institutional image of the FATEC to attract applicants and to select students.
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The FATEC administers the registration of applicants, and the admission exam. The minimum
education required to enroll in this program is a technical or technologist degree related to the
aerospace sector, and to have an intermediate English level. The number of vacancies is flexible
and determined according to the needs of Embraer, varying from 30 to 60. After taking the exam,
students with the best grades go through group interviews with Embraer, which recruits the best
candidates for the program. In 2016, the program received more than five hundred applications.
Since the FATEC remains a public educational institution, students do not have to pay fees or
tuition (Interviewee 32, participant from the FATEC).
Corporate capture processes in training are characterized by corporations receiving costfree training. In this case, although entailing some cost, the program has dramatically benefited
Embraer, for the company has received institutional, recruiting, and training services from the
FATEC at scanty costs. The only economic responsibility of Embraer is to pay FATEC’s
professors for hours taught in the program. As in the case of the ITA, professors from the
FATEC receive payment for their teaching via the Casemiro Foundation to avoid legal
allegations of the benefiting of single private firms through customized training services.
Regarding the costs of the program for Embraer, one participant from the FATEC affirmed:
One reason for this partnership is the cost of training. Training is expensive, and although
Embraer pays for our teaching hours, the logistic is ours (FATEC), the coordinator is a
professor from the FATEC. So, there is the side of costs. (Interviewee 38)
Moreover, this low cost is associated with how Embraer, through the FATEC, is able to
typify its workers as students. During the program, Embraer hires students as apprentices, paying
a scholarship of one thousand reais (U$300) per month. Although receiving public support to
train customized workers, Embraer is not required to hire the students at the end of the program,
to pay competitive wages, or to offer a career plan for students after graduation. Noteworthy, the
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FATEC has faced issues with Embraer, which has hired the FATEC’s students as technicians
(certificate degrees) and not as technologists with associate degrees. Therefore, the FATEC’s
alumni have received lower salaries as if they did not have higher education degrees. One
participant from the FATEC declared, “one difficulty is to make Embraer see the students from
the FATEC as having a higher education degree. This is a struggle” (Interviewee 32). Another
FATEC participant added:
The first students graduated at the FATEC were only able to be hired as technicians by
Embraer, but they are not technicians…The initial vision of Embraer was that the
company was an engineering company, which had no space for technologists. But they
are the same, however, technologists’ skills are narrower than engineers’. Embraer has
evolved in understanding this, and today, our students from Logistics are able to be hired
as analysts... (Interviewee 40)
Although this program characterizes a process of corporate capture, the FATEC also
benefits from this partnership. One participant from the FATEC affirmed that the PEE program
has proportionated some reformulations at FATEC’s aerospace-related courses, and thus, in
more suitable curriculums to attend to the general interests of the aerospace sector. This resulted
in FATEC’s programs being more successful in terms of attaining students hired after
concluding their studies, consequently enjoying higher enrollment levels (Interviewee 32).
“…the FATEC learned a lot because professors started to teach inside Embraer and were
able to capture its essence, its needs, and this made us reformulate some courses due to
this partnership. This helped us a lot to see the needs of firms.” (Interviewee 40, FATEC
participant).
To conclude, the Program Designer Embraer was established organically and
demonstrates a case of permanent process of corporate capture for several reasons. First, this
provides an excellent example of how firms influence training at educational institutions,
receiving specific training—a unique training initiative not offered to the general business
community. Like in the ITA program, Embraer is able to design the program, the curriculum, the
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hours, to use FATEC’s institutional image and institutional staff to recruit and train students.
This program model maintains its potential future workers as students and apprentices for 12
months, discharging labor contract and salaries, and expanding the time for Embraer to decide
whether students fit Embraer’s profile. Second, this program does not guarantee students will be
hired, receive competitive wages and scalable salaries and career plans, or provide benefits
packages. Importantly, the evolution of this program, and thus, process of corporate capture,
happened organically based on synergistic and informal one-on-one relations between employees
from Embraer and professors and administrators from the FATEC. Such synergistic interactions,
and ease for Embraer to advance its interests are related to how the aerospace organic coupling in
SJC resulted in many actors at local educational institutions like the SJC FATEC and Embraer
coming from the ITA or being former Embraer’s employees. This fact established close
professional ties among local actors and facilitates collective efforts.
In summary the Embraer’s processes of corporate capture in SJC can be summary in the
following way:

Diagram 10. Embraer’s Corporate Capture in São José dos Campos Regional Training System.

Source: Author.
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5.3 Labor Market Governance and the Aerospace Regional Training System of São José
dos Campos
In this section, this research will investigate whether the SJC’s local governance
reinforces or minimizes process of corporate capture in SJC’s regional training system. I will
argue that the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of corporate capture due to the nature
of interactions among state managers and other governance actors. State managers and
governance actors identify the local training needs and advance training initiatives based on
informal relations instead of formal strategies, like in Charleston. In this regard, among state
managers and local governance actors, professional and personal ties—created through the
aerospace organic coupling process in SJC—function as a mechanism of state selectivity
concerning which training initiatives will be advanced. This form of state selectivity combined
with the financial and social power of Embraer magnify its influence over educational
institutions’ initiatives. To develop this argument, first, this research will provide a context of the
aerospace local labor market of SJC, examining how actors part of SJC’s local governance
identify and address local training needs and how this is related to the Brazilian state form.
Second, this study will reveal how and why such a characteristic magnifies the power of
influence of MNCs, such as Embraer, therefore reinforcing processes of corporate capture in
SJC’s regional training system.
The co-evolution of the Institute of Research and Development, the Aeronautics Institute
of Technology, and then later, the creation of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE)
and the FATEC has greatly benefited SJC. SJC today is a technological hub with one of the
highest innovation rates and concentration of workers with graduate and postgraduate degrees in
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the country (www.inovacao.unicamp.br; Souza 2008). For example, in 2015 SJC ranked sixth in
registered patents in Brazil. In 2006, the aerospace sector in SJC boasted an impressive 34
percent of employed workers with graduate and postgraduate degrees (Souza 2008), presented in
the following table.

Table 8. Level of Workers’ Education Attainment at the Aerospace Sector in SJC in 2006.
Education Level
Number of Workers Percentage
Without Higher Ed. Degree
12,720
66%
Graduate and Postgraduate Degrees 6,475
34%
Total
19,195
100%
Source: Souza 2008, 154.

SJC has a well-developed and established public aerospace regional training system and
labor market. The aerospace regional training system in SJC remains composed of public
educational institutions, meeting the present and future sector needs. The primary public
educational institutions depict federal, state and municipal vocational high schools, SENAI (a
not-for-profit institution with certificate degrees), the FATEC, the ITA, and the INPE. These
institutions collaboratively offer certificate, associate’s, bachelor’s, and post-graduate degrees.
Different from the state of South Carolina, the state of São Paulo and SJC do not provide training
initiatives and programs as assets to attract and retain firms, or incentives related to training, as
one representative of the Investe SP39 declared:
Investe SP does not provide incentives, or subsidies to attract firms. So, we do not offer
training services as a way to attract firms to the state. Investe SP functions more as a
mediator between firms and municipalities across our state. If you are interested in
establishing a firm in the state of São Paulo, we can do a research for you and provide a

39

Investe SP is a public institution of the state of São Paulo that seeks to attract firms to the state. To do so, Investe SP does not
offer incentives, but provides information regarding the municipalities’ skills, infrastructure, logistic, existence of supplier,
market, and environmental regulations, helping firms to choose the best location in the state to establish their businesses. Investe
SP also intermediates municipalities and firms’ initial interaction (www.investe.sp.gov.br).
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list of municipalities that match all your requirements. We also give support in terms of
environmental regulations and taxation… (Interviewee 58)
Nonetheless, the presence of a well-developed aerospace regional training system and
local aerospace labor market in SJC does not mean the local aerospace firms are without skill
gaps and issues. Fieldwork evidence revealed that the aerospace business community, although
not in the same proportion of Charleston, faced some skill gaps. As one interviewee from the
FATEC explained, skill gaps in SJC are related to highly specialized areas, such as specific
software use and advanced manufacturing and design, while general aerospace skills such as
touch labor are abundant in the labor market (Interviewee 33). An aerospace firm representative
added:
We have difficulties hiring people to work with aeronautic processes. The applicants did
not have 50 percent of the skills we needed. Talking to other aerospace firms’ employees,
they said to have the same problem in relation to this job position…We also have issues
hiring mechanic and manufacturing engineers with skills in Mastercam, AutoCAD, or the
new software Top Solid. Another skill lacking is knowledge in CNC (computer
numerical control), and aeronautic sealing. (Interviewee 42)
Due to the economic crisis Brazil is currently facing, competition for skilled workers has
not been as severe as in the past. Nonetheless, poaching has remained one issue in the local
aerospace labor market, and more specifically, regarding how Embraer, or corporations from the
city of São Paulo pilfer skilled and experienced workers from small-size aerospace firms, as one
firm representative affirmed:
It is hard to compete with large companies for some skills in the region. The higher the
skills, the higher is the workers’ wage and benefits pretension, and small-size firms
cannot compete in this regard. But at the present crisis context, we have not “lost”
skilled workers for other firms. (Interviewee 42)
Another participant from the FATEC expressed how the labor market has some issues related to
poaching:
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It is normal a worker to start in a small aerospace firm, and then after he acquires skills,
Embraer poaches them. Workers prefer a higher wage…Small firm owners get mad.
Third-tier firms hire a young worker, train them, workers who were doing everything
wrong, then when they are good, Embraer poaches them…At small firms, workers don’t
have the same wage and benefits they get at Embraer. Here in SJC, working for Embraer
is also about status, even more than about wage… (Interviewee 40)
In this context where the aerospace business community in SJC faces training problems,
such as skill gaps and poaching, Embraer tackles its skill problems by capturing the institutional
capacity of local educational institutions, like the ITA and the FATEC, through the development
of highly specific and customized training partnerships. In this regard, one question emerges:
Does the SJC’s local form of governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in
its regional training system? As I will argue, the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of
corporate capture. This is because the way skill problems are identified and addressed magnifies
the power of influence of single large firms, such as Embraer, over educational institutions.
However, to develop this argument, first the main characteristics of the SJC’s local governance
must be unveiled.
As demonstrated before, the rescaling of national state power to international and
regional scales represents a neoliberal trend that has taken place in different countries (Ward et
al. 2010). In Brazil, the devolution of state power to subnational and local states was materialized
mainly by the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution. This legislation provided greater
administrative and financial power to subnational and especially to local states and thus, greater
autonomy in the designing of local developmental strategies (Souza 2016). This decentralization
was influenced by two theoretical streams, fostering a mix of institutional experiments at local
states (Frey 2007; Martins et al. 2010). The first one, termed neoliberal social democracy, has
advanced attempts to make subnational and local governments more efficient by reducing their
size and adopting managing practices used in the private sector. The second one, termed
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participative democracy, has sought to promote mechanisms of collective decision in which the
population receives greater access to public administration and decision-making. One wellknown example of this approach epitomizes the case of Porto Alegre city. However, generally,
local states have adopted a mix of both approaches (Frey 2007).
In the case of SJC, local government has remained more closely related to the neoliberal
social democracy governance. Since the 1990s, SJC has embraced a type of public management
where the logics of capital, privatization, and regional competitiveness have assumed a central
position (Korin & Moura 2004). This also means the city has transferred its responsibilities to
not-for-profit institutions. In terms of economic development, the Center for Competitiveness
and Innovation (CECOMPI) was the main institution responsible for local governance.
Nonetheless, the CECOMPI was recently absorbed by the SJC Technology Park. SJC created the
CECOMPI in 2003 as a not-for-profit institution in a context where local large corporations were
relocating to other regions. In this regard, SJC state managers, after consulting with professors
from the ITA, decided to create the CECOMPI to foster a new and more diversified
developmental path in the city. As part of this new public management, the CECOMPI sought to
overcome the city’s strong dependency on large corporations by promoting industrial clusters
and fostering innovation. For example, after its creation, the CECOMPI created the Aerospace
Brazilian Industrial Cluster Program, an initiative to support local aerospace firms. The existing
synergistic relation among local actors due to the past organic co-evolution of institutions and
aerospace firms made the establishment of the CECOMPI a smooth process. One former SJC
state manager described the creation of the CECOMPI as follows:
The CECOMPI was an idea born with the staff of the ITA. We (SJC state managers)
talked to the former director of the ITA, Michael Gartenkraut, and the president of the
Casemiro Foundation. I was working for the SJC municipality, and the mayor at the time,
Manoel, he was from the ITA…We were seeing large companies leaving the
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city…Kodak, Panasonic, Phillips... The companies that were coming were small…So
SJC needed to have a program that would make the next leap to make a more sustainable
economy to develop the city...At the academy, I was just discussing these issues related
to the development of clusters. Then we made an articulation with this group from the
ITA, and with some companies…How do we resolve this? How do we create a new cycle
of development?" And there was the idea of forming a group that would discuss these
issues together. This work group made up of five or six people…decided to create the
CECOMPI…So we came to this consensus, with the academy, represented by the ITA,
local state managers, and companies. We reached a consensus regarding the need to gain
competitiveness through innovation…The group (behind the creation of CECOMPI) was
very concerned with technological issues. They were former workers from the INPE, the
ITA, Embraer, so they were in the government but also connected to the market…
(Interviewee 30)
Following the creation of the CECOMPI, in 2006 SJC sought to advance this new
strategy of development by founding a technology park. The SJC Technology Park is based on
an approach called Triple Helix, which seeks to generate innovation and development by
bringing “together the state, industries, and universities...” (Interviewee 49). Therefore, the
Technology Park of SJC hosts several startups and well-established firms, three public
universities and several research centers and laboratories, providing a thriving environment for
firms to become more competitive (Interviewee 50). In 2016, SJC Technology Park absorbed the
CECOMPI and has become the primary institution steering economic development policies in
SJC. The Technology Park manages SJC’s industrial cluster programs: The Brazilian Aerospace
Cluster and the Information Technology and Communication Cluster. The Brazilian Aerospace
Cluster program consisted of 105 aerospace firms meeting monthly at the Technology Park to
discuss their common problems and possible solutions. As one participant from the CECOMPI
asserted, “the main asset of our program is our networking…rarely you will see it in other
industrial clusters. The level of trust among aerospace firms in our program is really high.”
(Interviewee 49). In this program, Embraer is depicted as a crucial participant, and as the lead
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firm, the company influences initiatives and uses the program to promote needed supplier
changes.
Although the creation of the CECOMPI and the SJC Technology Park appeared to
engender a process in which the local government transferred some of its power of decisionmaking to other non-public actors, this transfer, in reality, stood only as symbolic. SJC
financially maintains both institutions and the mayor of SJC appoints their CEOs. The local state
remained behind these institutions’ developmental decisions. Although local states in Brazil held
greater administrative and financial autonomy (able to establish taxes) and power after the 1988
Federal Constitution, they were not federally enabled to become the major protagonists in local
development. Primarily concerned with addressing problematic infrastructure and public
services, local states have based their local development policies mainly on the provision of
incentives, such as tax breaks and subsidies (Martins et al. 2010). Therefore, the Brazilian
national state as well as subnational states, such as the state of São Paulo, are still significant
players in promoting local development through spatial selective and uneven top-down policies
favoring some regions over others (Martins et al. 2010).
This has been the case of SJC. The establishment of the program Aerospace Brazilian
Industrial Cluster, although locally implemented by CECOMPI, is a national and subnational
initiative to which municipalities with industrial clusters can adhere and, afterwards, receive
public investments. For example, to promote a positive international trade balance, the federal
government has directed investments to industrial clusters such as the SJC Brazilian Aerospace
Cluster program to promote firm exports. Moreover, the establishment of the Technology Park,
although requiring significant infrastructure investments from SJC, was designed by the state of
São Paulo, as one representative of the Technology Park professed:
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The state of São Paulo started a program called “São Paulo System of Technology
Parks”. This initiative benefited SJC because the state of São Paulo selected five cities,
and due to their characteristics, these cities were indicated to host the first Technology
Parks. (Interviewee 50)
Although SJC Technology Park, a not-for-profit institution, is responsible for the local
government regarding economic development policies, the state has remained a principal actor in
steering such policies. SJC’s local governance resembles an associational governance (Almond
et al. 2017), given that local actors engage with local MNCs such as Embraer to improve
location-specific advantages. The Brazilian state, as one of Embraer’s main buyers and provider
of incentives and loans, pressures the company to support local suppliers and to foment
cooperative practices.
A critical feature of the SJC’s local governance regards how issues such as skill problems
are identified and addressed, and this partially explains why the SJC’s local governance
reinforces processes of corporate capture in training initiatives. Different from the region of
Charleston, local governance initiatives in SJC are not based on sectoral level studies, data, and
formal strategies, like the One-Region, but mostly on informal interactions. Marked by practices
of clientelism, the existence of local professional ties, acquired from its aerospace organic
coupling process, reinforces this interaction in SJC and serves as the main mechanism of state
selectivity regarding the establishment of state initiatives, such as training initiatives at the
aerospace. This form of state selectivity combined with Embraer’s financial and social power
magnify the company’s power of influence over educational institutions such as the ITA and the
FATEC.
Clientelism (see glossary for definition) was a form of political relation under the mode
of public management named patrimonialism, prevailing in the Brazilian state until 1930 when
the developmental state emerged and introduced a more professional public management form
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(De Oliveira 2017). Although the Brazilian state and its prevailing modes of public management
have drastically changed over the years40, practices of clientelism are still present in the Brazilian
state, but not as hegemonic as before (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006). Currently, the residues of
clientelism in Brazil are still seen in practices such as: restricted access to the state and unequal
control over material and symbolic resources; lack of formal/legal institutional channels to
access resources; state-market-society relations based on personalism, reciprocity of benefits,
and personal loyalty; political appointees occupying significant positions in the state; and
fragmented demands and discontinuous initiatives (Bahia 2003; Seibel & De Oliveira 2006; De
Oliveira Estevam 2010). Clientelism as a form of political relation intermediating the interests
among state managers, private actors, public and not-for-profit institutions, and society still plays
a crucial role as a mechanism of state selectivity regarding which actors and initiatives will be
privileged by the state (Seibel & De Oliveira 2006).
In the case of SJC, such a form of interaction reinforced by personal and professional ties
of actors related to the aerospace sector—former Embraer employees, alumni from the ITA and
the INPE, among others—explains how local issues, such as skill problems, are identified and
addressed through informal one-on-one interactions. This form of interaction also elucidates why
the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of corporate capture in training initiatives.
According to participants, the SJC’s local governance is marked by three significant elements,
revealing how local actors identify and address issues or demands related to training:
individualism, discontinuity, and access to the state based on informal one-on-one interactions.
Individualism is concerned with how the SJC’s local governance lacks articulation among state
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As De Oliveira (2017) pointed out, the Brazilian institutional structure and political-administrative culture represent a mix of
modes of public management: patrimonalistic, bureaucratic, and managerialism.
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managers and fosters initiatives based on individual interests instead of collective. One state
manager from the state of São Paulo voiced:
Inside São Paulo State Secretariat of Economic Development, Science, and Technology
there is no interaction among the departments, we do not have this culture of sitting and
planning things collectively. The way we work is too individualistic. Everyone does their
individual work, and we don’t work together…So I think there is a huge lack of
articulation. For example, our department of science and technology never interacts with
our department of regional development, and industrial clusters are related to innovation.
Not even that. So, the lack of articulation is huge…The federal government also does not
interact with us, the state. For you to have an idea, the Ministry of Development, Industry
and Foreign Trade does not talk to the states. The Ministry is formalizing the existence of
industrial clusters in São Paulo without talking to us…Clusters that do not even have a
considerable number of firms to be considered a cluster (Interviewee 52)
Discussing how the SJC’s local governance works, another participant added, “Initiatives
are disconnected. We do not have a formal local strategy that I can present to firms to show what
we plan for the future. Skills, workforce, training, logistics, safety, these are not sold as an asset
to attract firms...” (Interviewee 46). This lack of articulation among state managers at different
state scales and local governance actors is problematic and reinforces individualism, as well as
initiatives fostered based on informal mechanisms related to political, professional, and personal
ties. One state manager from SJC contended:
There is a lack of articulation among the different entities of the state and other actors.
So, the university does not talk to firms, and firms do not talk to local state managers.
This results in several different and disconnected demands for initiatives, which we have
a hard time to tie together… Interviewee 53)
Another state manager from the state of São Paulo further described how initiatives and
demands are based on political and personal interests instead of on the collective needs of the
local business community. One state manager from the state of São Paulo, talking about how
local governance actors demand investments and initiatives, declared:
I think that one of the biggest problems is that many of the demands are political.
Meaning that the demand comes through the local state but from a group of firm owners
and does not represent the sector needs. For example, the representative of a chamber of
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commerce from a city demands investments from us to do something for the industrial
cluster of their city, but in reality, one can see that the initiatives are not for the cluster in
general but to benefit a firm or small group of firms. (Interviewee 52)
This lack of collective initiatives and strategies is not only due to the absence of
articulation among state managers and other actors but also due to political interests outplaying
such actions. One state manager from SJC claimed collective actions involving different state
scales are not so common because they often require political ties among the political leaders
governing these spheres. One state manager from SJC affirmed:
The governor of the state of São Paulo is Geraldo Alckmin. He looks at the state and has
goals established for the macro-regions…He has policies of development for regions, but
this is still too distant from the municipalities. Why? Because of political issues. If the
mayor of the city of São Paulo is from the Workers Party, and the governor of the state of
São Paulo is from PSDB, then it will hinder any collective action, common development
for the general good. State managers they tend to defend more their interests and projects
than the interests of the country. (Interviewee 53)
Another issue reinforcing informal one-on-one relations in directing state initiatives
relates to the presence of political appointees and a consequent discontinuity of public initiatives.
Political appointees strengthen decisions being made based on political and personal interests
and advance a less technical approach to state problems as well as a discontinuity in public
initiatives. As one state manager from the state of São Paulo pointed out:
We do not have a long-term strategy. Every four years we have someone new, a new
mayor and governor. For you to have an idea, I have been here for seven years, and I
have had seven political appointees running the Secretariat. What can they do in one
year? You can have a 20-year strategy, but the next politician will revoke. This is
cultural… (Interviewee 52)
Other participants corroborated this view. A former director of the FATEC claimed:
We do not have a state policy of continuity. When you change the political party of São
José dos Campos, you change everything, change in the mode of thinking, new
personnel. In the first year of a new government, state managers will have to learn
everything, in the last year they have to run for the election, so they have basically to
years of work. (Interviewee 30)
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This lack of articulation and continuity impedes the SJC’s local governance from
identifying and addressing training issues based on formal broad collective strategies. Strategies
play an essential role in bringing players together, establishing regional needs and demands as
well as the collective goals and targets to be pursued. This collaboration constructs discursive
narratives of what was needed to initiate development—characteristics present in Charleston, but
not in SJC. As one participant from SJC local state described:
We do not have strategies because we in general change political parties every four years.
This change has not allowed the elaboration of long-term strategies. We have four years
with one administration. After that then we have new elections, and everything changes.
We have permanent workers that do not leave their job positions after a new political
party assumes power, but these workers do not have the power to influence policies. So,
we have projects that are often interrupted in the middle. So, we need more structuring,
continuous, and permanent projects, independent of the political party in power. This is
also aggravated by the lack of interaction among different spheres of the state.
(Interviewee 57)
When one representative of the FATEC in SJC was asked if they established and updated
their programs and courses based on technical studies and SJC formal sectoral strategies, he
answered, “There is no formal strategy…moreover, we do not trust in municipal studies. The
municipality is normally too influenced by political factors” (Interviewee 33). Therefore, since
formal collective strategies are not employed in the SJC’s local governance, the identification of
skills has been based on informal one-on-one interactions. One participant from the FATEC
articulated:
How technical is this plan, how political is this plan? There are plans that are much more
political than technical. There are few technical plans. We have a hard time having
technical plans. Today, SJC and the FATEC do not have a gold map, a guide to steer us.
In São José dos Campos, we find things through individuality, we go and talk to people.
(Interviewee 33)
Another representative from SENAI (a local not-for-profit educational institution) further
described this mechanism, explaining:

213

…I participate in industry meetings, such as CIESP, where firm owners meet, and there I
make myself available to listen to their skill needs…For example here in São José dos
Campos, we have the Association of United Chácaras, which is an association of
firms…I attend this meeting, they serve breakfast, and then I present my programs and
ask about their needs to that I can update my course and curriculums. (Interview 31)
Although interaction involves small- and medium-sized aerospace firms, this form of
interaction tends to reinforce the power of single firms over training initiatives, such as
customized programs. In SJC, informal one-on-one interactions magnify the power of influence
of the aerospace sector in the city, and more specifically of large firms, such as Embraer, who are
privileged by local actors due to their economic and social power as employers and as anchor
firms for the aerospace industrial cluster. Due to its size, Embraer is able to have permanent
customized training partnerships with educational institutions and to hire the trainees after
conclusion. One participant from the ITA explained, “Embraer has this program with us for 17
years…even during economic downturns, Embraer keeps the program with a small number of
students just to not stop it…” (Interviewee 34). Another representative from the FATEC added:
…to have a partnership, there is a need to have benefits from both sides. There is a need
for resources to pay professors (worked hours)…and the only companies that can pay for
this process are large companies. You cannot have professors teaching for free…You
need numbers; you need resources…companies have their staff to teach some
hours…Small firms cannot put their staff in a training program to teach for ten months.
They cannot take it. (Interviewee 40)
As stated before, the power of influence of Embraer over training is magnified not only
by its financial and social relevance but also by the fact that the organic coupling process in
SJC—and thus the co-evolution of educational institutions, research centers, aerospace firms—
has resulted in many important job positions in the local state, in educational institutions, in
private firms and not-for-profit organizations being occupied by the ITA graduates and people
who worked for a local aerospace company, such as Embraer, or for an aerospace-related
institution. This professional bond functions as a mechanism of state selectivity, which
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facilitates the interactions among local actors, granting actors more direct access to public
institutions and initiatives. The professional-personal ties and socioeconomic power of Embraer
explain why the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of corporate capture. Regarding the
economic power of Embraer, one participant from the ITA responded with the following when
asked why the ITA has only partnered with Embraer:
There is a difficulty (for other firms to have training partnerships with the ITA) because
the ITA is a military base, and there is not a department, where firms can go and speak
about a training partnership. The ITA does not have an office of projects…Firms don’t
know where to go, or who to speak with, which professor? The ITA does not have
someone to explain how the aerospace business community can try to establish a training
partnership. Firms owners can go there (to the ITA), and they will be jilted. So, they
don’t come back. If you look at the ITA’s projects with firms, you will see that small
aerospace businesses do not have any…The CECOMPI knows how hard it is to have the
ITA opening for other firm-education relations (Interviewee 35).
In conclusion, as demonstrated in the two previous subsections, processes of corporate
capture in training initiatives in SJC happened through direct firm-university interactions,
facilitated by employees from Embraer, the FATEC, and the ITA having close professional and
personal ties, inherence of its past aerospace organic coupling. In this regard, the SJC’s local
governance identifies and addresses skill gaps and training issues in the aerospace sector through
informal one-on-one relations. This occurs due to the local governance interactions being marked
by a lack of articulation—beyond the aerospace sector—, thus failing to build collective formal
strategies. Such a form to advance training initiatives privileges aerospace initiatives in SJC due
to how the aerospace organic coupling process in the city established strong personal and
professional ties among governance actors, who are somehow related to the ITA, Embraer,
INPE, IPD, or other aerospace firms. These bonds function as a mechanism of state selectivity
where Embraer’s training interests are privileged over the general aerospace business community
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due to its economic and social power. This explains why the SJC’s local governance reinforces
processes of corporate capture in training.

Conclusion
This chapter sought to analyze the evolution of Embraer processes of corporate capture in
SJC. More specifically, this chapter aimed at analyzing two main issues. First, this research
demonstrated how processes of corporate capture at the ITA and the FATEC in SJC, São Paulo,
Brazil evolved intrinsically related to the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy.
Such a strategy, I revealed, privileged domestic industrial capitalists, having organic and
structural coupling processes as its principal goals. This research claimed that in SJC, the
evolution of Embraer processes of corporate capture in training initiatives was associated with
the organic coupling process fostered by the Brazilian national state in the 1950s, which resulted
in the establishment of Embraer and the Brazilian aerospace sector in the city. Therefore, the
capture of training initiatives does not happen through bargaining events, like in South Carolina,
but organically through synergistic informal one-on-one interactions.
Second, in this chapter, this research examined whether the SJC’s local governance
reinforces of minimizes Embraer’s processes of corporate capture in the regional training system
of SJC. In this regard, it was argued that the SJC’s local governance reinforces processes of
corporate capture due to the nature of the interactions among state managers and other
governance actors. More specifically, I claimed that SJC state managers and governance actors
identify the aerospace local training needs and advance training initiatives based on clientelistic
informal relations and personal/professional ties, which function as the main mechanism of state
selectivity. This combined with the economic and social power of corporations magnify single
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firm influence, such as Embraer, over educational institutions and their training initiatives,
reinforcing processes of corporate capture.
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Chapter 6: Variegated Forms of Corporate Capture in Regional Training Systems: São
José dos Campos and Charleston in Comparison
In this chapter, I will present the major findings of this research. To do so, I compare the
major similarities and differences between the processes of corporate capture in SJC and
Charleston. First, I will compare both states and their relation to corporate capture. Second, I will
juxtapose their forms of governance and whether they reinforce or minimize capture. Finally, I
will compare their processes of corporate capture.

6.1 The Evolution of Corporate Capture Processes in Charleston and São José dos Campos
in Comparison
In the second and third chapter of this research, I sought to demonstrate not only how
mainstream literature has defined corporate capture but also how researchers explain its
evolution and relationship to the state and to different forms of governance. Although
mainstream literature brings important contributions to the topic, when their theoretical
explanations are contrasted with the empirical findings of SJC and Charleston, their associated
rationalizations are problematic.
As revealed before, two main bodies of literature have attempted to explain the
relationship between the state and corporate capture: FDI studies and the GPN literature.
Regarding FDI studies, scholars have claimed that liberal forms of the state are more prone to
have their institutional capacities captured than developmental states (see Phelps 2008; Almond
et al. 2013, 2014). Such explanations are based on different aspects (e.g., MNC opportunism),
but mostly in regard to the level of efficiency of state institutions to coordinate inter-scale actions
(Phelps 2008; Almond et al. 2013, 2014). The primary argument is that liberal states have low
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levels of coordination among their state apparatuses, which create power asymmetries and allow
MNCs to foster their interests over the interests of governments (see Phelps 2000, 2008;
Pavlinek 2016; Dawley 2007; Phelps and Fuller 2010). In the case of the GPN literature, scholars
have not attributed power asymmetries to the level of state coordination. Independent of the state
form of regions, GPN scholars assert that processes of corporate capture are related to the lack of
distinct and specific regional assets that meet the interests of MNCs, which puts states in an
inferior position when bargaining with firms (Mackinnon 2012; Coe and Hess 2011; Yeung
2016). However, as argued in previous chapters, such generalizations are problematic.
When contrasting the cases of SJC and Charleston, four major features stand out. The
first is that there is no correlation between particular forms of the state and specific levels of
coordination—for example, liberal states having low coordination and developmental states
having high levels of coordination. This particularity concurs with the variegated capitalism
literature and Marxist scholars such as Poulantzas (1978), who have argued that the economy is
not outside of the state but mutually constitutive. The second is that power asymmetry is not due
to low degrees of coordination among states institutions, or a lack of specific assets but is mostly
due to structural advantages that MNCs have over the state. Thirdly, corporate capture is
associated to the accumulation strategies of each state. Finally, an approach sensitive to state
scale is central to understanding the evolution of corporate capture.
Regarding the levels of state coordination in SJC and Charleston, the empirical findings
of this research point out to an opposite direction of what mainstream literature has claimed. As
explained before, the VOC literature has analyzed the US and the UK as liberal market
economies, which would lead this research to explain corporate capture in Charleston, South
Carolina as based on their potential low-level of state institutional coordination. Nonetheless, as
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argued in previous chapters, the US should not be pictured as a liberal market economy, or as
marked by low levels of coordination. The examination of Charleston, South Carolina points to
the direction of Block’s (2008) research, which depicts the US as a hidden developmental state.
Charleston, South Carolina resembles the developmental state of Brazil. For example, South
Carolina is characterized by a strong interventionist state with clear industrial policies of
development, strong alliances with local fractions of capital, and direct forms of investment in
specific sectors, such as manufacturing.
Moreover, Charleston, South Carolina—as described in chapter three—has extremely
high levels of coordination when compared for example with SJC, São Paulo, and yet corporate
capture is still a common process. SJC, São Paulo—in a developmental state with supposed high
levels of state coordination—has many issues regarding state-institutional coordination. For
example, state managers in Charleston, South Carolina base their initiatives on formal sectorbased strategies and studies, and have developed a flexible, efficient, and inter-scale fluid
institutional apparatus to attend the needs of MNCs. On the other hand, initiatives in SJC, São
Paulo are based on informal, often disconnected, one-on-one interactions which could be
characterized by low levels of coordination when seen side-by-side with Charleston. Moreover,
even though SJC presents a low level of state coordination in relation to Charleston, during the
interviews some participants stated that SJC has higher degrees of coordination than most cities
in the country. Therefore, it becomes problematic to frame national states according to different
levels of coordination, given that internal variations and deviations from the national state are
common. Such findings prove it to be misleading to associate liberal or developmental forms of
state with different degrees of institutional coordination, and thus, to propensities of states
having processes of corporate capture.
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These findings also oppose the supposition that power asymmetries between the state and
MNCs—and thus consequent processes of corporate capture—result mainly from deficient levels
of coordination among states’ institutions in contrast to the efficiency and opportunistic behavior
of MNCs, or from a lack of specific assets. When comparing the similarities of the evolution of
corporate capture in SJC and Charleston, it becomes evident that power asymmetries are not only
due to dysfunctionality in all levels of coordination (like in the case of SJC), or a lack of distinct
assets like in the case of Charleston but due to how MNCs have structural advantages over the
state. Such structural advantages are not only due to how MNCs are able to push their interests
over the interests of states given their ability to shift operations between locations (Featherstone
and Mackinnon 2017) in the context of the ecological dominance of neoliberalism, but also due
to how such advantages are institutionally inscribed in the state apparatus. One major similarity
in the cases of Charleston and SJC demonstrates that the evolution of corporate capture in
training is also related to how these states created models of development based on a strategic
and selective institutional apparatus that privileges manufacturing corporations (see Jessop
2014). Understanding that the state apparatus of both regions is selective and privileges
manufacturing MNCs alludes to how power asymmetries between MNCs and the state are
structurally inscribed in the capitalist state and are not just the result of a lack of specific assets
or coordination.
One important difference between SJC and Charleston resides in the fact that while the
accumulation strategy of South Carolina is based on the attraction of FDIs by fostering structural
coupling processes, SJC—although still giving centrality to Embraer—has a subnational strategy
that is much more concerned with developing SMEs through, for example, the SJC Technology
Park. As the empirical evidence revealed, however it does not mean that by placing SMEs at its
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center of accumulation strategy, SJC has been able to avoid the influence of Embraer and
consequent processes of corporate capture in educational institutions. This indicates that
corporate capture results from a combination of how states are based on a selective institutional
apparatus and of how MNCs behave as strategic actors pursuing their interests (see Hay 2002;
Jessop 2007). For example, in the case of Charleston, as discussed before, the ReadySC Program
grants to firms training incentives automatically—as part of its selective institutional apparatus.
However, in the case of Boeing, the company strategically advanced its interests in order to
increase ReadySC’s incentives. Nonetheless, acknowledging that MNCs are able to influence the
state in advancing their interests and agenda to a point known as corporate capture, does not
mean that the interests of state managers and state institutions are fully suppressed.
Corporate capture in Charleston and SJC reveals that it is more a process of
accommodation than imposition, e.g., corporate capture is not a process in which Boeing and
Embraer simply imposed or forced their interests over the interests of SJC and Charleston. State
managers—from the government and other subsidiary public institutions like educational
institutions—have their own interests in such articulations, and for corporate capture to happen
there is a need for MNCs’ and state managers’ interests to be accommodated, and somehow
beneficial for both parties. Block’s theorization of state managers as a distinct class, and
Rikowski’s (2000) theorization of education as a capitalist social form, are useful to understand
this process of accommodation. State managers, as Block (1987) noticed, are influenced by
MNCs due to their self-interest in power, prestige, and a healthy economy. While in SJC state
managers’ success is not so attached to their ability to attract MNCs, in the case of South
Carolina, they were almost synonymous. This is because the accumulation strategy of South
Carolina is primarily based on fostering structural coupling processes, (e.g., attracting FDIs),
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meaning that state managers’ success in having a healthy economy is dependent on their
capability to attract and retain manufacturing MNCs. In the case of SJC, state managers since the
1990s have pursued a wider accumulation strategy that is not solely based on the attraction and
retention of large MNCs but mostly on the creation of aerospace and IT sector start-ups. In South
Carolina, such a characteristic has resulted in processes of corporate capture, such as the one
between the ReadySC Program and Boeing to be more frequent and significant than processes of
corporate capture in SJC. This commitment of South Carolina state managers to success through
the attraction of manufacturing MNCs can be seen in how the state has embraced the agenda of
MNCs, such as Boeing, for example by battling against unions and by transforming its
educational agenda by placing emphasis on vocational training, and by establishing training
incentives. Therefore, corporate capture is a characteristic of capitalist states, as Phelps and
Wood (2006) and many Marxists have argued, the interests of capitalists and the state have
become intersected or blurred.
Another important difference is related to the scale in which Embraer and Boeing
influence the state of their respective regions, and to the mechanisms through which their
structural advantages are exerted and interests advanced. This demonstrates the importance of
the variegated capitalisms literature, which is not only sensitive to matters of scale, but also to
the existence of national sub-models of development and internal variations (Peck and Theodore
2007; Zhang and Peck 2014; Schröder and Voelzkow 2016).
In the case of SJC, the evolution of ITA’s and FATEC’s processes of corporate capture
by Embraer is intrinsically related to the import-substitution accumulation strategy of the
Brazilian national state, which was adopted from the 1930s to the 1980s (Oliveira 2004). As
previously highlighted, the Brazilian developmental state and its accumulation strategy had, at its
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core, development based on a mix of organic and structural coupling processes. Based on topdown decisions, the Brazilian national state, under the ideology of a nationalist developmental
collective project, created the ITA, the IPD, and Embraer in SJC. The co-evolution of these
institutions and Embraer established a synergistic and symmetric power relation among the
aforementioned actors, which has been maintained even after the privatization of Embraer in
1994. In this context, such an organic coupling has created the conditions for corporate capture
to evolve at the local scale in an organic way through one-on-one and informal interactions. The
evolution of corporate capture happened through Embraer’s direct access to public educational
institutions and did not involve state managers from SJC municipality, nor from the state of São
Paulo.
In contrast to SJC, the process of corporate capture of the ReadySC Program by Boeing
evolved at a different state-scale and involved different types of interaction. As analyzed
previously, the evolution of corporate capture in Charleston happened based on a bargaining
process between Boeing and state managers at the subnational scale and was part of its structural
coupling process. Initially, there was no direct communication between Boeing and the ReadySC
staff until capture was established. Training incentives and levels of customization were decided
at the state-level as part of the bargaining process to attract Boeing to the region. The same
applies to how the state manufacturing fraction of capital have influenced the education agenda
and strategy of South Carolina.
Such differences in scale are related to the differential state power of both states.
Although Brazil and the United States have a similar institutional architecture, i.e., a federalist
system in which state power is distributed at three different levels of government, state power
across such scales is distributed differentially in both countries. In the United States, in terms of
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intervention, subnational states have much more power, or autonomy when compared to Brazil,
where the federal government is still the major player. Such a greater autonomy and power
enable subnational states in the United States to have a more active role than in Brazil, and to
design singular types of developmental policies that can greatly differ from their federal
government approach. Although, in Brazil, the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution
fostered a devolution of power from the national state to states and municipalities, and thus
granted to these state levels greater autonomy. Nonetheless, the Brazilian federal government has
not transferred enough power for subnational states to become the major players in designing
developmental policies and steering development at the local level. Such features demonstrate
why processes of corporate capture are concentrated in some scales rather than others.
To conclude, the evolution of corporate capture in both regions suggests that such a
process is not a phenomenon of specific forms of state, nor an outcome relative to the existence
or lack thereof effective state coordination and specific regional assets. Corporate capture is a
common, general feature in capitalist states. Instead of associating corporate capture with
different forms of state or types of assets, both case studies reveal that the influence of MNCs
over the state is primarily due to the structural advantages that such corporations have over the
state, which is related not only to the state accumulation strategy and different scales, but also to
certain mechanisms through which firms are able to exert their influence. Moreover, scale poses
a relevant feature in the explanation of how firms influence the state and how capture evolve.
The diagram below summarizes the findings in this regard.
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Diagram 11. The Evolution of Processes of Corporate Capture in SJC and Charleston in Relation
to their States’ Accumulation Strategies

Source: Author.
6.2 Charleston and SJC Regional Training Systems, Local Forms of Governance and
Corporate Capture in Comparison
As established in the introduction, one of the main research questions of this study was,
do the local forms of governance of each region reinforce or minimize processes of corporate
capture in the regional training systems of SJC and Charleston? The response to this question has
proven to be complex. In the last two chapters, this research analyzed how the local forms of
governance in Charleston and SJC reinforce processes of corporate capture in training at the
local scale. Although, as discussed on chapter three, in the case of Charleston, attempts have
been made—without much success—to minimize some of its detrimental outcomes. In this
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subsection, by comparing the tendencies of the local forms of governance of SJC and Charleston
to reinforce corporate processes, I will reveal two major things.
First, the tendency of SJC and Charleston governance to reinforce processes of capture is
intrinsically related to their state form, accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity.
Second, their tendency to reinforce or minimize corporate capture is related to their governance
mechanisms through which skill problems are identified and addressed, and through which
MNCs foster their private interests. This subsection will be structured as follows. First, I will
compare both forms of governance, demonstrating their relationship to their state forms,
accumulation strategies, and type of state selectivity. Second, I will contrast their governance
mechanisms, and explore whether such mechanisms tend to reinforce or minimize corporate
capture.
The cases of SJC and Charleston present important features regarding the nature,
characteristics and functioning of local forms of governance. While some scholars have argued
that systems of governance are marked by shared power and interests, a collective mode of
coordination and a strong autonomy from the state (Rhode 2007), the cases of SJC and
Charleston reveal a different narrative. Their forms of governance, as Davies (2011, 2014, 2015)
theorized, are marked by a strong relation to the state, hierarchical power relations, and can
function as an instrument for single capitalist such as Embraer and Boeing, or fractions of capital
to advance their interests (see Lovering 2011). As both local forms of governance tend to
reinforce processes of corporate capture in training, theoretical rationalizations become crucial to
provide explanations of the reasons behind these processes.
Scholars such as Almond et. al. (2013, 2014, 2017) have argued that systems of
governance tend to reinforce processes of corporate capture in regional training systems due to
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their forms of state. According to the authors, subnational states within liberal market economies
often have less active systems of governance in regard to fostering processes of externalization,
and thus, are more prone to processes of corporate capture. Coordinated market economies, the
authors argue, in general have systems of governance with wider developmental concerns.
Despite this, the authors also acknowledge that national states can present, at the subnational
scale, deviations from such a correlation, given that their state forms (e.g., federalism), can
present some autonomy for variation (Almond et al. 2017; Tregaskis and Almond 2017; Almond
et al. 2014). Understanding local forms of governance and their relation to processes of corporate
capture according to their extent or commitment to wider development goals is valid, but to
correlate such forms of governance with specific types of state becomes problematic.
In this regard, the governances of Charleston and SJC (both within national states with a
federalist system) have wider developmental goals, but processes of corporate capture are still
present and reinforced. For example, one of the major goals of Charleston governance is to train
and hire local residents by newly established MNCs, while the SJC’s local governance has
greater concerns with developing Embraer’s domestic value chain. Therefore, their wider
developmental goals do not nullify their tendency to reinforce corporate capture in training.
Consequently, it implies that the tendency of their local forms of governance to reinforce or
minimize capture is beyond the extension of their developmental goals.
When comparing the cases of Charleston and SJC, one major evidence, which indicates
how to understand the tendency of their local forms of governance to reinforce processes of
corporate capture, is how such forms are related to their state accumulation strategy. As revealed
previously, the accumulation strategies of SJC and Charleston are based on a selective
institutional apparatus that privileges certain actors, fractions of capital and their sectors, and
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some initiatives (see Jessop 2015; Rutherford et. al. 2018). This particularity affects local forms
of governance in two main ways. First, some actors will be more successful than others in
shaping the governance agenda of their regions and in advancing their interests, given their
privileged position in their state apparatus and accumulation strategy. Second, local forms of
governance tend to pursue development based on methods and initiatives that are congruent with
their state accumulation strategies. Different state strategies tend to result in different methods to
attract, embed, retain, and/or develop firms.
In this context, the local forms of governance of SJC and Charleston tend to reinforce
processes of corporate capture in training due to their state accumulation strategies and, more
specifically, due to the centrality and power of representation given to MNCs in the balance of
forces among existing actors. As discussed, South Carolina state managers have given centrality
to the state manufacturing fraction of capital, having a strategic accumulation strategy based on
fostering structural coupling processes. In this context, local economies across the state must
compete with one another for such investments. Such competition has forced regions like
Charleston to develop local forms of governance adapted and congruent to the logics of this
accumulation strategy. In this regard, manufacturing corporations have a privileged position in
the governance agenda of Charleston, where governance actors have pursued development based
on compatible practices related to its state accumulation strategy.
To be more specific, Charleston’s local form of governance reinforces processes of
corporate capture in its regional training system by embracing South Carolina accumulation
strategy as part of its own developmental strategy. By doing so, the local governance of
Charleston seeks to locally implement higher-state scale training initiatives, which are
understood as corporate capture. In this respect, this research demonstrated how processes of
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corporate capture in South Carolina are related to its accumulation strategy, and thus, to broader
structural occurrences that involve not only single-firms influence over educational institutions
and their training programs (as exemplified in the case of Boeing and ReadySC) but also the
influence of an industrial/manufacturing fraction of capital over broad state educational agenda
and policies. To foster structural coupling processes, the state of South Carolina has developed
an institutional apparatus that is flexible, inter-scale fluid and efficient, has committed to keep
the state’s right-to-work status, and has further aligned its educational agenda and initiatives with
manufacturing corporations’ interests, which this research explored as a form of corporate
capture. In this respect, the local governance of Charleston reinforces processes of corporate
capture fostered at the state level by embracing and implementing such practices at the local
level.
For example, Charleston’s local form of governance reinforces corporate capture at the
local scale by implementing state programs at high schools, such as Career Academies and
Apprenticeship Carolina that are of great benefit for manufacturing MNCs, and part of the recent
further alignment between South Carolina’s educational agenda and the interests of private
manufacturing corporations in the state. Local governance also reinforces corporate capture in
Charleston’s regional training system by supporting the state’s right-to-work status. Local
governance also has a crucial role in shaping the imaginaries of students concerning vocational
education and the local community regarding the relevance of unions. One example in this
regard is related to how governance leaders, such as the Charleston Chamber of Commerce and
the Charleston Regional Development Alliance, enforce the idea that increasing local wages is a
matter of individuals learning the right skills or improving their skills and not of unions fighting
for workers’ rights. It is worth mentioning that in Charleston, processes of corporate capture also
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result from single-firm influence over educational institutions and their training programs, which
this research will reiterate later in this chapter.
As in the case of Charleston, the local form of governance in SJC also reinforces
processes of corporate capture, and this tendency is related to the Brazilian import-substitution
accumulation strategy, which was adopted from the 1930s to the 1980s. As demonstrated before,
this strategy sought to foster accumulation by privileging domestic corporations. The Brazilian
developmental state sought to foster a mix of organic and structural coupling processes. As a
result, the Brazilian state fostered an organic coupling in SJC in the 1950s, which culminated in
two major features. First, this organic coupling resulted in the co-evolution of the Aeronautics
Institute of Technology, the IPD, Embraer, and later, of the local aerospace industrial cluster.
Second, it resulted in SJC having many important job positions in local state, educational
institutions, private firms, and not-for-profit organizations being occupied by graduates from the
Aeronautics Institute of Technology as well as people who have worked for a local aerospace
company, such as Embraer or for aerospace-related institutions.
This organic coupling and consequent spillovers have created personal and professional
bonds among local governance actors that facilitate governance interactions around aerospace
issues, and grant Embraer direct access to public institutions, including public educational
institutions, such as the ITA and the FATEC. Therefore, the ease with which Embraer employees
represent the company’s needs to governance actors along with its socioeconomic power and
central role in local development explain why SJC form of governance tends to reinforce
Embraer’s processes of corporate capture. Several examples can be given to illustrate this
argument. Most major job positions in SJC city hall, such as in the Secretary of Economic
Development of SJC, are occupied by alumni from the ITA, or former employees from Embraer.
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This is also the case for the SJC Technology Park, the FATEC, and the CECOMPI. The
evolution of the processes of corporate capture at the ITA and at the FATEC happened based on
the personal and professional bonds.
Another important finding, which demonstrates whether forms of governance tend to
reinforce or minimize corporate capture is related to their governance mechanisms through
which skill problems are identified and addressed, and through which MNCs foster their
interests. Up to this point, this research has emphasized how Charleston’s local form of
governance reinforces processes of corporate capture at the local scale, which is related to a
dynamic fostered by a manufacturing fraction of capital at its subnational level, and in regard to
South Carolina’s educational agenda and training initiatives. Nonetheless, corporate capture in
South Carolina is not only structural and due to fractions of capital permanently influencing
South Carolina’s educational agenda and policies, but also due to single firms’ influence over
training initiatives. One particular case explored was the case of Boeing structural coupling and
the consequent capture of the ReadySC program. In this respect, it is also important to analyze
whether and why the local governance of Charleston reinforces or minimizes this particular
process of corporate capture. As stated before, such a tendency is related to the governance
mechanisms through which skill problems are identified and addressed, and through which
MNCs foster their interests.
When contrasting both cases, findings in this matter reveal their forms of governance are
shaped by the way their states select which interests, actors, and initiatives to attend—an aspect
that this research explored as state selectivity. So, as local forms of governance seek to present
their local actors’ interests, they function according to the specificities of their state selectivity.
In the case of Charleston, governance actors identify and address skills gaps and training issues

232

based on formal studies and four-year local strategies, which are used as instruments to present
their needs to state managers and to justify public investments in educational institutions, in new
training centers, and in new training initiatives and programs. In this context, Charleston’s local
form of governance while reinforcing processes of corporate capture initiated at higher-scale, has
attempted to minimize processes of corporate capture at least in relation to some of its
detrimental outcomes at the local scale such as workers being hired from outside the region.
Such attempts to minimize processes of corporate capture are related to how its formal local
strategy One-Region is based on sector-level studies that pay particular attention to the skill
needs of the business community in general instead of single firms. Such formal studies are also
used as an instrument of power, through which local governance actors use in order to do
lobbying. As one participant from the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce explained,
formal studies are used to educate legislators regarding their training demands, and to convince
them about investment needs.
It is also worth recalling that such attempts to minimize corporate capture are limited and
problematic, only partially addressing existing issues. While Charleston’s local governance
actors seek to develop a regional training system based on the needs of the local business
community, such an attempt is a long-term solution, which ignores the short-term skill demands
of local small aerospace firms. ReadySC Program could address such problems. Nonetheless, the
program has prioritized and been captured by large MNCs, such as Boeing, where the skills
needs of local aerospace firms in the business community have been overlooked. Moreover,
ReadySC demands MNCs that have received its services pay competitive wages. In the case of
Boeing, this has not happened, and such a negative outcome has been addressed by governance
actors in a problematic way. In Charleston’s regional strategy, governance actors link increases
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in wage to local residents getting the right skills, overlooking how possible changes in ReadySC
requirements could foster important increases in the wages and benefits of the local working
class. Such an action is supported by regional business actors, who are are against raising
workers’ wages via unions, collective bargaining or by the state raising minimum wages.
Additionally, local actors lack the power to advance structural changes at the subnational scale,
where ReadySC resides. Therefore, Charleston’s local form of governance contradictorily
reinforces the broader and structural processes of corporate capture while attempting to minimize
some of the detrimental effects of such capture.
In contrast to Charleston, SJC presents a significant difference regarding its governance
mechanisms through which how skill problems are identified and addressed, and MNCs such as
Embraer foster their interests. Different from Charleston, such governance mechanisms reinforce
processes of corporate capture. This is because skill problems are identified and addressed based
on informal one-on-one interactions among governance actors. Such interactions are
characterized by clientelistic practices (see De Oliveira 2017), where the governance actors’
local professional ties (acquired from its aerospace organic coupling process) serve as the main
mechanism of state selectivity regarding the establishment of training initiatives. This form of
state selectivity combined with Embraer’s financial and social power magnify the company’s
power of influence over educational institutions such as the ITA and the FATEC, and thus
explain why SJC form of governance has a tendency to reinforce processes of corporate capture.
In conclusion, the tendencies of SJC’s and Charleston’s local forms of governance to
reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in their regional training systems are related
to their state forms and accumulation strategies. Moreover, such tendencies are also associated to
their governance mechanisms and, more specifically, to how governance actors identify and
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address skill needs, and allows MNCs to advance their interests. The table below summarizes
such findings.

Table 9. Charleston’s and SJC’s Local Forms of Governance in Comparison.
Local Forms of
Charleston
São José dos Campos
Governance
Leadership
- Charleston Metro Chamber of - SJC City Hall
Commerce (CMCC)
- Technology Park
- Charleston Regional
(CECOMPI)
Development Alliance (CRDA)
State Selectivity
- Interests are presented to state - Interests are presented to
managers through formal
state managers through
strategies and studies.
informal one-on-one
- Strong lobbying to “educate”
interactions, and marked by
politicians at the subnational
individualism and
scale.
discontinuity.
- Formal governance meetings
- Personal/professional ties
at the local scale to establish
are important for actors to
goals and strategies and to
present their interests and to
create common discourses about be attended by state
the needs of Charleston.
managers.
- Manufacturing corporations
- MNCs such as Embraer
such as Boeing with structural
with structural advantages
advantages over the state.
over the state.
Institutional
- Urban Entrepreneurialism.
- Political culture/legacy
Legacy/Political Culture
- Skill needs identified through
marked by a mix of
formal studies.
clientelistic, bureaucratic, and
- Skill needs addressed
managerialist relations.
collectively through four-year
- Skills needs identified
strategies
through informal one-on-one
interactions.
- Skill needs addressed
through firms directly access
to educational institutions.
Reinforcing Corporate
- Governance actors implement - Clientelistic relations at the
Capture
and expand higher-state
local governance (based on
programs seen as forms of
professional ties related to the
corporate capture.
aerospace sector) along with
Embraer’s economic and
political power allow the firm
to influence educational
institutions, and thus, to
reinforce corporate capture.
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Minimizing Corporate
Capture

- Formal studies and the OneRegion strategy minimize single
firm influence. However,
attempts to minimize Boeing’s
corporate capture of ReadySC
have focused on long-term
training initiatives.
Additionally, the responsibility
regarding issues of corporate
capture related to low wages
and lack of transparency have
been transferred to individuals.
Local governance actors not
only lack the power to address
these issues but also believe that
providing the right skills along
with firms’ competition can deal
with such wage problems.

- Lack of collective strategies
and studies benefit single
firm influence such as
Embraer.
- Attempts to minimize
corporate capture have not
been made. However,
educational institutions like
the ITA and FATEC do take
advantages of their processes
of corporate capture. They do
so by learning through their
relationship with Embraer the
skill needs of the sector.
Therefore, these educational
institutions are able to update
their courses, create new ones
and to make their programs
more relevant to other firms
in the aerospace sector.

Source: Author.

6.3 The Processes of Corporate Capture of Charleston and São José dos Campos in
Comparison
The findings regarding the processes of corporate capture in both regions suggest that
such dynamics are significantly more complex than mainstream literature has suggested. When
comparing the major characteristics in the processes of corporate capture within SJC’s and
Charleston’s regional training systems two major findings stand out. First, corporate capture in
regional training systems is a multi-scalar process. Second, the detrimental outcomes of
corporate capture should be understood beyond the binary view of corporate capture versus
externalization, MNCs interests versus government interests, incorporating its relation to class
and uneven development.
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As discussed in the second and third chapters, mainstream literature has identified
processes of corporate capture in regional training systems according to how MNCs influence
the state, receive customized training packages, distort local skill agendas and policies, recruit
the most talented workforce from the local business community and from outside the region,
and/or avoid knowledge sharing (Phelps 2000, 2008; Dawley 2007; Phelps and Fuller 2010). In
this regard, mainstream literature has predominantly stressed how FDIs do or do not result in
wider cluster benefits and externalization. Corporate capture is understood in relation to the
unequal power relations in which the interests of MNCs versus the interests of governments are
at play.
Although such a portrayal is important and valid, the processes of corporate capture in
the regional training systems of Charleston and SJC reveal a need to expand this comprehension.
Regarding what corporate capture looks like, the findings of this research reveal a much more
detailed description of its particularities. For example, corporate capture can be conceptualized
as permanent or temporary. The corporate capture of ReadySC Program by Boeing exemplifies a
process that is sporadic and will end after the state of South Carolina delivers skills agreed upon
to Boeing, while Embraer’s customized training programs at the FATEC and at the ITA can be
conceptualized as a permanent form of corporate capture, given that this process will exist as
long as both parties are interested in keeping such arrangements. Another example concerns the
specificities of customized training services.
Customized training services can assume different forms. In the case of Charleston, it
includes not only the state training workers for firms free-of-charge and bureaucracy, but also
practices such as the development and customization of curriculum and courses, the provision of
instructors to teach on-the-job, reimbursement for firms to pay internal training, and travel
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funding for firms to send their workers to other countries in order to receive training. Moreover,
customized training can also involve the free use of educational institutions’ infrastructure and
apparatuses not only for training purposes but also for recruitment. For example, ReadySC
Program in Charleston as well as the ITA and the FATEC in SJC allow Boeing and Embraer to
use their apparatuses to recruit and leverage the number of applicants.
Another detail often neglected by scholars regarding the details of processes of corporate
capture relates to how these processes are often marked by a lack of transparency. Furthermore,
it reveals how MNCs circumvent the juridical form of national, subnational, and/or local states in
regard to existing institutionalized training incentives and laws that apply for the business
community in general. For example, in Brazil it is illegal for public educational institutions to
provide free-of-charge customized training services for firms. As discussed previously, this is
considered a type of lobbying. However, to establish customized training programs for Embraer,
the FATEC and the ITA have used a not-for-profit institution (Foundation Casemiro) as a
mediator for their relations. In such a way, the FATEC and the ITA are not supposedly related to
Embraer, but to a not-for-profit organization. In the case of Charleston, the state of South
Carolina has documents that establish the parameters and levels of training incentives for the
business community; however, as demonstrated before, Boeing has received training initiatives
that are way beyond what is established in such documents. Moreover, the whole bargaining
process between Boeing and South Carolina happened in secret and the exact extension of
incentives has not been fully disclosed, even today.
The cases of Charleston and SJC also point out to another major aspect of processes of
corporate capture in regional training systems, which has been overlooked by scholars. This is
related to its multi-scalar nature. When comparing the processes of corporate capture in SJC and
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Charleston, it becomes clear that such processes can take place at different scales, result from
isolated initiatives or broader structural and institutional dynamics, and can be fostered either by
single firms and/or fractions of capital. For example, in SJC, processes of corporate capture are
isolated initiatives, and take place at the local scale—under the influence of a single firm,
Embraer—through informal and often one-on-on interactions. Different from SJC, in Charleston,
processes of corporate capture are linked to broader institutional dynamics, taking place at the
subnational scale, and are fostered under the influence of fractions of capital. The development
of its Career Academies, Apprenticeship programs and ReadySC happened under the influence
of South Carolina manufacturing fraction of capital. Additionally, processes of corporate capture
in Charleston also originate associated to isolated initiatives like in SJC, under the influence of a
single firm, which was illustrated through the case of Boeing and ReadySC.
Another major aspect of processes of corporate capture in regional training systems,
revealed in both cases, relates to how such processes have been understood beyond the binary
view of corporate capture versus externalization, and in relation to class and uneven
development. First, as Phelps (2008) argued, processes of corporate capture are always partial,
meaning that rarely will MNCs have the ability to fully capture the capacity of educational
institutions. What the cases of Charleston and SJC demonstrate is that educational institutions
will concomitantly develop firm-specific customized training initiatives along with general
training initiatives, unless of course, if such institutions are intentionally designed to provide
only customized training services, which is the case with ReadySC. The FATEC and the ITA in
SJC provide customized training services for Embraer along with training services that are
intended to provide skills for the business community in general. The same happens in
Charleston, where governance actors, seeking to address the skill needs of its business
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community, have worked with educational institutions (under the One-Region strategy goals) to
expand their training centers, programs, and courses. Therefore, such dynamics in both regions
imply that corporate capture in their regional training systems should be understood in relation to
the degree of duality existing between customized firm-specific and general-skills training
programs. As conceptualized on chapter three, regions are often based on what was termed dual
regional training systems. The existence of customized training programs, or the influence of
MNCs over the educational strategies of regions does not always imply a lack of training for the
general business community, or distortions in local educational agendas.
Moreover, the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston demonstrate a need
to go beyond the dichotomy MNCs interests versus government and business community
interests. Educational institutions can have their own interests in being captured. Such a capture
can result in a closer relationship with major local employers, build experience and knowledge
regarding the skill needs in the sector, and result in reforms in their existing educational
programs, courses, and initiatives. As Rikowski’s (2000) argued, education is a capitalist social
form, and educational institutions have their own interests. In this regard, the success of
educational institutions is partially dependent on having programs and courses that deliver
relevant and up-to-date skills for employers. In this context, corporate capture of certain
programs can allow educational institutions to work with large firms and to make their courses
more valuable in the local labor market.
Going beyond this dichotomy also involves considering how processes of corporate
capture are related to class and uneven development. This was particularly clear in Charleston
and SJC. As discussed, the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston reinforce class
inequality. In the case of SJC, the Embraer’s customized training program at the ITA, intended
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not only to address a skill gap in the market but also to replace high wage, long-term
employees—engineers—with highly skilled young engineers from the elite with much lower
wages and career plans. Somehow such a process of corporate capture initially acted as a form of
job “elitization” along with a form of job precariatization. In the case of Charleston, corporate
capture reinforces class inequality in regard to how careers academies and apprenticeship
programs are developed in low-income schools, where local actors seek to convince students and
their parents to pursue vocational careers. As Bowles and Gintis (1978) would claim, working
class jobs for working class students.
Another relationship of corporate capture to class, revealed in both cases, involves how
their processes of corporate capture, and more specifically in relation to customized training
programs, can result in training initiatives that do not provide possibilities for continuous, lifelong education, and can provide skills that are not transferable to other firms due to the highly
specific skill content of their curriculum, which are intended to meet the interests of single firm
interests. While this is not the case of the processes of corporate capture at the ITA and at the
FATEC, in Charleston, the corporate capture of ReadySC by Boeing resulted in the program
giving the company carte blanche in regard to the design of curriculums and courses. Training
for Boeing is highly specific, and many skills are non-transferable to other firms due to the
specificity of aerospace production. Such issues diminish workers’ empowerment by reducing
job mobility.
Finally, the processes of corporate capture in both regions, related to their customized
training programs, have serious issues concerning wage and benefit requirements. In the case of
SJC, these issues are even more drastic given that free-of-charge customized training is provided
by the ITA and the FATEC without any requirements for Embraer to pay high wages, offer
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benefits, or even hire registered students. In contrast to SJC, in South Carolina, state managers
have put some requirements for firms receiving ReadySC services. For example, firms must
generate a certain number of jobs, pay competitive wages, and offer permanent jobs with benefits
in order to receive free-of-charge customized training services. Although this can be seen as a
gain for the working class, “competitive wages” paid by Boeing in Charleston are 30% lower
than the wages paid in Everett, Washington. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency and
accountability regarding whether Boeing is meeting such requirements. No information is
available in this regard.
In conclusion, when the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston regional
training systems are put in comparison, greater details regarding corporate capture in regional
training systems are revealed. In this regard, comparing both cases not only allows this research
to provide further details of what corporate capture looks like, but also enables this research to
re-conceptualize it. As demonstrated, two major findings stand out. First, corporate capture is
multi-scale process. Second, the detrimental outcomes of corporate capture surpass the binary
view of corporate capture versus externalization and demands scholars to extend such analysis
beyond MNCs interests versus government interests to incorporate its relation to class and
uneven development. The table below summarizes these findings.

Table 10. Corporate Capture in the Regional Training Systems of SJC and Charleston.
Corporate Capture Charleston
São José dos Campos
Temporality
Temporary
Permanent
Multi-scale Process - Capture evolves at the subnational
- Corporate capture happens
scale and then it is expanded at the
locally. Different from South
local scale. Its evolution is intrinsically Carolina, it is not related to
connected to SC accumulation strategy bargaining events. Capture
in which corporate capture works as a
evolves organically through
form to attract MNCs and foster
informal one-on-one
structural coupling processes.
interactions. Embraer’s access
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to state managers is easily
Subnational Scale:
granted due to professional ties
- South Carolina’s Educational Strategy among local actors related to
and Agenda.
the aerospace sector and to the
- Training Programs such as Career
former national collective
Academies, ReadySC and
developmental project.
Apprenticeship Carolina.
Additional, Embraer’s
economic and political power
Local Scale:
magnifies its power of
- The Charleston Career Academies
influence.
Program.
- The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Local Scale:
Program.
- Program Designer Embraer at
- ReadySC Program under the
the FATEC.
“control” of MNCs such as Boeing.
- Embraer Program of
- Boeing’s influence over high schools Specialization in Engineering
such as R.B Stall High School.
at the ITA.
Incentives
- $33 Million.
- Cost-free recruiting.
- Cost-free recruiting.
- Cost-free customized
- Cost- and bureaucracy-free
training. However, Embraer
customized training for more than
pays for professors’ teaching
3,800 workers in manufacturing
hours.
positions.
Requirements for
- Payment of competitive wages,
- No requirements.
cost-free
provision of permanent jobs with
customized training benefits packages. But problematic.
Skill Transferability Low
Medium
Transparency
- Lack of transparency regarding
- Illegal association between
whether Boeing is meeting the
Embraer and the FATEC and
requirements established by the
the ITA (considered lobbying).
ReadySC Program.
- Lack of transparency regarding the
amount of training incentives given by
state managers.
Form of Relations Asymmetric relations
Symmetric relations
Uneven Class
- Low wages
- ITA: Training as a form of
Relations
- Poor benefits package
job “elitization” along with a
- No requirement for hiring locals for
form of job precariatization.
high edge jobs.
Training to replace engineers
- Vocational education and jobs
with high salaries and benefits
targeting the working class.
packages.
- Strong discourse to convince working - Workers typified as students
class students to pursue vocational
during training.
careers.
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- Militancy against unions such as
IAM. Maintain the right-to-work state
status.
Source: Author.

Conclusion
This chapter sought to put in perspective the major findings of this research in regard to
the processes of corporate capture in Charleston and SJC. By contrasting the major similarities
and differences in the findings of both cases, I attempted to abstract some major conclusions in
regard to the relationship between the state, local forms of governance, and processes of
corporate capture. Regarding the state and its relationship to processes of corporate capture, my
empirical evidence suggests that in SJC and Charleston, such processes are related to broader
causes than levels of coordination and asymmetrical informal, being intrinsic and structurally
related to their state and their state accumulation strategy, which provide structural advantages
for MNCs such as Boeing and Embraer to advance their interests.
In regard to whether the local forms of governance of SJC and Charleston reinforce or
minimize processes of corporate capture, a correlation between their states—more specifically
their form, accumulation strategy and state selectivity—and the tendency of their local forms of
governance to reinforce corporate capture was established. As revealed the tendency of their
local forms of governance to reinforce corporate capture is related to their states, the mechanisms
through which skill gaps are identified and addressed, to the multiple interests of governance
actors in the commodification of education and workers as well as the political and economic
power of MNCs like Embraer and Boeing.
Finally, in this chapter, by comparing the processes of corporate capture in the regional
training systems of Charleston and SJC, I sought to demonstrate how such processes involve
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dynamics at different scales and go beyond the traditional dualistic view of corporate capture,
being related to uneven development and class relations.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In today’s globalized world, the power of influence of multinational corporations over the
state and society is significant. MNCs have become giant global corporations whose size in
terms of value added is greater than many nation states (Chandler and Mazlish 2005). In the last
decades, the power of corporations has drastically increased not only due to mergers and
acquisitions—which have resulted in some of the largest conglomerates of corporations in the
world such as Unilever—but also due to how the liberalization of international trade has
culminated in more fluidity of MNCs across nations (Chandler and Mazlish 2005; Hudson 2011;
Featherstone and Mackinnon 2017).
This context allows MNCs to expand their influence over different areas of our society.
Several studies have demonstrated how corporations influence, according to their interests, how
schools, colleges and universities educate, how states design their environmental laws, how
states regulate the use of pesticides, or the commercialization of certain medications, among
many other things (Chandler and Mazlish 2005). The influence of large corporations over
governments across the world has even led scholars to denounce them as a threat to democracy,
conceptualizing this process as the privatization of democracy (Berrón and González 2016).
One facet of this is related to how MNCs are influential today in regard to how states
have re-organized their roles, their functionalities and their operations to find ways not only to
maintain the firms that are well-established in their regions, but also to attract new ones. One
particular area is related to how states have actively advanced the commodification of education
by, for example, aligning their educational agendas and strategies with businesses, or by creating
training initiatives and programs as incentives to attract and retain firms (Markusen and Nesse
2007). Many scholars have conceptualized such an influence of MNCs over the state as
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processes of corporate capture (Phelps 2008). It is in this context that this dissertation was
developed.
As stated previously, the main goal of this research was twofold. First, it was to analyze
the existing processes of corporate capture related to Boeing South Carolina and Embraer in the
regional training systems of Charleston and SJC respectively. Second, this research sought to
investigate how SJC and Charleston forms of state and governance accounted for differences in
the evolution of corporate capture. In this respect, throughout this study, I strived to answer three
main questions.
In the first question, it was asked: Do Boeing South Carolina and Embraer foster
processes of corporate capture in the regional training systems of Charleston and SJC? In this
regard, I believe this research not only answered this inquiry but was also able to advance the
theoretical and empirical understanding of processes of corporate capture in regional training
systems. As revealed, Boeing and Embraer do foster processes of corporate capture in the
regional training systems of Charleston and SJC. In the case of Charleston, this research
disclosed how manufacturing MNCs have influenced the educational agenda and strategy of
South Carolina, fostering for example the creation of different programs such as Career
Academies, ReadySC, and Apprenticeship Carolina. Moreover, this study explored how Boeing
was able to obtain several training incentives, exploiting, for example, the institutional capacity
of ReadySC, a public program from South Carolina that committed to provide customized
training, free-of-charge, to Boeing. In the case, of SJC, this research revealed how Embraer
fostered processes of corporate capture in the FATEC and the ITA, influencing these educational
institutions to establish customized programs that could deliver highly specific skills, also freeof-charge, for Embraer.
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When analyzing these existing processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston, this
research realized that such processes were much more nuanced than what the FDI studies and
GPN literature had presented (see Phelps 2000, 2008; Dawley 2007; Phelps & Fuller 2010). For
example, processes of corporate capture in both regions were related to multiple scales, were
marked by illegalities and a lack of transparency, and had clear links to class relations, going
beyond the view of government interests versus MNCs interests often stressed by mainstream
literature (Phelps 2000, 2008; Almond et al. 2014). This required this study to rethink the term
theoretically. Engaging with Neo-Marxist scholars, this research sought to reconceptualize the
concept of corporate capture in terms of uneven development. Such a reconceptualization also
attempted to develop an understanding of corporate capture that is not dualistic (meaning that
corporate capture excludes the existence of processes of externalization) and is more sensible to
questions of scale. Empirically, this analysis was able to incorporate a much more detailed
description of what is corporate capture in regional training systems.
In my second research question, I inquired: How does the state in each region account for
differences in how corporate capture evolves? When examining the evolution of processes of
corporate capture in the regional training systems of SJC and Charleston and its relation to their
state forms, it was also clear the need to rethink mainstream literature explanations. In this
respect, as demonstrated in the second chapter, the GPN literature and FDI studies had a
problematic approach to explain the relationship between the state and processes of corporate
capture based on the lack of specific assets and low levels of institutional coordination
(Mackinnon 2012; Coe & Hess 2011; Yeung 2016; Phelps 2000, 2008). As FDI researchers
claim, liberal states are more prone to capture than developmental states, given that such a lack
of coordination results in an absence of initiatives fostering processes of externalization such as
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cluster formation (Phelps 2008). The processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston posed
a challenge to such conceptualizations. Corporate capture is present in both states, even in the
state of South Carolina, which as described on chapter four, is marked by high degrees of
coordination. Additionally, the state of South Carolina, according to its state accumulation
strategy, seeks to be intentionally captured in some cases in order to foster structural coupling
processes. Moreover, the case of SJC revealed that the “classic” developmental states are also
prone to corporate capture. Both cases also pointed to the need for an approach more sensible to
state scale, which could break with mainstream broad generalizations. Therefore, corporate
capture could not be only a matter of existence/lack of specific assets or state coordination.
Capture evolves in much more complex ways and at multiple state scales.
In this regard, drawing from the variegated capitalism literature as well as Neo-Marxists
readings of the state, this research developed an approach, which could explain why and how
corporate capture evolves in relation to the state. Answering the question posed, I demonstrated
that in SJC and Charleston the evolution of their processes of corporate capture is intrinsically
related to how their state accumulation strategies privilege manufacturing MNCs, providing them
structural advantages. Furthermore, I revealed that such an evolution happens related to their
state forms and degrees of autonomy, thus, at multiple state scales and through different
mechanisms.
In Charleston, processes of corporate capture in training initiatives evolved at multiple
scales but mostly at the subnational. As disclosed, the state of South Carolina has developed an
institutional apparatus that privileges manufacturing corporations, given that accumulation is
pursued based on structural coupling processes. Such corporations have influenced the state of
South Carolina, advancing their interests in regard, for example, to vocational training. In this
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respect, the state of South Carolina in the last few years went through a drastic change, further
aligning its educational agenda and strategy with the interests of MNCs. This in turn has resulted
in the creation of several vocational training programs, which I depicted as examples of
corporate capture. I argued that the programs ReadySC, Careers Academies and Apprenticeship
Carolina were intentionally created to be captured by MNCs as a form to foster structural
coupling. Therefore, capture in this case was not about a lack of specific assets or state
coordination but the opposite. This research went further to demonstrate that corporate capture in
South Carolina is related not only to its manufacturing fraction of capital but also to single
MNCs such as Boeing. In this particular case, I revealed that the ReadySC Program was
automatically captured by Boeing, given that the company met its requirements to receive
incentives. Nonetheless, as demonstrated, Boeing advanced the degree of corporate capture
regarding ReadySC program to a higher level, receiving many more benefits and incentives than
would a regular business from the local business community.
In the case of SJC, I unveiled how Embraer’s processes of corporate capture evolved also
related to its accumulation strategy. However, the Embraer case shows that the evolution of
corporate capture happened through different mechanisms and at a different scale. As it was
argued, Embraer’s evolution of corporate capture at the ITA and the FATEC happened through
an organic form. As disclosed, the Brazilian developmental state, under the collective
developmental project, fostered an organic coupling process in SJC, which was based on the coevolution/co-creation of the CTA, the IPD, the ITA, and later on, Embraer. Such a co-evolution
established a professional aerospace community with strong ties. Main local actors in the state,
educational institutions, firms, research institutes, and not-for-profit organizations have often
worked or graduated at the ITA and/or worked for an aerospace firm. This created a professional

250

bond among local actors, which has granted Embraer access to educational institutions and an
easiness to establish customized training partnerships with public local educational institutions
seen as processes of corporate capture. Different from Charleston, capture in SJC involves
informal symmetric power relations at the local scale and did not emerge as part of a bargaining
event.
Finally, in my third question, I established the following inquiry: Do the local forms of
governance of each region reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in the regional
training systems of SJC and Charleston? When analyzing my empirical data in order to answer
this question, it was clear that mainstream literature in regard to two main approaches was
problematic: Workforce development systems and local forms of governance. First, mainstream
literature has problematically depicted local forms of governance as collective modes of
coordination, as marked by trust and reciprocity, shared power and interests, and as having a
strong autonomy from the state was problematic (Blanco 2015; Davies 2011). However, SJC and
Charleston forms of governance have a strong relationship to their state forms and accumulation
strategy and are marked by hierarchical power relations. Regarding workforce development
systems, the GPN literature has conducted their studies on a conceptualization based on market
relations, overlooking the contradictory nature of labor and labor markets (Gereffi and
Fernandez-Stark 2016; De Vries et al. 2016; Chin and Liu 2014; Fernandez-Stark et al. 2011).
The workforce development systems of SJC and Charleston were contradictory, requiring
discursive and institutional regulation. An analysis based on demand and supply of labor and
training would not be sufficient to explain the dynamics taking place in both regions.
In this regard, this study engaged with Neo-Marxist conceptualizations of labor,
governance, and the state to address such an issue (Jonas 1996; Phelps & Wood 2006; Lovering
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2011; Block 1987; Offe 1984). This research developed an approach to local forms of
governance and regional training systems that could provide a more refined explanation of the
training dynamics of both regions. This was important for this research to demonstrate whether
SJC and Charleston forms of governance reinforce or minimize processes of corporate capture in
their regional training systems. I argued that the tendency of SJC’s and Charleston’s local forms
of governance to reinforce processes of corporate capture is related to their state form,
accumulation strategy, and type of state selectivity. Moreover, it was also claimed that even in
regions where their forms of governance tend to minimize processes of corporate capture, MNCs
are still able to influence and capture regional training systems despite subnational states’
accumulation strategies and local forms of governance prioritizing domestic SMEs. This is due
to the multiple interests of governance actors involved in the commodification of education and
workers, as well as, the economic and political power of MNCs.
This argument about corporate capture has implications in regard to the nature of
capitalism and the state. Despite Charleston and SJC being located in different national and
subnational states and being marked by distinctive contexts and backgrounds, there was a
relative similarity of the outcomes of corporate capture in their regional training systems. Such a
similarity points out to how corporate capture is a structural feature of capitalism and the
capitalist state. Acknowledging corporate capture as a structural feature of capitalism and the
capitalist state enforces the importance of the concept of corporate capture. This is because the
concept not only accounts for the nuances and degrees of corporate power and influence (MNCs
and fractions of capital) over the interests of states and local business communities, but also
acknowledges the dynamics and outcomes for the working class. Therefore, the concept is useful
to account for the multiple actors and their interests around policies of inward investments, and
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more specifically, around training policies and initiatives. Moreover, as conceptualized in this
dissertation, the concept of corporate capture is sensitive to the multiple state scales in which
corporate power and influence take place.
In SJC, I claimed that its local form of governance reinforces processes of corporate
capture. This happens due to a combination of factors: How skill needs are identified and
addressed based on clientelistic relations, how the local existing aerospace professional bond
grants to firms easier access and cooperation with educational institutions, and how Embraer’s
economic and political power allows the company to take advantage of such features. As
revealed, based on clientelistic relations—strengthened by the existing aerospace professional
bond among local actors, as described before—skill needs are identified through informal oneon-one interactions among governance actors. Based on the same relations, skill needs are
addressed through direct interaction between firms such as Embraer and educational institutions.
Personal/professional ties are important for actors to present their interests and to be attended by
state managers. In this context, clientelistic relations in local governance, the existence of
professional ties related to the aerospace sector along with Embraer’s economic and political
power allow the firm to influence educational institutions, and thus, to reinforce corporate
capture. The lack of formal studies and strategies to identify and address skill needs at the labor
market, benefits single firm influence such as Embraer over public educational institutions.
In the case of Charleston, I also argued that its local form of governance reinforces
processes of corporate capture. However, it was acknowledged that local actors have, although
problematically, attempted to minimize such processes of capture. As was claimed, Charleston’s
local form of governance reinforces processes of corporate capture by implementing and
expanding higher-state programs seen as forms of corporate capture. To illustrate my argument
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two examples in this regard were given: The Charleston Youth Apprenticeship Program and the
Charleston Career Academies Program. In the case of the Charleston Career Academies
Program, it has allowed, for example, Boeing to exert influence over high schools vocational
training programs such as at the R.B Stall High School.
One major difference from the SJC’s local form of governance resided in the fact that
skill needs are identified and addressed based on a different political culture (and legacy).
Having a political culture based on urban entrepreneurialism, the local form of governance in
Charleston has a much more technocratic and broad approach to identify and address its region’s
skill needs. Skill needs are identified based on sector-level studies and collective governance
meetings, and are mostly addressed through formal four-year strategies such as the One-Region.
Such studies and strategies serve as a tool for governance actors such as the CMCC and the
CRDA to present the region’s skills needs to local educational institutions and state managers.
Governance actors such as CMCC use these studies and the One-Region strategy to influence
educational institutions, so that they can reformulate, create or expand their courses and
programs. Governance actors also used such studies and the One-Region strategy to represent
(i.e. “to educate”) the skill needs of the region to state managers, and more specifically, as a tool
for lobbying for investments, expansion of educational institutions and programs, creation of
new programs, courses and training initiatives, among others.
The existence of sector-level formal studies and strategies have the potential to decrease
single firms’ influence over the educational agenda and training initiatives of regions, as scholars
such as Phelps (2008) have showed. However, as I argued, attempts to minimize Boeing’s
corporate capture of ReadySC Program have been problematic. Attempts to minimize Boeing’s
corporate capture of ReadySC have focused on long-term training initiatives. Additionally, the
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responsibility regarding issues of corporate capture related to low wages and lack of
transparency have been transferred to individuals and to the market. Local governance actors not
only lack the state power at the local scale to address these issues, but also believe that providing
the right skills along with firms’ competition can deal with such wage problems.
This research, therefore, by engaging with labor geography studies and Neo-Marxists
scholars attempted to contribute to the FDI and GPN literatures, more specifically, in discussions
regarding the “dark side” of strategic coupling processes related to issues of labor and uneven
development (Mackinnon 2012; Bair and Werner 2015). As scholars have stated, the GPN
literature has overlooked these questions (Rutherford et al. 2018; Gutelius 2016; Coe 2015; Bair
and Werner 2015). By addressing the relationship between the state, governance, and processes
of corporate capture, this study hopes to contribute to other studies and scholars who have
worked toward addressing similar issues. Moreover, this research’s contribution to studies of
corporate capture related to regional training systems can serve as an initial reflection (and for
action) for state managers to rethink their practices when bargaining with MNCs. More
specifically, this study by bringing some light to how MNCs have exploited the institutional
capacities of regions in regard to training initiatives, hopes to provide some considerations—
although not so direct—of what could be done to ameliorate issues related to labor. Additionally,
this research calls our attention in regard to the need for the working class through its
representatives such as unions to be more proactive, and thus more involved in MNCs/states
bargaining events in terms of demanding, as part of the negotiations, better working conditions
and more inclusive training initiatives in regard to gender, race, and ethnicity.
Worth noting, in my attempt to answer the research questions above mentioned, this
study met several difficulties, having various theoretical and empirical deficiencies. Empirically,
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some of the deficiencies presented in this research is associated to its task of comparing the
evolution of corporate capture and its relation to the state of two regions located in different
contexts. First, it was a challenge to compare the processes of corporate capture between two
different forms of state. While the federal government in Brazil is much more active than the
federal government in the United States, we see the opposite in regard to their subnational states.
South Carolina was a major actor in the processes of corporate capture in Charleston, while the
state of São Paulo had a much less significant role. Charleston was also much more active than
SJC. In this respect, instead of starting this study with bounded units, comparing SJC and
Charleston, their subnational and national states, this research departed with the processes and
practices under study, more specifically their processes of corporate capture, and then their
relation to the state. Yet, at many times this study had to deal with issues when comparing
distinct realities and contexts.
Such a difficulty was not only related to differences in state power and structure, but also
to the task of comparing the evolution of corporate capture in both regions in relation to their
accumulation strategies, which had a historical mismatch. As described, the evolution of
corporate capture in SJC was related to the Brazilian import-substitution accumulation strategy,
which was replaced almost 40 years ago, while the evolution of corporate capture in Charleston
is associated to its current accumulation strategy. Therefore, it was complex to compare issues
that are related to different historical moments. Moreover, I compared regions with different
levels of maturity regarding their labor markets and regional training systems. Boeing was
established in Charleston in 2011, therefore, its influence, in a context in which the aerospace
labor market and training system of Charleston are just being built, is much clear than in the case
of SJC, where its regional training systems and labor market are well established. This can lead
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this research to consider that Boeing is much more influential than Embraer in their regions
without contemplating that such an influence resides in the emerging aerospace labor market of
Charleston.
This research also draws only on two case studies in order to make broad claims, and
although this study analyzed other empirical studies to support its claims, more empirical studies
are needed to strength and confirm the findings presented in this dissertation, and to assess its
established theoretical approach and arguments. Hopefully, such an issue will serve as
motivation to stimulate more studies in this regard.
Another issue is related to a lack of interviews with some key actors. First, a small
number of interviews were conducted with representatives of aerospace SMEs in both regions. In
total, six firms’ representatives were interviewed, three from each region. Many researchers
analyze matters of corporate capture based on the interest of MNCs versus the interests of
governments along with the interests of their local business communities. In this respect, this
research was not able to collect significant data in regard to the interests of the local business
community of both regions. Several attempts were made to contact firms’ representatives;
however, the response rate was very low. Governance actors, public educational institutions and
state managers provided substantial information in this matter but still, having more interviews
with aerospace SMEs could enrich this research substantially. Second, as stated in the
introduction, this research was not able to have interviews with representatives from Boeing.
This is an important limitation encountered in this research. Boeing’s representatives were
contacted through several mechanisms such as phone calls, emails, and in-person. Some
participants were also requested to ask Boeing’s staff for an interview. All requests were denied.
Boeing’s refusal to participate in this research reinforces one of the claims presented in this
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research: Processes of corporate capture often involves issues of transparency. Boeing has
received from the state of South Carolina nearly one billion dollars in incentives and subsidies,
still the company refuses to share information that is of public interest. The impossibility of
collecting information directly from Boeing’s representatives made the task of understanding
Boeing’s training strategies, influence over South Carolina’s and Charleston’s educational
strategy agenda, skill deficiencies, and problems regarding the workforce much more difficult.
Nonetheless, this does not invalidate this research. This research sought to mitigate this issue by
directing questions related to Boeing to all research participants, and by analyzing secondary
documents such as newspaper articles, yet, this still represents a significant a problem. In the
case of Embraer, its representative was more than willing to participate in an interview, and this
might be related to the predominance of clientelistic relations, as described previously, which
prevail in the local political and economic culture of SJC.
Theoretically, one of the issues concerns the concept of corporate capture. Corporate
capture cannot be easily measured or quantified. As the market requires state intervention in
order to function, MNCs are always influencing the state and its actions. Therefore, what is the
point at which the influence of MNCs can be considered or not considered a process of corporate
capture? Additionally, the processes of corporate capture in SJC and Charleston did not always
have the same resemblance. For example, corporate capture in SJC is not related to processes of
corporate capture at its subnational state (São Paulo) like in the case of Charleston and South
Carolina. Another example concerns the differences in levels of skill specificity provided in
these regions’ customized training programs. Training and skills in Charleston are much more
firm-specific—therefore less transferable—than in SJC. This means that establishing variables to
measure whether corporate capture exists in different regions can pose a challenge, given that the
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ways corporations influence the state in terms of education and training can greatly vary across
space, and thus, corporate capture can present different characteristics. Yet, in both locations,
MNCs do influence their states’ regional training systems.
Another issue is related to how the term corporate capture can mislead readers to a view
that such a process only involves the interests of MNCs being advanced, neutralizing for
example, the interests of states and public educational institutions. However, as the cases of SJC
and Charleston revealed, corporate capture is more a process of accommodation than imposition,
involving multiple interests. The state and public institutions also have their own interests.
Another theoretical deficiency in this research concerns its focus on the relation between
capital and the state, which resulted in a lack of attention toward the role of the working class in
processes of corporate capture. As some scholars have argued, such a disregard concerning the
role (or agency) of workers in shaping the state is a common feature found in the work of
scholars engaging with Marxist state theorists (Clarke 1991; Kelly 1999). This is the particular
case of Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (Pfister 2004; Las Heras 2018; Kelly 1999).
Jessop’s approach, by placing emphasis on the overdetermining role of capitalist structures,
undermines the role that individual and collective actors (and more specifically of the
‘dominated’, such as the working class or social movements) have in the emergence and shaping
of hegemonic state projects (Pfister 2004; Las Heras 2018). In other words, Jessop overlooks
how the state continuously interacts with the ‘dominated’, responding to and therefore being
shaped by their interests. As Davies (2013) stated, this is problematic because hegemony and
consent under hegemonic state projects tend to be fragile, and often encounter resistance and
confrontation from the ‘dominated’, who actions can lead to counter-hegemonic projects due to
their emancipatory power.
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As stated before, this illustrates one theoretical—and consequently empirical—deficiency
of this research, which by engaging with Jessop and other Marxist state theorists, lacked
attention to how workers in SJC and Charleston—who have been part of the processes of
corporate capture—perceive, conform, or react to such processes. In this regard—and although
unions’ representatives were interviewed—this research did not conduct interviews with
workers, for example, to inquire about their experiences, views and evaluation regarding the
training programs under study (such as main problems), or about whether workers push their
own agenda, find ways to resist existing detrimental outcomes of corporate capture. Interviewing
workers could also be of great contribution, for example, to further analyze whether Boeing has
met ReadySC program’s requirements such as hiring trainees in permanent positions, paying
competitive wages, etc. Therefore, a significant problem that this research acknowledges is that
the working class and its representatives were scarcely given voice, and their agency barely
recognized. Such an issue calls for the adoption of a more refined approach to labor agency, and
provides some potential empirical guidance for future research.
The first potential topic for future research could be to analyze national and subnational
states that are marked by a strong influence of workers in the functioning and design of their skill
training systems and curriculum (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2011; Rutherford el al. 2018;
Rutherford 1998). That is the case of national states such as Germany and Switzerland (the socalled, by VoC scholars, coordinated market economies), or subnational states like Quebec, and
even some sectors such as the steel sector in Canada, which are marked by strong union
representation and involvement in training initiatives (Deissinger & Gonon 2016; Busemeyer &
Trampusch 2011; Rutherford et al. 2018; Rutherford 1998). For example, in Germany, unions
and works council work with the state and capital (local chambers) to negotiate skill
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improvement and qualification, codetermining its skill training system (Franz & Soskice 2005).
Unions have a crucial role in advising the government on vocational and education training
decisions, and thus, in the design and updating of training regulation for occupational profiles.
Unions in Germany understand vocational training as a public issue, and thus, a matter of
education rather than employment (Deissinger & Gonon 2016). In such a model, vocational
training provides marketable/transferable certified skills (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2011; Franz
& Soskice 2005). In this context even though this research sees corporate capture as a structural
feature of the capitalist state, and thus, a common aspect of European coordinated market
economies (see Tansey 2018), it would be interesting to examine whether workers, in states with
strong labor representation in training like Germany, are able to minimize, or offset FDI
processes of corporate capture in their regional training systems. In such a context, are workers
involved in FDI training initiatives incentives, and able to minimize corporate capture in
training?
The second potential topic for future research could be to analyze how labor can have a
crucial role in amending processes of corporate capture even in more liberal forms of state like in
the United States, where labor representation is often weak. Scholars such as Rutherford (1998)
revealed, that even in more liberal states such as Canada, workers can have in some sectors
greater power to advance their agenda, for example, developing more labor friendly training
systems. For example, the author demonstrates how the Canadian steel sector has large corporate
actors more opened to dealing with unions whereas in the automobile sector, companies are often
hostile to union involvement in training, even when having industry-wide skill transferability is
of their interest (Rutherford 1998). As this research overlooked the fact that labor, as an
independent actor, can have an important role in invoking counter-narratives and pushing back
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processes of corporate capture, it would be interesting to examine cases in which workers and
their representatives were successfully able to oppose MNCs’ processes of corporate capture.
One potential case for future research could be the case of Amazon and its bargaining event with
New York City. This well-known case could demonstrate how workers and their representatives
can take part in MNCs’ negotiations with states, contesting and resisting the influence and power
of MNCs over the state, and thus, minimizing processes of corporate capture (see Goodman and
Weise 2019). In this case, labor organizers, progressive groups and some city politicians worked
together, using the New York City’s $3 billion offer in subsidies to Amazon as an asset to push
the company to commit to union jobs (Riley 2019). Although resulting in Amazon withdrawing
its deal with New York, such a study has potential to shed some light in regard to how labor can
amend processes of corporate capture in more liberal forms of state like in the United States.
To conclude, some of the deficiencies present in this research point to the potential
theoretical and empirical areas that I would like to engage in my future research. As stated, more
theoretical and empirical research is needed in regard to how different actors with differential
powers, such as labor, the state and MNCs, have important roles and capabilities to advance their
interests and ideologies concerning how skills are socially constructed. More specifically, how
workers are able to push their agenda over issues of corporate in regional training systems. This
also involves the need to equally recognize the importance of geographic and historical
specificity of such processes.
This research then, joins other scholars who have begun to give greater attention to the
tensions around labor that emerge from the differential powers of key actors (Rutherford et al.
2018; Coe 2015; Werner 2018), and provides some relevant points for future research. Finally,
by engaging with the GPN literature and attending some of its scholars’ call to explore the “dark
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side” of strategic coupling (Mackinnon 2012; Bair and Werner 2015), this research hopes to
contribute to such a topic as well as to spark more discussions in regard to how GPNs, the state,
MNCs, and labor are related to uneven development and issues of corporate capture in regional
training systems.
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